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ABSTRACT
In recent years, there is an increasing interest in distributed machine learning. On one
hand, distributed machine learning is motivated by assigning the training workload to mul-
tiple devices for acceleration and better throughput. On the other hand, there are machine-
learning tasks requiring distributed training locally on remote devices due to the privacy
concerns. Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) and its variants are commonly used for train-
ing large-scale deep neural networks, as well as the distributed training.
Unlike machine learning on a single device, distributed machine learning requires collabo-
ration and communication among the devices, which incur the new challenges: 1) the heavy
communication overhead can be the bottleneck that slows down the training; 2) the un-
reliable communication and weaker control over the remote entities makes the distributed
system vulnerable to systematic failures and malicious attacks.
In this dissertation, we aim to find new approaches to make distributed SGD faster and
more secure. We present four main parts of research. We first study approaches for reducing
the communication overhead, including message compression and infrequent synchronization.
Then, we investigate the possibility to combining asynchrony with infrequent synchroniza-
tion. To address security in distributed SGD, we study the tolerance to Byzantine failures.
Finally, we explore the possibility of combining both communication efficiency and security
techniques into one distributed learning system.
Specifically, we present the following techniques to improve the communication efficiency
and security of distributed SGD: 1) a technique called “error reset” to adapt both infrequent
synchronization and message compression to distributed SGD, to reduce the communication
overhead; 2) federated optimization in asynchronous mode; 3) a framework of score-based
approaches for Byzantine tolerance in distributed SGD; 4) a distributed learning system
integrating all these three techniques. The proposed system provides communication re-
duction, both synchronous and asynchronous training, and Byzantine tolerance, with both
theoretical guarantees and empirical evaluations.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed the increasing attention to distributed machine learning al-
gorithms [1, 2, 3, 4]. The reason to train machine-learning models in a distributed manner
varies from case to case.
A common motivation is the rapid growth of the sizes of machine-learning models and
datasets, which makes the model training increasingly time-consuming. Deep neural net-
works have achieved remarkable success in recent years [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. To achieve bet-
ter performance, increasingly larger datasets and neural networks are used, which require
longer time for training. In modern deployments, it is common to use multiple machines/de-
vices (GPUs) in public clouds or private clusters to improve the throughput and accelerate
the training [1, 3, 4, 10].
Furthermore, there is a trend to increase not only the sizes, but also the diversity of the
datasets, so that the data collections are more informative and representative. To do so, we
can train a global model on the data from multiple sources, such as massive edge devices [11,
12], and different organizations [13, 14, 15]. Edge devices/IoT such as smartphones, wearable
devices, sensors, and smart homes are increasingly generating massive, diverse, and private
data, which cannot be collected onto a central datacenter due to privacy concerns. For
the cross-silo settings, different companies or organizations can not share their data due to
confidentiality or legal constraints. In either case, the training data are required to stay
in local storage for privacy preservation. As a result, the training data are decentrally
stored and training tasks are deployed locally on edge devices or inside each organization.
Typically, the entities in such scenarios are geographically far away from each other, which
raises problems not only in the slow communication, but also in the security, since the remote
entities are less reliable and more vulnerable to failures and malicious attacks.
In this dissertation, we focus on Distributed Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) and its
variants, which are commonly used for training large-scale deep neural networks.
The main difference between vanilla SGD and distributed SGD is that, in distributed
SGD, there are multiple processes called workers, which collaborate by communicating with
each other to train a global model. Thus, other than computation, communication plays a
significant role in distributed SGD, which raises unique problems in both theory and practice,
especially when the number of workers increases.
In distributed SGD, the communication overhead is a potential bottleneck of the perfor-
mance of the systems. No matter how the workers are synchronized, the overall communi-
cation overhead increases with the number of workers, which results in significant burden
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on the network, and makes it difficult for the distributed systems to achieve the ideal scal-
ability. Furthermore, when the workers are geographically far away from each other, the
communication is extremely slow.
The ways for the workers to collaborate and synchronize with each other also has a signif-
icant influence on the system performance. The two prevailing approaches are synchronous
training and asynchronous training. Synchronous training requires, periodically, the global
updates to be blocked until all the workers reach the same status. In contrast, for asyn-
chronous training, the global model parameters are updated immediately whenever a worker
posts new updates. Typically, synchronous training is more stable with less noise, but it is
also slower due to the global barrier across all the workers. Asynchronous training is faster,
but any asynchronous training technique needs to address instability and noisiness due to
staleness.
Besides the higher-level algorithms and system design, the lower-level communication
frameworks and implementation also play an important role in the performance of distributed
SGD. There exists multiple frameworks that enable communication and synchronization
between the workers, such as the message passing interface (MPI) [16] that provides collective
communication APIs for communication, and the parameter server architecture [17, 18, 19,
20, 21] that uses central servers to gather and broadcast messages with the workers. The
former is more efficient in synchronizing dense tensors with relatively low bandwidth, while
the latter is more flexible when supporting sparse tensors and asynchronous training, but
requires more computation and communication resources.
Furthermore, compared to vanilla SGD, distributed SGD is more vulnerable to attacks and
hardware/software failures that can happen on the remote entities and the communication
media. The risk of having attacks and failures also increases with the number of workers.
Although many of these topics have been studied in the literature of traditional distributed
systems, the differences in the performance metrics between the traditional distributed sys-
tems and distributed machine learning raise new problems, which needs new solutions for
the emerging distributed machine-learning scenarios.
In this dissertation, we focus on making the communication more efficient and secure for
distributed SGD. We introduce new techniques to reduce the communication overhead, make
synchronization more flexible, and tolerate malicious attacks, which are especially designed




As outlined, the main difference between vanilla SGD and distributed SGD is the com-
munication and collaboration between the workers, which raises the new challenges and
motivates our work. On one hand, the communication incurs the overhead additional to
the computation, which is a potential bottleneck of the distributed learning systems. On
the other hand, the communication is vulnerable to systematic failures or data transmission
from malicious entities.
Compared to traditional distributed systems, distributed learning systems have unique
characteristics. While the traditional distributed systems typically require strict consis-
tency, consensus between the workers, and solutions with exact results, distributed machine
learning allows noisy and inexact solutions. Inherited from the nature of robustness and ran-
domness in the machine-learning algorithms, the tolerance to small errors and noise brings
up not only new problems, but also new solutions for distributed machine learning.
In this dissertation, we focus on the two important problems in distributed machine learn-
ing:
• Communication efficiency. A common issue of distributed machine learning is that,
when scaling to a large number of workers, the communication overhead overwhelms and
becomes the major bottleneck. By increasing the number of workers, the overall time
consumed by computation will be reduced, thus reducing the training time. However, in
practice, it is difficult to achieve the ideal scalability of distributed SGD due to the com-
munication overhead, which increases with the number of workers. Furthermore, when the
workers and servers in the learning system are geographically far away from each other,
any communication is extremely slow. To make things worse, synchronization among
massive numbers of workers can be slow or even congest the network. Thus, to achieve
better scalability and faster training, it is necessary to reduce the communication over-
head and relax the synchronization. Fortunately, unlike traditional distributed algorithms,
machine-learning algorithms are naturally robust to small errors and noise [22]. Thus, the
combination of machine learning and distributed systems permits using lossy compression
and synchronization relaxation in order to efficiently exploit the robustness. For example,
SignSGD [23] truncates every floating-point number to 1 bit to compress the communi-
cation, and HOGWILD! [24, 25] asynchronously updates each coordinate of the model
parameters.
• Security with unreliable workers. In distributed machine learning, one of the most
difficult problems today is security. In some cases, it is difficult to verify the identities or
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behaviors of the workers, especially for federated learning. It is also possible that some of
the workers are hacked and injected by poisoned data, or the messages are manipulated
in the communication media. In the worst cases, some workers may take arbitrary actions
or modify their portion of the data and/or models arbitrarily. In addition to adversar-
ial attacks on purpose, it is also common for the workers to have hardware or software
failures, such as bit-flipping in the memory or communication media. In such scenarios,
we assume that the workers are unreliable, and need to protect the system from potential
attacks and failures. To be more specific, we consider the worse-case threat model, where
the faulty nodes release arbitrary values. Such a threat model is also called the “Byzantine
failure” model in distributed systems [26]. While the Byzantine tolerance in the tradi-
tional distributed systems aims to reaching consensus [27, 28], the Byzantine tolerance
in machine learning has a very different definition. Due to the nature of robustness, the
machine-learning algorithms accept any solution that converges to a small region around
the optimal, which requires no consensus, and allows small fluctuation. Such a relaxed
condition of fault tolerance opens the world of Byzantine-tolerant machine learning algo-
rithms to new possibilities. For example, robust estimations of the average [29, 30] are
used to produce Byzantine-tolerant but inexact solutions for distributed SGD.
As motivations of this dissertation, we consider the following scenarios:
• Centralized learning with unreliable workers and system failures. In distributed
systems, it is common for the workers to have hardware or software failures, which causes
error in the messages between the nodes. A traditional solution is to assign the same tasks
to multiple nodes and validate the replicated results [31]. The replicated tasks waste the
computation resources, and make the distributed systems less efficient. In our work, we
aim to produce reliable results without using replication techniques.
• Federated learning on unreliable edge devices or communication media. In
federated learning, the servers have limited control over the users’ behavior. To protect
privacy, the users are in general anonymous to the servers. Although it is possible to
verify the identity of workers/devices [32], nefarious users can feed poisoned data with
abnormal behaviors without backdooring the operating system. For example, in the model
training of next word prediction [33] on mobile phones, which is a well-known application of
federated learning, the malicious users can easily feed random or adversarial training data
(sentences) to the trainers, which results in bad prediction models. Furthermore, messages
from the edge devices to the central server can be manipulated during transmission. As a
result, some workers may push harmful updates to the servers.
4
1.2 THESIS STATEMENT
The thesis statement is composed of four parts:
1. Communication: it is possible to reduce the communication overhead for distributed
stochastic gradient descent and maintain good training convergence and accuracy.
2. Asynchrony: it is possible to use asynchronous training in distributed SGD with re-
duced communication.
3. Security: It is possible to protect the distributed learning system from malicious attacks
on the workers, and establish theoretical guarantees in the worse cases.
4. Joint communication efficiency and security: it is possible to design and implement a
distributed learning system that integrates both communication efficiency and security.
In this dissertation, we first investigate how to improve the performance of communication-
efficient distributed SGD. Specifically, we present a new framework, error reset, to adapt
arbitrary compressors for distributed SGD, and achieve better convergence than the previous
work when aggressive compressors are used. The key idea is to apply the residual error of
the compression immediately to the local models, which results in bifurcated local models
instead of cached compression error. We show the empirical and theoretical analysis of SGD
with error reset.
Then, we explore the possibility of combining asynchronous SGD with infrequent commu-
nication. The idea is to design an asynchronous version of SGD with infrequent synchro-
nization, which results in the asynchronous federated optimization algorithm. We present
both theoretical and empirical results.
Furthermore, we investigate how to protect distributed SGD with parameter servers from
malicious attacks on the workers. To be more specific, we focus on the so-called Byzantine
attacks, which are well studied in traditional distributed systems but not yet thoroughly
investigated in distributed learning systems. We develop a new score-based approach, which
uses a dataset different from the training data to validate the updates from the workers.
We apply this technique to both synchronous and asynchronous SGD, as well as federated
optimization. Both theoretical and empirical evaluation are presented to show the tolerance
to Byzantine attacks.
Last, we design and implement a prototype distributed learning system that integrates
both communication efficiency and security proposed in this dissertation. The integrated
system uses the parameter-server architecture with an additional group of special nodes
called validators. The server-worker-validator architecture achieves both communication
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efficiency and security as follows: the workers locally train the model and send compressed
updates to the servers, the servers then relay and scatter the candidate updates to the
validators, and finally the validators filter out the potentially malicious updates and update
the global model parameters on the servers, which are then pulled by the workers.
1.3 RESEARCH OVERVIEW
In this section, we briefly summarize the research we have done to support the thesis
statement. The details will be presented in the later chapters. In this dissertation, we study
the following topics: approaches to achieve communication efficiency, security in distributed
SGD, and the combination of communication efficiency and security. To be more specific:
1. Communication compression: In Chapter 4, we study communication-efficient dis-
tributed SGD. We start with two important previous work: local SGD and SGD with
error feedback (EF-SGD). Local SGD decreases the number of synchronization rounds
to reduce the communication overhead, while EF-SGD compresses the updates us-
ing arbitrary compressors such as sparsification and quantization, and corrects for
the residual errors incurred by the compressors. The strengths and weakness of both
approaches are also discussed. To improve convergence for communication-efficient dis-
tributed SGD, we introduce a new technique, error reset, which generalizes local SGD,
and adapts arbitrary compressors in a manner different from error feedback. Error re-
set achieves better convergence by closing the gap between vanilla SGD and SGD with
compressed communication. We establish theoretical guarantees for the convergence
of SGD with error reset, and empirically evaluate the performance on some benchmark
datasets.
2. Flexible synchronization in federated optimization: In Chapter 5, we study
synchronization strategies for federated optimization. The standard federated opti-
mization algorithms [34, 35] use a blocking/synchronous approach to collect updates
from a group of subsampled workers. Such a synchronization strategy is less flexible
for federated learning, as availability and completion time vary from device to device,
e.g., due to limited computational capacity and battery time, it is difficult to synchro-
nize the selected devices at the end of each epoch. Often, some devices will no longer
be available before synchronization. To overcome such a disadvantage, we introduce
asynchronous training to federated optimization. Different from the previous work, in
asynchronous federated optimization, the workers are allowed to check in and update
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the global model parameters at any time, which provides more flexible synchroniza-
tion. We prove the convergence of asynchronous federated optimization theoretically,
and empirically evaluate this algorithm via simulation.
3. Byzantine-tolerant SGD: In Chapter 6, we study the tolerance to Byzantine failures
of distributed SGD. First, we present the threat model of the malicious attacks or fail-
ures. Note that the definition of the Byzantine failures in distributed machine learning
is slightly different from the ones in traditional distributed systems. Then, we discuss
the previous approaches based on robust statistics, and their hidden vulnerability un-
der certain conditions. To improve the security and robustness of distributed SGD,
we introduce a new family of Byzantine-tolerant SGD, namely Zeno. Different from
the approaches based on robust statistics, Zeno uses a standalone validation dataset
to test the benignity of the updates from unreliable workers. As a result, the proposed
algorithms tolerate an arbitrarily large number of Byzantine workers (potentially more
than 50%), since they are no longer based on majority voting. We prove the theoretical
convergence for both synchronous and asynchronous SGD with Zeno, and empirically
evaluate them on some benchmark datasets.
4. Combination of communication efficiency and security: Finally in Chapter 7,
we study how to combine communication compression and Byzantine tolerance in
both synchronous and asynchronous training. The goal is to design and implement a
distributed learning system based on the parameter server architecture, that achieves
communication efficiency and security at the same time. Furthermore, we study the
theoretical guarantees of convergence, and Byzantine tolerance of the proposed system.
Empirical evaluation is also conducted.
1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS
The main contribution of this dissertation is to improve the distributed machine-learning
systems in two aspects: more efficient communication with less communication overhead
and more flexible synchronization, and better tolerance to malicious attacks via score-based
validation, without or with limited performance regression. We summarize the thesis research
in Table 1.1. Specifically, this dissertation makes the following contributions:
1. Communication reduction with error reset: In Chapter 4, we introduce a new
technique, error reset, that reduces the communication overhead by adapting arbitrary
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Table 1.1: Research Summary: FL=federated learning, async.=asynchronous,
stat.=statistics
Communication efficiency Security
Local SGD/FL Compression Async. Robust stat. Score-based














X X X X X
compressors in a manner different from the previous work, error feedback. The key idea
is to partially synchronize the gradients or models, and store the yet-to-be-synchronized
part in the local models. We show that error reset achieves better convergence than
the previous work such as error feedback and local SGD, when using highly aggressive
compressors. We also provide theoretical analysis for this new approach.
2. Asynchronous federated optimization: In Chapter 5, we introduce a novel asyn-
chronous algorithm for federated optimization. Different from FedAvg that conducts
synchronous training on the subsampled workers, our approach enables asynchronous
and non-blocking updates from the workers. The key ideas are (i) to solve regular-
ized local problems to guarantee convergence, and (ii) then use a weighted average to
update the global model, where the mixing weight is set adaptively as a function of
the staleness. Together, these techniques result in an effective asynchronous federated
optimization procedure.
3. Score-based validation, i.e. Zeno, for Byzantine-tolerant SGD: In Chapter 6,
we introduce a new family of Byzantine-tolerant SGD, Zeno. Different from the ap-
proaches based on robust statistics, Zeno treats each candidate update as a suspect,
and computes a score using a standalone validation dataset. This score indicates how
benign the given update is. Candidate updates with relatively bad scores are then
filtered out. The key idea of Zeno is to test the decrease of the loss value after the can-
didate update is applied to the model parameters. This allows the algorithm to tolerate
an arbitrarily large number of Byzantine workers. We apply Zeno to both synchronous
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and asynchronous SGD, and conduct both theoretical and empirical analysis.
4. ZenoPS, a system designed for communication-efficient and secure dis-
tributed learning: Finally in Chapter 7, we present the system design and imple-
mentation details of a prototype distributed learning system, ZenoPS, that integrates
error reset and Zeno, works in both synchronous and asynchronous modes. ZenoPS is
based on the parameter server architecture, which is composed of the server nodes and
the worker nodes, and an additional group of nodes with a new role as the validators.
We present some empirical results as showcases of achieving both communication com-
pression and Byzantine tolerance. Furthermore, we theoretically evaluate the Byzan-
tine tolerance, and the convergence of ZenoPS in both synchronous and asynchronous
modes.
1.5 DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION
This dissertation is organized as the following parts:
Chapter 2. Background and Preliminaries. This chapter defines the notation used
across the entire dissertation, and introduces the detailed main problems we deal with,
including the optimization problem, and the threat models.
Chapter 3. Related Work. This chapter introduces the previous work that are related
to the communication efficiency and security in distributed machine learning, as well as the
variants of stochastic gradient descent algorithms.
Chapter 4. Communication Compression with Error Reset. This chapter in-
troduces the techniques to reduce the communication overhead of distributed stochastic
gradient descent, combining both message compression and infrequent synchronization with
error reset.
Chapter 5. Asynchronous Federated Optimization. This chapter introduces the
asynchronous federated optimization, which enables asynchronous training for federated
learning.
Chapter 6. Byzantine-tolerant Distributed SGD. This chapter introduces Zeno,
a Byzantine-tolerant optimization method that could be applied to both synchronous and
asynchronous training.
Chapter 7. ZenoPS: A Distributed System Integrating Communication Effi-
ciency and Security. This chapter introduces ZenoPS, a prototype distributed learning
system based on parameter server architecture, and integrating both communication effi-
ciency and security techniques introduced in the previous chapters.
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Chapter 8. Conclusion and Future Work. This chapter concludes the dissertation
and discusses the future directions of this research.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
In this chapter, we discuss the background materials of distributed SGD and Byzantine
failures. We first define some important notation and the optimization problem we are going
to solve in this dissertation, followed by an overview of the previous works that are highly
related to this dissertation.
2.1 NOTATIONS
First, in Table 2.1, we define some important notation and terminologies that are used
throughout this dissertation.
2.2 PROBLEM FORMULATION











i∈[n] Ezi∼Dif(x; zi), ∀i ∈ [n], x ∈ Rd is the model param-
eters, and zi is a mini-batch of data sampled from the local data Di on the ith device. Each
device can be a GPU, a machine with multiple GPUs, or an edge device such as a smart
phone, depending on the scenario and application.
In a nutshell, the goal is to train a global model with the dataset distributed on n devices.
Each device runs a worker process to train the model on the local dataset. Via the network,
the workers on the devices collaborate with each other to train the global model. We solve
this optimization problem using distributed SGD and its variants, which will be introduced
later in this chapter.
2.2.1 IID vs. Non-IID
For distributed machine learning, there are different ways to distribute the dataset onto
multiple devices. Typically, there are two standard settings: independent and identically
distributed (IID), and non-IID. Throughout this paper, we use the following definitions:
Definition 2.1. (IID dataset) In the IID settings, all the devices have the same local
training data, i.e., Di = Dj,∀i, j ∈ [n]. Furthermore, any random samples zi ∼ Di and
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Table 2.1: Notations and Terminologies
Notation/Term Description
n The number of workers
k The number of active workers
T, t The number of iterations or server steps, and the current iteration t ∈ [T ]
t′ Some previous iteration or server step, t′ ≤ t− 1
τ Maximum delay, t− 1− t′ ≤ τ
H The number of local iterations (worker steps), or synchronization interval
h The current local iteration (worker step), h ∈ [H]
d The number of model parameters, or size of model
[n] The set of integers {1, . . . , n}
St The set of Randomly selected devices in the t
th iteration
b Parameter of trimmed mean
Hmin, Hmax Minimal/maximal number of local iterations
Hi,t Number of local iterations in the t
th epoch on the ith device
xt The initial model in the t
th iteration
xi,t,h Model updated in the t
th server step, hth worker step, ith device
Di The training dataset on the ith device
D The entire training dataset D = D1 ∪ · · · ∪ Dn
Dr The validation dataset on the validators
zi,t,h Data (mini-batch) sampled in the t
th server step,
hth worker step, on the ith device
σ2 The variance of the stochastic gradient of a single sample
f(x; z ∼ D), The stochastic function value and gradient on random sample z,
∇f(x; z ∼ D) drawn from the dataset D, sometimes we use f(x) and ∇f(x) for short
F (x),∇F (x) F (x) = E[f(x)],∇F (x) = E[∇f(x)],
the expectation is taken over the random samples
η Learning rate
α, ρ, γ, etc. Some positive constants or hyperparameters
δ The approximation factor of the compressor C,
where ‖v − C(v)‖2 ≤ (1− δ)‖v‖2
‖ · ‖ All the norms in this paper are l2-norms
V1, V2, V3, etc. Some constants defined in assumptions and used in theoretical analysis
q,m q is the number of Byzantine workers, m = n+ q
Device Where the training data are placed
Worker The process that trains the model on the local datasets
Byzantine worker Worker with Byzantine failures
Server The process that maintains the global model parameters and
exchanges information with the workers and validators
Validator The process that validates the updates sent from worker, and
filter out the potentially malicious ones
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zj ∼ Dj are independent from each other.
Definition 2.2. (Non-IID dataset) In the non-IID settings, different devices have different
local training data, i.e., Di 6= Dj, ∀i, j ∈ [n]. Similar to the IID settings, we still assume
the independence, i.e., any random samples zi ∼ Di and zj ∼ Dj are independent from each
other.
Furthermore, we denote the total training data D = D1 ∪ · · · ∪ Dn.
2.3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the previous work, on which the entire dissertation is based.
We first introduce distributed stochastic gradient descent, and different communication and
synchronization mechanisms. Then, we introduce the threat model we use in this disserta-
tion: Byzantine failures.
2.3.1 Distributed Stochastic Gradient Descent and Data Parallelism
In this dissertation, we use stochastic gradient descent (SGD) to solve the optimization
problem 2.1. The detailed vanilla SGD algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.1. In each
iteration, a random mini-batch of data z is sampled from the training dataset, which is
used to compute the stochastic gradient g. Then, we rescale g with the learning rate η, and
update the model parameters x.
Algorithm 2.1: Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD)
1: Initialize x0 ∈ Rd
2: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
3: gt ← ∇f(xt−1; zt)
4: xt ← xt−1 − ηgt
5: end for
The vanilla SGD algorithm can be extended to distributed versions by assigning the train-
ing dataset to multiple workers. In this dissertation, we assume that different workers uses
different mini-batches to update the entire global model. Such a way to parallelize SGD is
called data parallelism. On the other hand, model parallelism partitions the model parame-
ters onto different workers, where different workers update different parts of the model with
the same mini-batch of data. Although we do not conduct research in model parallelism in
this dissertation, we briefly discuss model parallelism in Chapter 3.
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There are typically two strategies to execute distributed training with SGD: synchronous
and asynchronous. In synchronous training, the combination of the updates aggregated from
all the workers are applied to the global model parameters in every step. In contrast, for
asynchronous training, the global model parameters are immediately updated by any single
worker without waiting for the other workers [40, 41, 42]. Typically, synchronous training
is more stable with less noise, but it is also slower due to the global barrier across all the
workers. Asynchronous training is faster, but any asynchronous training technique needs to
address instability and noisiness due to staleness.
The detailed distributed synchronous SGD algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.2. In each
iteration, every worker computes the stochastic gradient on a random mini-batch of data,
and then takes the average over the gradients from all the workers. The averaged gradient
is used to update the global model parameters in the same way as vanilla SGD. The global
averaging incurs communication overhead.
Algorithm 2.2: Distributed Synchronous Stochastic Gradient Descent (DS-SGD)
1: Initialize x0 ∈ Rd
2: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
3: for all worker i ∈ [n] in parallel do
4: gi,t ← ∇f(xt−1; zi,t)
5: end for
6: Synchronization: ḡt ← 1n
∑
j∈[n] gj,t
7: xt ← xt−1 − ηḡt
8: end for
The detailed distributed asynchronous SGD algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.3. In
each iteration, the global model parameters are updated by the stochastic gradient from an
arbitrary worker. Note that such stochastic gradient is based on the model parameters from
any previous iteration instead of the last iteration. There is a central node that maintains
the latest version of the global model parameters. Pushing the stochastic gradient from any
worker to the central node, and pulling the model parameters from the central node to any
worker incur communication overhead.
In overall, if the same number of stochastic gradients are applied to the global model
parameters, then synchronous SGD and asynchronous SGD have the same communication
overhead. The main difference is that the global updates are blocked until all the gradients
are collected for synchronous training, while for asynchronous training, the global updates
are executed whenever the stochastic gradients arrive. Furthermore, since the stochastic
gradients are potentially based on the model parameters previous to the latest version, such
staleness incurs additional noise to the convergence.
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Algorithm 2.3: Distributed Asynchronous Stochastic Gradient Descent (DA-SGD)
1: Initialize x0 ∈ Rd
2: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
3: arbitrary worker i ∈ [n]:
4: gt ← ∇f(xt′ ; zi,t′), t′ < t
5: xt ← xt−1 − ηgt
6: end for
2.3.2 Communication Strategies in Distributed SGD
For distributed SGD, there are various strategies and infrastructures that support the
communication and synchronization between the workers. The two prevailing approaches
are parameter servers and AllReduce. In this section, we briefly introduce both of them.
• Parameter Server: A popular strategy to enable distributed training is using the
parameter-server (PS) architecture [17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. The system is composed of the
server nodes and the worker nodes, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Typically, the training
data and the major workload of computation are distributed onto the worker nodes. For
cloud computing, the worker nodes are placed on the cloud, where more worker nodes
accelerate the training. For edge computing, the worker nodes are placed on the edge
devices, where more worker nodes bring more training data. The server nodes, located on
the cloud, are used for the synchronization among the worker nodes. In a nutshell, the
workers conduct computation on their local data, then the resulting updates are merged
by the server. Such merge/synchronization operations cause the communication over-
head. Different algorithms send different types of updates to the server, e.g., gradients
or updated model parameters. Thus, the same PS architecture could be used in different
algorithms and scenarios.
• AllReduce: AllReduce is another technique commonly used for synchronous data-parallel
training in traditional datacenters. It shows improved usability and performance for dis-
tributed training in recent years. Based on message passing interface (MPI) [16], the
distributed infrastructures such as Open MPI [43] or Horovod [44] are utilized to average
tensors without server nodes.
Both PS and AllReduce has their own strength and weakness. Typically, AllReduce,
especially ring AllReduce [45], has better performance when the overall bandwidth is limited.
However, if there is sufficient network bandwidth and additional computation resources for






















第1页 共1页 2020/1/11 16:49
Figure 2.1: Parameter-server architecture
2.3.3 Basic Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we present the theoretical analysis for synchronous and asynchronous
SGD, under some basic assumptions. Generally, we assume that the objective function
F (x) introduced in the optimization problem 2.1 is smooth but non-convex, with bounded
gradients and variance .
Assumption 2.1. (Smoothness) F (x) and Fi(x),∀i ∈ [n] are L-smooth: F (y) − F (x) ≤
〈∇F (x), y − x〉+ L
2
‖y − x‖2,∀x, y, and Fi(y)− Fi(x) ≤ 〈∇Fi(x), y − x〉+ L2 ‖y − x‖
2,∀x, y.
Assumption 2.2. (Bounded variance) For any stochastic gradient gi = ∇f(x; zi), zi ∼ Di,
we assume bounded intra-worker variance: E[‖gi −∇Fi(x)‖2] ≤ V1 = σ
2
s
,∀x ∈ Rd, where σ2
is the variance of the gradient of a single data sample, s is the mini-batch size per worker.
Assumption 2.3. (Heterogeneity) We assume bounded heterogeneity between different
workers: ‖∇F (x)−∇Fi(x)‖2 ≤ V2,∀x ∈ Rd.
Note that in the IID settings, V2 = 0.
Assumption 2.4. (Bounded gradients) For any stochastic gradient ∇f(x; z),∀x ∈ Rd, we
assume bounded expectation: ‖∇F (x; z)‖2 = ‖E[∇f(x; z)]‖2 ≤ V ′1 , ∀i ∈ [n], t ∈ [T ]. In some
cases, we directly assume the upper bound of the stochastic gradients: ‖∇f(x; z)‖2 ≤ V3.
Assumption 2.5. (Global minimum) There exists at least one global minimum x∗, where
F (x∗) ≤ F (x),∀x.
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First, we present the error bound of synchronous SGD.
Theorem 2.1. (Error bound of synchronous SGD) We take Assumption 2.1 (smoothness),
2.2 (bounded variance), and 2.5 (global minimum). Taking η ≤ 1
L
, after T iterations,
Algorithm 2.2 (distributed synchronous SGD) has the following error bound:∑
t∈[T ] ‖∇F (xt−1)‖2
T



























Proof. Using smoothness, we have
F (xt)− F (xt−1)





































gj,t −∇F (xt−1) +∇F (xt−1)‖2.
Taking the expectation on both sides conditional on xt−1, we have
E[F (xt)− F (xt−1)]








gj,t −∇F (xt−1) +∇F (xt−1)‖2




















Taking η ≤ 1
L
, we have
E[F (xt)− F (xt−1)]
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By re-arranging the terms, we have
‖∇F (xt−1)‖2 ≤






By telescoping and taking total expectation, we have∑
t∈[T ] ‖∇F (xt−1)‖2
T












Remark 2.1. In most cases, the error bound can be partitioned into two parts. The first part
show how fast the resultant model parameters escape from the initial value F (x0)− F (x∗).
The second part contains the additional error or noise incurred by variance, heterogeneity,
etc.
Then, we present the error bound of asynchronous SGD.
Theorem 2.2. (Error bound of asynchronous SGD) We take Assumption 2.1 (smoothness),
2.3 (heterogeneity), 2.4 (bounded gradients), and 2.5 (global minimum). Assuming bounded
delay t−1−t′ ≤ τ , taking η ≤ 1
L
, after T iterations, Algorithm 2.3 (distributed asynchronous
SGD) has the following error bound:∑
t∈[T ] ‖∇F (xt−1)‖2
T
≤ 2E[F (x0)− F (x∗)]
ηT
+ 2η2L2τ 2V ′1 + 2V2.
























Proof. Using smoothness, we have
F (xt)− F (xt−1) ≤ 〈∇F (xt−1), xt − xt−1〉+
L
2





Taking the expectation on both sides conditional on xt′ ; t
′ < t, we have
E[F (xt)− F (xt−1)]


















































V1 . η ≤ 1L
≤ −η
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‖∇F (xt−1)‖2 + ηL2‖ −
t−1∑
k=t′+1










By re-arranging the terms, we have
‖∇F (xt−1)‖2 ≤
2E[F (xt−1)− F (xt)]
η
+ 2η2L2τ 2V ′1 + 2V2 + LηV1.
By telescoping and taking total expectation, we have∑
t∈[T ] ‖∇F (xt−1)‖2
T
≤ 2E[F (x0)− F (x∗)]
ηT
+ 2η2L2τ 2V ′1 + 2V2 + LηV1.
QED.
Remark 2.2. To compare the error bounds of synchronous and asynchronous SGD, we
assume the same total number of stochastic gradients applied to the global model parame-
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ters for both cases. If synchronous SGD is executed for T iterations with n workers, then
asynchronous SGD should be executed for nT iterations. Thus, for asynchronous SGD, the
convergence of some parts of the error bound is accelerated by the factor of n or
√
n, while
the convergence of the variance term V1 is slowed down by the factor of
√
n, compared to
synchronous SGD. As a result, asynchronous SGD potentially converges faster than syn-
chronous SGD, but also suffers from larger variance. Note that for asynchronous SGD, there
is an additional error term, V2, caused by the dissimilarity between different workers, since
we do not make assumptions of the difference between the delay of different workers. In
the IID settings, V2 vanishes. Furthermore, if we assume that the workers check in with the
same probability in each iteration, then V2 also vanishes.
2.3.4 Byzantine Failures
Byzantine failure is a well-studied problem in the field of distributed systems. It is first
introduced in [26]. In general, Byzantine failures assume a threat model where the failed
agents behave arbitrarily in a traditional distributed system. Such a threat model assumes
the worse cases of failures and attacks in distributed systems.
[29] introduces the Byzantine failures to distributed synchronous SGD, with some modi-
fication to make the threat model fit the machine-learning scenario, in which the Byzantine
failures only happen on the workers. In a nutshell, workers with Byzantine failures send
arbitrary messages to other processes.
In this dissertation, we use the following threat model.
Definition 2.3. (Threat Model). Additional to the n honest workers, there exists q Byzan-
tine workers that send out arbitrary messages during communication. Furthermore, we
assume that the workers are anonymous to the other processes.
The existence of Byzantine workers prevents the distributed SGD from converging or
decreasing the loss value on the training data.
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CHAPTER 3: RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we discuss the previous work that are related to the general topics of this
dissertation, but less relevant to the specific problems we deal with. Although we are not
going to involve these related work in the following chapters of this dissertation, it is possible
to extend and apply the current research to these topics in the future.
3.1 VARIANTS OF SGD
In this dissertation, we focus on distributed training with vanilla SGD, and study how
to reduce the communication overhead and make the system tolerant to Byzantine failures.
However, there are other variants of SGD that are widely used in various applications. In
the future, we will extend our research to these variants and applications.
The two prevailing variants of SGD is SGD with momentum and SGD with adaptive learn-
ing rates. There are also algorithms that combines these two techniques. In the following,
we briefly introduce these SGD variants.
3.1.1 SGD with Momentum
There are two momentum methods that are commonly used for accelerating the training
of deep neural networks: Polyak’s momentum (i.e., heavy ball method), and Nesterov’s
momentum. These two methods are similar to each other, and are both widely applied
in distributed training. There are also previous work that incorporate momentum into
communication-efficient SGD algorithms [46, 47, 48].
Polyak’s momentum [49, 50] is the default choice of SGD variants in many deep learn-
ing frameworks such as Tensorflow [51], PyTorch [52], and MXNet [53], to accelerate the
convergence of gradient descent methods. Polyak’s momentum can be expressed as follows:
mt = βmt−1 + gt, (3.1)
xt = xt−1 − ηmt, (3.2)
or
mt = βmt−1 + ηgt, (3.3)
xt = xt−1 −mt, (3.4)
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where gt is the gradient based on the model parameters in the current iteration. Roughly
speaking, Polyak’s momentum uses the current gradient as well as the accumulated previous
gradients to update the model parameters. The hyperparameter β determines how quickly
the accumulated previous gradients decay.
Algorithm 3.1: SGD with Polyak’s momentum
1: Initialize x0 ∈ Rd,m0 = 0
2: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
3: gt ← ∇f(xt−1; zt)
4: mt = βmt−1 + gt
5: xt ← xt−1 − ηmt
6: end for
Nesterov’s momentum [54] is another variant of SGD that has been widely used. [55]
shows that Nesterov’s momentum can be expressed in a way similar to Polyak’s momentum:
mt = βmt−1 + gt, (3.5)
xt = xt−1 − η(βmt + gt), (3.6)
or
mt = βmt−1 + ηgt, (3.7)
xt = xt−1 − (βmt + ηgt). (3.8)
Similar to Polyak’s momentum, Nesterov’s momentum moves the model parameters in the
direction of the accumulated gradient.
Algorithm 3.2: SGD with Nesterov’s momentum
1: Initialize x0 ∈ Rd,m0 = 0
2: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
3: gt ← ∇f(xt−1; zt)
4: mt = βmt−1 + gt
5: xt ← xt−1 − η(βmt + gt)
6: end for
3.1.2 SGD with Adaptive Learning Rates
Adaptive learning rate methods adapt coordinate-wise dynamic learning rates by ac-
cumulating the historical gradients. Examples include AdaGrad [56, 57], RMSProp [58],
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AdaDelta [59], and Adam [60]. Along similar lines, recent research has shown that AdaGrad
can converge without explicitly decreasing the learning rate [61, 62]. SGD with adaptive
learning rates are useful in training language models, such as Big LSTM model [63] and
Transformer [8].
We briefly introduce two representative adaptive learning rate methods: AdaGrad and
Adam. The detailed AdaGrad is shown in Algorithm 3.3. The general idea is to accumulate
the gradients in a coordinate-wise manner, and use such accumulation as the denominator
to normalize the gradients. Such accumulation grows when the number of iterations grows,
so that we do not need to explicitly decrease the learning rate η.
Algorithm 3.3: AdaGrad
1: Initialize x0, ε, v
2
0 = 0
2: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
3: gt = ∇f(xt−1; zt)
4: v2t ← v2t−1 + gt ◦ gt
5: xt ← xt−1 − η gt√
v2t+ε1
6: end for
On the other hand, Adam, as shown in Algorithm 3.4, uses both momentum and adaptive
learning rates. However, different from the Polyak’s momentum introduced in Algorithm 3.1,
Adam uses a moving average of the gradients and the coordinate-wise square of the gradients.
Unlike AdaGrad, the adaptive variables (denominators) in the Adam update rules is not
accumulative. Thus, Adam still needs learning rate decay for convergence.
Algorithm 3.4: Adam
1: Initialize x0, v0 = 0, m0 = 0, ε
2: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
3: gt = ∇f(xt−1; zt)
4: mt = β1mt−1 + (1− β1)gt
5: v2t ← β2v2t−1 + (1− β2)gt ◦ gt




8: xt ← η m̂t√
v̂2t+ε
9: end for
So far, the research on the communication-efficient SGD algorithms with adaptive learning
rates is limited. Most of the previous work focus on reducing the communication overhead
for vanilla distributed SGD or SGD with momentum. When incorporating communication
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compression into SGD with adaptive learning rates, typically it is not trivial to guarantee
the convergence theoretically, unless unbiased compressors are used. Recently, there are
researches reducing the communication overhead for AdaGrad and Adam via less frequent
synchronization [64, 65].
3.2 DECENTRALIZED OPTIMIZATION AND ADMM
In this dissertation, we focus on centralized SGD, where we use collective APIs or param-
eter servers to aggregate the updates from the workers to central nodes. However, there are
also optimization algorithms where there is no central nodes. Instead, such algorithms estab-
lish a peer-to-peer (P2P) network between the workers, in which the workers communicate
with the neighbouring nodes and exchange updates. Opposite to the centralized approaches,
these algorithms are called decentralized optimization algorithms.
Many decentralized optimization algorithms can be described as variants of alternating
direction method of multipliers (ADMM) algorithms [66, 67]. We consider n workers con-
nected by an underlying P2P network, where the ith worker maintains its own local model





Fi(xi), s.t. x1 = . . . = xn. (3.9)




2. Reach consensus among different workers, which means x1 = . . . = xn.









s.t. Z = ŴX, (3.11)















 ∈ Rn×d, (3.13)
Ŵ and W̄ are mixing matrices generally different from the adjacency matrix of the P2P
network W. We assume that Ŵ and W̄ satisfies
1. Ŵij = W̄ij = 0 if worker i and worker j are not connected;
2. Ŵ = Ŵ>, W̄ = W̄>;
3. null{I− Ŵ} ⊇ span{1}, null{W̄} ⊇ span{1};
4. W̄ < 0.
Note that when X satisfies the constraint X = ŴX, it reaches consensus that x1 = · · · = xn,
which yields that the penalty term ‖X‖2
W̄
= 0 because null{W̄} ⊇ span{1}.
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∈ R2nd×nd, (3.16)
where the vectors x and z are the vectorized X and Z,












































 ∈ Rn×d. (3.20)







Λt+1 := Λt + ρ(ŴXk+1 − Zk+1), (3.23)
Γt+1 := Γt + ρ(Xk+1 − Zt+1). (3.24)
Note that we update Z before X.
The update of X can be replaced by a gradient descent step with learning rate η, which




Xt+1 := Xt − ηt
[




Λt+1 := Λt + ρ(ŴXt+1 − Zt+1), (3.27)
Γt+1 := Γt + ρ(Xt+1 − Zt+1). (3.28)
In each iteration, each worker collects the model parameters of the previous iteration
from the neighbouring workers in the P2P network, and take the weighted average using the
mixing matrix W̄ and Ŵ, which is formulated as W̄Xt and ŴXt above.
It turns out that several decentralized optimization algorithms such as decentralized gra-
dient descent [68, 69], EXTRA [70], and DIGing [71] are special cases of the inexact ADMM
algorithm above, by taking specific η, W, Ŵ, and W̄.
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3.3 MODEL PARALLELISM
In this dissertation, we focus on data parallelism, which is introduced in Chapter 2. There
is another approach to distribute the training workload onto multiple workers or devices,
which is called model parallelism. In data parallelism, different workers update the same
model parameters using different mini-batches of data. On the contrary, in model parallelism,
different workers update different parts of the model parameters using the same mini-batch
of data.
Recently, the increasing sizes of both the machine-learning models and datasets are making
it more and more difficult to fit the model training in the memory of a single GPU device.
For example, the full version of GPT-3 [72] model has 175 billion parameters, which requires
model parallelism for training.
On the other hand, nowadays there is trend to move model training from cloud to edge,
where the edge devices are typically weak devices with limited resources such as on-device
memory. These include unmanned aerial vehicles and smart phones. Latency require-
ments [73, 74], and privacy needs [35, 75] necessitate training only using nearby or in-house
weak devices. To train larger models, groups of weak devices have to collaborate with each
other to obtain sufficient computation power and memory.
To train deep neural networks using model parallelism, first we need to partition the models
onto multiple devices. There are two ways to partition the neural networks: horizontally
and vertically. Horizontal partitioning places the operators or layers of neural networks
on multiple devices, while vertical partitioning splits the parameters of each layer across
multiple devices.
Horizontal partitioning is also called operator placement. A popular method is called the
learning-based approach, which generates the placement of operators on devices by reinforce-
ment learning [76, 77, 78]. The learning-based approaches iteratively improve the placement
given the hardware specs to minimize the training time. The learning-based approaches
show as good as or even better training performance on the partitioned models, compared
to the models partitioned manually by the experts. However, the reinforcement learning
algorithms typically take a very long time for training. To make the model partitioning
faster, heuristic approaches [79] and algorithms based on constrained optimization [80] are
proposed.
Compared to horizontal partitioning, vertical partitioning has better parallelism but also
more communication overhead between the devices, which is typically used in a single ma-
chine with multiple GPUs [81, 82, 83]. Recently, DeepSpeed [84, 85] presents a framework




Different from Byzantine failures/attacks that focus on attacking the training phase, there
is another type of attacks that focus on the testing phase. Such attacks also manipulate
the model at the training phase. However, unlike Byzantine attacks, the goal of backdoor
attacks is to produce wrong results on target data samples in the testing or predicting phase.
For example, backdoor attacks can manipulate the models to misclassify a specific object.
Backdoor attacks typically do not affect the training loss.
Unlike Byzantine attacks, backdoor attacks does not necessarily happen in distributed
training. While Byzantine attacks can be caused by attacking the communication media
and inserting malicious workers into the distributed systems, backdoor attacks are usually
implemented by injecting malicious data samples into the training data.
Recently, there are researches studying backdoor attacks in distributed training, especially
in federated learning [86, 87, 88, 89]. In federated learning, the backdoor attacks can ma-
nipulate the local models on the workers to fit both the normal data and malicious data.
As a result, the resulting local models behave normally on the normal data and produce
wrong results on the unseen target samples, and further poison the global model. Due to
the heterogeneity of the data distributions on different workers, federated learning is more
vulnerable than the traditional distributed learning to backdoor attacks. There are also
defense techniques to protect federated learning from backdoor attacks [90, 91].
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CHAPTER 4: COMMUNICATION COMPRESSION WITH ERROR RESET
In this chapter, we study the communication-efficient distributed SGD algorithms. We
discuss various approaches to reduce the communication overhead of distributed SGD, and
present a technique to adapt arbitrary compressors in distributed SGD. Most contents of this
chapter are published in the paper [36]. The contributions of this chapter are summarized
as follows:
• We establish the necessity and benefits of reducing the communication overhead of dis-
tributed SGD, and discuss the strength and weakness of the previous work.
• We propose a communication-efficient SGD algorithm, called Communication-efficient
SGD with Error Reset (CSER) as well as its variant with Nesterov’s momentum [54].
CSER includes a new technique that adapts arbitrary compressors for SGD, and achieves
better convergence than the baselines when aggressive compressors are used.
• We extend the idea of error reset to the synchronization of both gradients and models. We
show that tuning the compression ratios between the gradient synchronization and model
synchronization improves the convergence.
• We establish the theoretical guarantees of the convergence of CSER, and show empirically
that with appropriate compression ratios, CSER accelerates distributed training of deep
neural networks.
• This chapter establishes an important foundation of our proposed distributed learning
system that integrates both communication efficiency and security, which is presented in
Chapter 7. In the integrated system, we use message compression, infrequent synchro-
nization, and error reset to reduce the communication overhead.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the rapid growth of the sizes of both machine-learning models and datasets
makes it more and more time-consuming to train machine-learning models. To accelerate
the training of deep neural networks, distributed SGD and its variants are proposed, so
that more data samples can be processed simultaneously. Thus, with fixed per-worker mini-
batch sizes, increasing the number of workers improves the throughput, which is akin to
single-threaded SGD with large mini-batch sizes and more computation power [1, 2, 3, 4], if
we ignore the communication overhead between the workers. However, a larger number of
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workers also incur more communication. When the communication overhead overwhelms,
the distributed system becomes less scalable. As a result, the communication overhead
becomes the bottleneck of the performance of the distributed learning systems, when scaling
to more machines or devices.
In this chapter, we introduce an algorithm called Communication-efficient SGD with Error
Reset, or CSER. The key idea in CSER is the technique called error reset that corrects for
the local model using the compression errors. We show that SGD with error reset converges
better than the previous work, when scaling up the compression ratio of the communication
to as high as 1024×.
4.2 PROBLEM SETUP
We consider training deep neural networks based on the distributed SGD in Algorithm 2.2,
which incurs synchronization when averaging the gradients from different workers. Such
synchronization requires an overall communication overhead of 2nd floating-point numbers,
which is composed of sending nd floating-point numbers from the workers to a central node,
and broadcasting nd floating-point numbers from the central node back to the workers, where
n is the number of workers, and d is the size of the model.
The goal is to reduce the communication overhead by the factor of RC, i.e., the overall
communication overhead is reduced to 2nd
RC
, and at the same time maintain good convergence.
RC is also called the compression ratio of the compressor C.
4.3 PRELIMINARIES
Various approaches have been proposed to reduce the communication overhead for dis-
tributed SGD, including message compression and infrequent synchronization. The former
uses lossy compression to transmit fewer bits when synchronizing tensors, while the later
reduces the frequency of synchronization.
Message compression methods use compressors such as quantization and sparsification to
reduce the number of bits in each synchronization round. For the unbiased compressors
where the compressed tensors are random variables with the expectation the same as the
original tensors, we can directly replace the gradients with the compressed ones in Algo-
rithm 2.2 without further modification [92, 93]. However, for the biased compressors, the
technique called error feedback (EF-SGD) [94, 95, 96] is necessary to correct for the residual
errors incurred by the compressors, and to guarantee theoretical convergence. The detailed
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algorithm of EF-SGD is shown in Algorithm 4.1. In each iteration, the local update p is
compressed by the compressor C defined in Definition 4.1, which produces the compressed
tensor p′ and the residual error e = p − p′. The compressed tensors are then synchronized
and averaged across all the workers. The residual errors are locally cached and fed back to
the local gradients in the next iteration.
Definition 4.1. [94] An operator C : Rd → Rd is a δ-approximate compressor for δ ∈ [0, 1]
if ‖C(v)− v‖2 ≤ (1− δ)‖v‖2,∀v ∈ Rd.
On the other hand, infrequent synchronization methods such as local SGD [46, 47, 97, 98,
99] would decrease the overall number of synchronization rounds. The detailed algorithm of
local SGD is shown in Algorithm 4.2. In local SGD, each worker locally updates the local
models without synchronization for H iterations, and then synchronizes and averages the
local models instead of the gradients across all the workers.
Algorithm 4.1: EF-SGD
1: Input: C: compressor
2: Initialize xi,0 = x0, ei,t = 0,∀i ∈ [n]
3: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
4: for all Workers i ∈ [n] do
5: pi,t ← ei,t−1 − η∇f(xi,t−1; zi,t)
6: p′i,t ← C(pi,t)
7: ei,t ← pi,t − p′i,t





9: xi,t ← xi,t−1 + p̄′t
10: end for
11: end for
Algorithm 4.2: Local SGD
1: Input: H: synchronization interval
2: Initialize xi,0 = x0,∀i ∈ [n]
3: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
4: for all Workers i ∈ [n] do
5: xi,t− 1
2
← xi,t−1 − η∇f(xi,t−1; zi,t)
6: if mod (t,H) 6= 0 then
7: xi,t ← xi,t− 1
2
8: else






There also exist previous works that combine both message compression and infrequent
synchronization, which is called QSparse-local-SGD [48]. QSparse-local-SGD periodically
synchronizes the model parameters like local SGD, and compresses the synchronization mes-
sages to further reduce the communication overhead. Similar to EF-SGD, it also uses error
feedback to correct for the residual errors of compression. The details of QSparse-local-SGD
are presented in Algorithm 4.3.
4.4 RELATED WORK
For the compression methods, widely used compressors include quantization [23, 92, 93,
94, 96, 100, 101] and sparsification [95, 102, 103]. Quantization compresses the communi-
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Algorithm 4.3: Qsparse-local-SGD
1: Input: C - compressor, H > 0 - synchronization interval
2: Initialize xi,0 = x̂0 = x0 ∈ Rd, ei,t = 0,∀i ∈ [n]
3: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
4: for all Workers i ∈ [n] in parallel do
5: xi,t− 1
2
← xi,t−1 − η∇f(xi,t−1; zi,t)
6: if mod (t,H) 6= 0 then
7: xi,t ← xi,t− 1
2
, x̂t ← x̂t−1, ei,t ← ei,t−1
8: else
9: pi,t ← ei,t−1 + xi,t− 1
2
− x̂t−1
10: p′i,t ← C(pi,t)
11: ei,t ← pi,t − p′i,t









cation by reducing the number of bits of the floating-point values. Sparsification reduces
the communication by dropping out parts of the messages. We note that for the biased
compressors (i.e., the expectations are not the original values) such as SignSGD [23], error
feedback is required to guarantee the convergence [94, 95, 96]. Recently, PowerSGD [104]
proposes low rank approximation of the gradient matrices to compress the communication.
In this dissertation, we focus on the centralized algorithms. However, there are also
decentralized algorithms using message compression or infrequent synchronization to reduce
the communication overhead [47, 105, 106, 107, 108].
4.5 MOTIVATIONS
To motivate error reset, we discuss the potential weakness of the previous work. For EF-
SGD, it is easy to check that even if a single worker is used instead of multiple workers, EF-
SGD is not reduced to vanilla SGD, as long as the compressor C is not an identity mapping
function. In other words, there is an inevitable gap between EF-SGD and vanilla SGD.
Thus, we argue that although error feedback compensates the residual errors of the biased
compressors, it also incurs some unnecessary noise, which results in the gap between EF-SGD
and vanilla SGD. Furthermore, we find that when using highly aggressive compressors, such
as random sparsifiers with high compression ratios, EF-SGD has relatively worse training
convergence and accuracy, which is also reported in some previous work [95, 104].
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The recent work of QSparse-local-SGD further reduces the bidirectional communication
overhead (in both aggregation and broadcasting) by combining EF-SGD with local SGD.
Although the overall compression ratios are increased, the potential issues in the convergence
also get worse. For instance, our experiments reveal that QSparse-local-SGD fails to converge
at a compression ratio of 256×, using random sparisifiers as the compressors.
Thus, we need to find new techniques to reduce the communication overhead of distributed
SGD, which close the gap between EF-SGD and vanilla SGD, and improve the convergence
for aggressive compressors.
4.6 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we formally introduce the idea of SGD with error reset. We discuss the
difference between error reset and error feedback. Furthermore, we introduce some variants
or generalizations of the basic algorithm of SGD with error reset.
4.6.1 Error Reset
We propose a procedure to apply arbitrary δ-approximate compressors to distributed SGD,
which achieves good accuracy when using aggressive compressors and fixes the potential
convergence issues of QSparse-local-SGD. Our procedure directly applies the residuals to the
local models, then uses the local models to compute the gradients in the next iteration, which
results in bifurcated local models similar to local SGD. The detailed algorithm of SGD with
error reset is presented in Algorithm 4.4. It is easier to understand the idea of error reset if we
compare it with error feedback directly. Note that the only difference between error reset and
error feedback is in Line 9 of Algorithm 4.4 and 4.5. When updating the local models, error
feedback only uses the synchronized p̄, while error reset replaces the local residual error ei,t−1
from the previous iteration with the ones ei,t in the current iteration inside the local model
parameters. As a result, different workers maintain different local models in error reset,
while different workers have the same synchronized models xi,t = xj,t,∀i, j ∈ [n], t ∈ [T ] in
error feedback.
Algorithm 4.4 shows the basic version of Communication-efficient SGD with Error Reset
(CSER), or CSER-Basic.
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Algorithm 4.4: Error Reset
(CSER-Basic)
1: Input: C - compressor
2: Initialize xi,0 = x0 ∈ Rd, ei,t = 0,∀i ∈ [n]
3: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
4: for all Workers i ∈ [n] in parallel do
5: pi,t ← ei,t−1 − η∇f(xi,t−1; zi,t)
6: p′i,t ← C(pi,t)
7: ei,t ← pi,t − p′i,t





9: xi,t ← xi,t−1 − ei,t−1 + ei,t + p̄′t
10: end for
11: end for
Algorithm 4.5: Error Feedback
(EF-SGD)
1: Input: C - compressor
2: Initialize xi,0 = x0 ∈ Rd, ei,t = 0, ∀i ∈ [n]
3: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
4: for all Workers i ∈ [n] in parallel do
5: pi,t ← ei,t−1 − η∇f(xi,t−1; zi,t)
6: p′i,t ← C(pi,t)
7: ei,t ← pi,t − p′i,t





9: xi,t ← xi,t−1 + p̄′t
10: end for
11: end for
Note that if we use a single worker, the update rule in Line 9 of Algorithm 4.4 becomes
−ei,t−1 +ei,t+ p̄′t = −η∇f(xi,t−1; zi,t). In this case, CSER-Basic is equivalent to vanilla SGD,
no matter what compressor is used.
4.6.2 Variants and Generalizations
Similar to QSparse-local-SGD which combines error feedback with local SGD, we also
combine error reset with local SGD. The resulting algorithm is called Partially Local SGD
with Error Reset, or “CSER-PL” in [36].
To help understand the differences between CSER-PL and Qspars-local-SGD, we present
both algorithms side by side in Algorithm 4.6 and 4.7. Note that Qspars-local-SGD is
rewritten into a new format for an easier comparison. In general, CSER-PL is similar to
Qspars-local-SGD, but uses error reset instead of error feedback to compensate the local
residual errors. The proposed algorithm locally update the models on each worker with-
out synchronization for H iterations, and then uses arbitrary compressors with error reset
to partially synchronize the local models. CSER-PL is more memory-efficient compared
to Qsparse-local-SGD, since it does not maintain the variable e during the local updates.
Furthermore, if the compressor C in CSER-PL is the identity mapping function (i.e., no
compression at all when synchronizing the local models), then CSER-PL is equivalent to
local SGD in Algorithm 4.2. Note that if we take the synchronization interval H = 1, then
CSER-PL is equivalent to the basic Algorithm 4.4 of SGD with error reset.
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Algorithm 4.6: CSER-PL
1: Input: C - compressor, H > 0 -
synchronization interval
2: Initialize xi,0 = x̂0 = x0 = 0,∀i ∈ [n]
3: Pass Initialize ri,0 = 0,∀i ∈ [n]
4: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
5: for all Workers i ∈ [n] do
6: xi,t− 1
2
← xi,t−1 − η∇f(xi,t−1; zi,t)
7: if mod (t,H) 6= 0 then
8: xi,t ← xi,t− 1
2
9: x̂t ← x̂t−1
10: Pass
11: else
12: pi,t ← xi,t− 1
2
− x̂t
13: p′i,t ← C(pi,t)
14: ei,t ← pi,t − p′i,t





16: xi,t ← x̂t−1 + p̄′t + ei,t





1: Input: C - compressor, H > 0 -
synchronization interval
2: Initialize xi,0 = x̂0 = x0 = 0,∀i ∈ [n]
3: Initialize ei,0 = 0,∀i ∈ [n]
4: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
5: for all Workers i ∈ [n] do
6: xi,t− 1
2
← xi,t−1 − η∇f(xi,t−1; zi,t)
7: if mod (t,H) 6= 0 then
8: xi,t ← xi,t− 1
2
9: x̂t ← x̂t−1
10: ei,t ← ei,t−1
11: else
12: pi,t ← ei,t−1 + xi,t− 1
2
− x̂t−1
13: p′i,t ← C(pi,t)
14: ei,t ← pi,t − p′i,t





16: xi,t ← x̂t−1 + p̄′t




Although CSER-PL has no communication between two synchronization rounds, it is
unnecessary to shuwdown synchronization in the iterations between the model synchroniza-
tions. In fact, we can spare some communication budget from the model synchronization
to the gradient synchronization in the intermediate iterations. The resulting algorithm is
a more generalized version of SGD with error reset, which partially synchronizes both the
gradients and model parameters.
We call this generalized version of algorithm as the full version of CSER, or simply CSER.
The proposed algorithm has two arbitrary compressors: C1 and C2, with approximation factor
δ1 ∈ (0, 1] and δ2 ∈ [0, 1], respectively. The detailed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4.8.
CSER uses a sub-routine defined in Algorithm 4.9, which partially synchronizes the tensors,
including both the model parameters and the gradients. Given any compressor C, on any
worker i, the sub-routine takes the average only over the compressed part of the messages,
and locally combines the residual with the averaged values.
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Algorithm 4.8: CSER
1: Input: C1, C2 - compressors, H > 0 - error-reset
interval
2: Initialize xi,0 = x0 ∈ Rd, ei,0 = 0,∀i ∈ [n]
3: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
4: for all Workers i ∈ [n] in parallel do
5: gi,t ← ∇f(xi,t−1; zi,t), zi,t ∼ Di
6: g′i,t, ri,t ← PSync(gi,t, C2)
7: xi,t− 1
2
← xi,t−1 − ηg′i,t, ei,t− 1
2
← ei,t−1 − ηri,t
8: if mod (t,H) 6= 0 then
9: xi,t ← xi,t− 1
2






, ei,t ← PSync(ei,t− 1
2
, C1)













1: Input: vi ∈ Rd, C -
compressor
2: On worker i:
3: v′i = C(vi)
4: ri = vi − v′i
5: Partial synchronization:






7: v′i = v̄
′ + ri
8:
9: return v′i, ri
In the algorithm, xi,t is the local model on the ith worker in the iteration t. In Line 11 and
12, the first compressor C1 flushes the local error ei,t by partial synchronization, i.e., the local
errors are (partially) reset for every H iterations, which is similar to QSparse-local-SGD.
Between the error-reset rounds, we add a second compressor C2 to partially synchronize the
gradients (Line 6), and accumulate both the synchronized values and the residuals to the
local models (Line 7).
The locally accumulated residual error ei,t maintains the differences between the local
models, which causes additional noise to the convergence. Formally, we have xi,t − ei,t =
xj,t − ej,t, ∀i, j ∈ [n], t ∈ [T ], i.e., xi,t − ei,t are the same across different workers.
Note that Algorithm 4.4 (CSER-Basic), Algorithm 4.6 (CSER-PL), and Algorithm 4.2 (lo-
cal SGD) are all special cases of CSER. By utilizing both gradient and model synchronization,
and balancing the communication budget between them, CSER potentially achieves a better
trade-off between the accuracy and the reduction of bidirectional communication. When all
the budget is on C1, the local models bifurcate too much, which leads to bad accuracy as local
SGD. Instead, we trade off some budget of C1 for the partial synchronization of gradients
with C2, thus mitigate the weaknesses.
Additionally, we add Nesterov’s momentum to CSER. The resultant algorithm is called
Momentum CSER (M-CSER). Compared to Algorithm 4.8, the momentum variant simply
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adds momentum to the gradients before applying the second compressor C2, as shown in
Algorithm 4.10.
Algorithm 4.10: Distributed Momentum SGD with Error-Reset (M-CSER)
1: Input: C1, C2 - compressors, H > 0 - synchronization interval
2: Initialize xi,0 = x0 ∈ Rd, ei,0 = 0,mi,0 = 0,∀i ∈ [n]
3: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
4: for all Workers i ∈ [n] in parallel do
5: gi,t ← ∇f(xi,t−1; zi,t), zi,t ∼ Di
6: mi,t ← βmi,t−1 + gi,t
7: pi,t ← η(βmi,t + gi,t)
8: p′i,t, ri,t ← PSync(pi,t, C2)
9: xi,t− 1
2
← xi,t−1 − p′i,t, ei,t− 1
2
← ei,t−1 − ri,t
10: if mod (t,H) 6= 0 then
11: xi,t ← xi,t− 1
2
, ei,t ← ei,t− 1
2
12: else
13: Error reset: e′
i,t− 1
2
, ei,t ← PSync(ei,t− 1
2
, C1)










4.6.3 Globally-randomized blockwise sparsifier (GRBS)
In the experiments, we use a blockwise random sparsifier with synchronized random seed,
which is also mentioned in [104].
Definition 4.2. (Globally-Randomized Blockwise Sparsifier, GRBS) Given any tensors
vi ∈ Rd, i ∈ [n] distributed on the n workers, the compression ratio RC, and the number
of blocks B, GRBS partitions each vi into B blocks. In each iteration, GRBS globally
picks B
RC
random blocks for synchronization, and GRBS is a 1/RC-approximate compressor
in expectation. The tensor partitioning and the random dropping are globally chosen, i.e.,
different workers drop the same blocks in the same iteration.
Compared to the other compressors, GRBS has the following advantages:
• Minimal additional overheads: With synchronized random seeds, different workers al-
ways choose the same blocks for synchronization. Thus, GRBS always achieves the desired
compression ratio in bidirectional (in both aggregation and broadcasting) communication.
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Furthermore, unlike top-k sparsifiers or quantization, GRBS has neither additional com-
munication overhead for the mismatched indices, nor additional computation overhead for
the compression. Some compressors such as quantization require additional computation
to convert the input tensors into the compressed tensors.
• Bidirectional compression for free: Tensor synchronization takes two steps: collect-
ing the tensors to a central node, and then broadcasting the aggregated tensor. GRBS
compresses the communication in both steps with the same desired compression ratio.
Most of the previous works only compress the communication in the collection step, and
have heavier broadcasting communication [48, 109]. Bidirectional compression with quan-
tization requires special techniques [96, 110].
• Adaptivity to AllReduce and parameter server: Due to the synchronized random
seed, different workers always choose the same blocks for synchronization. Thus, GRBS
is compatible with both AllReduce [16, 44] and parameter server [17, 18, 19]. Other
compressors such as random sparsifier and quantization cannot be directly employed with
Allreduce or parameter server since their compressed gradients cannot be directly summed
without first be decompressed. For top-k sparsifiers, users have to modify the AllReduce
implementation to adapt sparse tensors, or use AllGather instead. Both approaches incur
additional communication or computation overhead.
• Less memory footprint: With GRBS, CSER can further reduce the memory footprint
and the corresponding overhead of memory copy. For any block, its local residual is
either already merged into the local model, or reset to 0. Thus, we can directly apply
partial synchronization to the local models xi,t, instead of the residuals ei,t, which makes
it unnecessary to maintain ei,t in the memory.
Although GRBS has less communication and computation overhead, it is too aggressive
for the existing algorithms such as QSparse-local-SGD when we consider a large RC. In the
experiments, we show that CSER improves the convergence when the overall compression
ratio is as large as 1024×.
4.7 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the convergence guarantees of CSER. Note that we assume
non-IID workers in this section.
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4.7.1 Main results
Now, we establish the convergence analysis for the proposed algorithms, including CSER-








We show that the sequence {x̄t−1 : t ∈ [T ]} converges to a critical point.
First, we show the error bounds of CSER-Basic, and its local residual errors.
Lemma 4.1. (Bounded local error of CSER-Basic) In Algorithm 4.4, using the compressor
C with the approximation factor δ, under Assumption 2.4 (bounded gradients), the local







for ∀t ∈ [T ].
Proof. Case I: For t = 0, we have no local error:
ei,0 = 0.
Case II: For t = 1, we have the local error:
E‖ei,t‖2
≤ η2(1− δ)E ‖gi,t‖2
≤ (1− δ)η2V3.
Case III: For any t > 1, we can bound the local error:
E‖ei,t‖2
≤ (1− δ)E‖pi,t‖2
= (1− δ)E‖ei,t−1 − ηgi,t‖2
≤ (1− δ)(1 + a)E ‖ei,t−1‖2 + (1− δ)(1 + 1/a)E ‖ηgi,t‖2
≤ (1− δ)(1 + a)E ‖ei,t−1‖2 + (1− δ)η2(1 + 1/a)E ‖gi,t‖2
≤ (1− δ)(1 + a)E ‖ei,t−1‖2 + (1− δ)η2(1 + 1/a)V3
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≤ (1 + 1/a)(1− δ)η2V3
+∞∑
τ=0
[(1 + a)(1− δ)]τ
≤ 1 + 1/a
1− (1 + a)(1− δ)
(1− δ)η2V3,
for any a > 0, such that (1 + a)(1 − δ) ∈ (0, 1). The bound above is minimized when we
take a = 1√








Using the Lemma 4.1 above, we establish the error bound of CSER-Basic for smooth but
non-convex problems.
Theorem 4.1. (Error bound of CSER-Basic) We take Assumption 2.1 (smoothness), 2.2
(bounded variance), 2.4 (bounded gradients), and 2.5 (global minimum). Taking η ≤ 1
L
,
after T iterations, Algorithm 4.4 using the compressor C with the approximation factor δ
















)2 + Lηn V1









Proof. Conditional on the previous states (xi,t), using smoothness, we have











We bound the terms step by step.
Note that E [gi,t] = ∇Fi(xi,t−1). Thus, we have
2○



















































































































E ‖x̄t−1 − xi,t−1‖2 .
Using x̄t−1 − xi,t−1 = 1n
∑
















































































































)2 + Lη22n V1.
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)2 + Lηn V1.
QED.
We compare the error bound between error reset and error feedback. To do so, we show
the convergence analysis of error feedback as follows. The following error bound and the
corresponding proof are similar to the theoretical analysis in [94].
Lemma 4.2. (Error bound of EF-SGD) We take Assumption 2.1 (smoothness), 2.2 (bounded
variance), 2.4 (bounded gradients), and 2.5 (global minimum). Taking η ≤ 1
L
, after T itera-

















)2 + Lηn V1









where x̃t = xt − 1n
∑
i∈[n] ei,t.
Proof. We introduce auxiliary variables x̃t = xt − 1n
∑
i∈[n] ei,t.
It is easy to check that x̃t − x̃t−1 = − ηn
∑
i∈[n] gi,t, where E[gi,t] = ∇Fi(xt−1).
Conditional on the previous states, using smoothness, we have











We bound the terms step by step.
Note that E [gi,t] = ∇Fi(xt−1). Thus, we have
2○


































2E ‖∇F (xt−1)‖2 .
1○

















‖∇F (x̃t−1)−∇F (xt−1)‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
3○
.
Using smoothness, we have
3○
= ‖∇F (x̃t−1)−∇F (xt−1)‖2
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)2 + Lηn V1.
QED.
In the theoretical analysis above, we found that CSER-Basic and EF-SGD have the same
error bound. However, the error bound of CSER-Basic is not very tight, which is explained
in the following remark.










2. This variance vanishes when n = 1. However, for error feedback, the com-




2, which does not vanish when n = 1. Using a
single worker, CSER is equivalent to SGD, and the compression error vanishes, no matter
what compressor is used. In contrast, EF-SGD is not reduced to SGD even using a single
worker, due to the staleness in error feedback. Note that the same conclusion is also applied
to QSparse-local-SGD.
The remark above shows that error reset always has an error bound no greater than error
feedback. Furthermore, note that error reset utilizes the local residuals ei,t in a way different
from error feedback. Diving deep into the proofs, we find that their compression errors have
different sources. For error reset, the compression error comes from the difference between
the local residual errors, while for error feedback, the compression error comes from the
magnitude of the local residual errors.
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Now, we analyze the convergence of the generalized version of the proposed algorithm,
CSER. Note that for CSER-Basic, it is easy to check that xi,t− ei,t = xj,t− ej,t,∀i, j ∈ [n], t.
However, for the same statement in CSER, the proof is slightly more complicated, which is
shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. (Bifurcated local models of CSER) ei,t,∀i ∈ [n], t maintains the differences
between the local models xi,t:
xi,t − ei,t = xj,t − ej,t,∀i, j ∈ [n], t.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction.
For t = 0, we have xi,0 = x0, ei,0 = 0,∀i ∈ [n], thus xi,0 − ei,0 = xj,0 − ej,0,∀i, j ∈ [n].
Assume that
xi,t−1 − ei,t−1 = xj,t−1 − ej,t−1,∀i, j ∈ [n],
then we have 2 cases:
Case 1: mod (t,H) 6= 0. Then we have
xi,t = xi,t− 1
2







ei,t = ei,t− 1
2
= ei,t−1 − ηri,t.
Thus, we have










C2(gk,t) = xj,t − ej,t









,∀i, j ∈ [n].
Then, we have














































) = xj,t − ej,t.
QED.
To show the error bound of CSER, we first establish the upper bound of the local residual
errors in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4. (Error Reset of CSER) After every H steps, for Algorithm 4.8 using the com-
pressor C1 and C2 with the approximation factors δ1 and δ2, under Assumption 2.4 (bounded







for ∀t ∈ [T ], mod (t,H) = 0.
Proof. First, we establish the bound of the local error E‖ei,t− 1
2
‖2 before (partial) synchro-
nization.
Case I: For t = 0, we have no local error:
ei,0 = 0.
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for any a > 0, such that (1 + a)(1 − δ1) ∈ (0, 1). The bound above is minimized when we
take a = 1√
1−δ1
− 1, which results in
E‖ei,t− 1
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Combining all the 3 cases above, we obtain that for ∀t ∈ [T ] such that mod (t,H) = 0:
E‖ei,t− 1
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Then, after the (partial) synchronization, we have
E ‖ei,t‖2
≤ (1− δ1)E ‖ei,t‖2






for ∀t ∈ [T ], mod (t,H) = 0. QED.
Now we can establish the error bound for CSER.
Theorem 4.2. (Error bound of CSER) We take Assumption 2.1 (smoothness), 2.2 (bounded
variance), 2.4 (bounded gradients), and 2.5 (global minimum). Taking η ≤ 1
L
, after T itera-
tions, using the compressor C1 and C2 with the approximation factors δ1 and δ2, Algorithm 4.8


































Proof. Conditional on the previous states (xi,t), using smoothness, we have











We bound the terms step by step.
Note that E [gi,t] = ∇Fi(xi,t−1). Thus, we have
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, leading a linear speedup using more workers.
Corollary 4.1. (Convergence rate of CSER) We take Assumption 2.1 (smoothness), 2.2
(bounded variance), 2.4 (bounded gradients), and 2.5 (global minimum). Then, taking the









for some γ > 0, after
T  n iterations, using the compressor C1 and C2 with the approximation factors δ1 and δ2,






























































































































To compare the error bounds between CSER and QSparse-local-SGD, we quote the fol-
lowing results (reformatted to match the notations in this paper) from Theorem 1 of [48]
without proof.
Lemma 4.5. [48] Taking η ≤ 1
2L


























Comparing Lemma 4.5 with Theorem 4.2, CSER shows a better error bound than QSparse-
local-SGD.
Finally, we analyze the convergence of CSER with Nesterov’s momentum. Frist, we use
the following two lemmas to establish the upper bound of the momentum updates.
Lemma 4.6. (Bounded update of M-CSER) For any local update, under Assumption 2.4
(bounded gradients), we have E ‖pi,t‖2 ≤ η
2
(1−β)2V3, ∀i, t.





Thus, taking st =
∑t
τ=0 β
τ , we have
E ‖pi,t‖2
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Similar to the error bound of CSER, we establish the upper bound of the local residual
errors in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.7. (Error Reset of M-CSER) With momentum, under Assumption 2.4 (bounded









for ∀t ∈ [T ], mod (t,H) = 0.
Proof. First, we establish the bound of the local error E‖ei,t− 1
2
‖2 before (partial) synchro-
nization.
Case I: For t = 0, we have no local error:
ei,0 = 0.
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V3. . Lemma 4.6
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for any a > 0, such that (1 + a)(1 − δ1) ∈ (0, 1). The bound above is minimized when we
take a = 1√
1−δ1
− 1, which results in
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Combining all the 3 cases above, we obtain that for ∀t ∈ [T ] such that mod (t,H) = 0:
E‖ei,t− 1
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for ∀t ∈ [T ], mod (t,H) = 0. QED.
Using the lemma above, we have the following error bound for M-CSER. Note that larger
β leads to faster escape from the initial point, but worse asymptotic performance.
Theorem 4.3. (Error bound of M-CSER) We take Assumption 2.1 (smoothness), 2.2 (bounded





ter T iterations, using the compressor C1 and C2 with the approximation factors δ1 and δ2,













































Proof. To prove the convergence, we introduce 2 sequences of auxiliary variables: {x̄t, t ≥ 0}








x0, t = 0,x̄t − ηβ21−β 1n∑i∈[n] mi,t, t ≥ 1.
For t = 0, we have
z̄t+1 − z̄t
































































































































































Thus, for ∀t ≥ 0, we have








Conditional on all the states previous to xi,t, using smoothness, we have











We bound the terms step by step.
Note that E [gi,t] = ∇Fi(xi,t−1). Thus, for 2○, we have
2○
= E‖z̄t − z̄t−1‖2
= E



















































Then, for 1○, we have
1○


























































































= E ‖∇F (z̄t−1)−∇F (x̄t−1)‖2































































































E ‖x̄t−1 − xi,t−1‖2 .
Without loss of generality, assume that the latest synchronized model is xi,t0 , where t0 ≤
t− 1, mod (t0, H) = 0. Thus, we have
















































































































E ‖pi,τ − C1(pi,τ )‖2














E ‖pi,τ − C1(pi,τ )‖2 . Lemma 4.7





































Finally, combining all the ingredients above, we have
E [F (z̄t)− F (z̄t−1)]
≤ 1○ + L
2
2○

































































































































































By re-arranging the terms, we have
‖∇F (x̄t−1)‖2

















































Similar to CSER, the following corollary shows that M-CSER converges to a critical point





. Increasing the number of workers n accelerates the convergence.
Corollary 4.2. (Convergence rate of M-CSER) We take Assumption 2.1 (smoothness),
2.2 (bounded variance), 2.4 (bounded gradients), and 2.5 (global minimum). Then, taking









for some γ > 0, after
T ≥ 4γ2L2n
(1−β)2 iterations, using the compressor C1 and C2 with the approximation factors δ1 and










































































, and T ≥ 4γ2L2n
(1−β)2 , we have η ≤
1−β
2L




































































In this section, we report the empirical results in a distributed environment.
4.8.1 Evaluation setup
We compare our algorithms with 3 baselines: SGD with full precision (SGD in brief),
EF-SGD, and QSparse-local-SGD. We use momentum to accelerate the training in all the
experiments, though QSparse-local-SGD with momentum does not have convergence guar-
antees in its original paper [48].
We conduct experiments on two image classification benchmarks: CIFAR-100 [111], and
ImageNet dataset [112], in a cluster of 8 machines where each machine has 1 NVIDIA
V100 GPU and up to 10 Gb/s networking bandwidth (8 AWS P3.2xlarge instances). Each
experiment is repeated 5 times.
For CIFAR-100, we use the wide residual network (Wide-ResNet-40-8, [113]). We set
weight decay to 0.0005, momentum to 0.9, and mini-batch size to 16 per worker. We decay
the learning rates by 0.2 at 60, 120 and 160 epochs, and train for 200 epochs. The initial
learning rate is varied in {0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 1.0}.
For ImageNet, we use a 50-layer ResNet [6]. We set weight decay to 0.0001, momentum
to 0.9, and mini-batch size to 32 per worker. We use a learning rate schedule consisting of 5
epochs of linear warmup, followed by a cosine-annealing learning-rate decay [114], and train
for total 120 epochs. We enumerate the initial learning rates in {0.025, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5}.
For all the algorithms, we test the performance with different overall compression ra-
tios (RC). We use the globally-randomized blockwise sparsifier (GRBS) as the compressor,
as proposed in Section 4.6.3. Note that CSER has not only two different compressors with
compression ratios RC1 and RC2 respectively, but also the synchronization interval H. The
overall compression ratio RC of CSER is
1
1/RC2+1/(RC1×H)
. For QSparse-local-SGD, its overall
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Table 4.1: Compressor configurations
Optimizer Overall RC RC2 RC1 H
EF-SGD 2 2
QSparse-local-SGD 2 1 2
CSER-Basic 2 2
CSER 2 4 2 2
EF-SGD 4 4
QSparse-local-SGD 4 1 4
CSER-Basic 4 4
CSER 4 8 2 4
CSER-PL 4 2 2
EF-SGD 8 8
QSparse-local-SGD 8 1 8
CSER-Basic 8 8
CSER 8 16 2 8
CSER-PL 8 2 4
EF-SGD 16 16
QSparse-local-SGD 16 4 4
CSER-Basic 16 16
CSER 16 32 8 4
CSER-PL 16 4 4
EF-SGD 32 32
QSparse-local-SGD 32 4 8
CSER-Basic 32 32
CSER 32 64 8 8
CSER-PL 32 8 4
EF-SGD 64 64
QSparse-local-SGD 64 16 4
CSER-Basic 64 64
CSER 64 128 8 16
CSER-PL 64 8 8
EF-SGD 128 128
QSparse-local-SGD 128 16 8
CSER-Basic 128 128
CSER 128 256 4 64
CSER-PL 128 8 16
EF-SGD 256 256
QSparse-local-SGD 256 128 2
CSER-Basic 256 256
CSER 256 512 16 32
CSER-PL 256 16 16
EF-SGD 512 512
QSparse-local-SGD 512 128 4
CSER-Basic 512 512
CSER 512 1024 8 128
CSER-PL 512 16 32
EF-SGD 1024 1024
QSparse-local-SGD 1024 128 8
CSER-Basic 1024 1024
CSER 1024 2048 32 64
CSER-PL 1024 32 32
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RC is RC1 ×H. Note that QSparse-local-SGD is reduced to local SGD when taking RC1 = 1,
which is also tested in our experiments. The detailed configurations of H, RC1 , and RC2 can
be found in Table 4.1.
4.8.2 Empirical results
Table 4.2 presents the test accuracy on CIFAR-100 with various compression ratios. We
evaluate not only CSER, but also the other two special cases: CSER-Basic and CSER-
PL. Note that for CSER, CSER-PL, and QSparse-local-SGD with the same overall RC, the
configurations of H, RC1 , and RC2 are not unique. We try multiple configurations and report
the ones perform best on the training loss.
Table 4.2: Testing accuracy (%) on CIFAR-100 with different overall compression ratios (RC).
Note that fully synchronous SGD does not have compression, thus RC = 1, and all the other
algorithms do not have the fully synchronous cases, thus RC ≥ 2.
Baseline Proposed algorithm
Optimizer/ SGD EF-SGD QSparse-local CSER-Basic CSER CSER-PL
RC -SGD
1 87.01±0.11
2 87.20±0.10 87.16±0.03 87.17±0.21 87.47±0.03
4 86.97±0.08 87.08±0.22 87.25±0.23 87.22±0.03 87.33±0.05
8 86.61±0.23 87.15±0.10 87.14±0.05 87.09±0.05 87.27±0.04
16 85.69±0.31 87.02±0.13 87.15±0.09 87.28±0.04 86.72±0.05
32 85.17±0.12 86.70±0.04 86.83±0.20 86.90±0.15 86.92±0.26
64 84.65±0.07 80.64±0.47 86.63±0.16 86.78±0.11 86.91±0.15
128 83.50±0.87 70.27±2.37 86.30±0.15 86.81±0.17 86.36±0.21
256 83.92±0.55 diverge 86.34±0.20 86.68±0.07 86.27±0.02
512 76.05±0.56 diverge 85.75±0.34 86.20±0.09 85.68±0.12
1024 diverge diverge 85.13±0.13 85.66±0.07 84.94±0.37
In Figure 4.1, we show the test accuracy on ImageNet, with the overall compression ratios
in {32, 256, 1024}. Since the experiments on ImageNet are expensive, we do not tune different
configurations of compressors (H,RC1 , RC2) for each overall RC on ImageNet, but directly
use the best configurations tuned on CIFAR-100.
4.8.3 Discussion
We can see that in all the experiments, with the same compression ratio, CSER shows
better performance than the baselines. When the compression ratio is small enough (≤ 16),
68
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Figure 4.1: Testing accuracy with different algorithms, for ResNet-50 on ImageNet.
the test accuracy is even better than fully synchronous SGD on CIFAR-100. When RC ≤ 32,
for CIFAR-100, QSparse-local-SGD has comparable performance to CSER or its special
cases. Even with very large compression ratio (≈ 256), the proposed algorithm can achieve
comparable accuracy to SGD with full precision. CSER accelerates training by 10× for
CIFAR-100, and 4.5× for ImageNet.
Compared to EF-SGD, CSER shows much better performance when the compression
ratio is large (RC ≥ 64). We can see that CSER fixes the convergence issue in EF-SGD and
QSparse-local-SGD when aggressive compressors are used. For ImageNet with RC = 1024,
even if we decrease the learning rates to 0.025, EF-SGD and QSparse-local-SGD still diverge,
while CSER converges well with even larger learning rates.
Note that in most cases, CSER performs better than CSER-Basic and CSER-PL. The
reason is that CSER uses both gradient partial synchronization and model partial synchro-
nization. With finely tuned compression ratios, the local models will not be too far away
from each other between the model synchronization rounds, which results in better conver-
gence. Note that although CSER-Basic has slightly worse performance compared to CSER




In this chapter, we propose a novel communication-efficient SGD algorithm called CSER.
We introduce error reset and partial synchronization that enable an aggressive compression
rate as high as 1024×. Theoretically, we show that the proposed algorithm enjoys a speedup
using more workers. Our empirical results show that the proposed algorithm accelerates
the training of deep neural networks. In future work, we will apply our algorithms to other
datasets and applications, especially SGD with adaptive learning rate and NLP applications.
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CHAPTER 5: ASYNCHRONOUS FEDERATED OPTIMIZATION
In this chapter, we study another aspect that affects the efficiency of communication in
distributed optimization: synchronization strategy. The goal is to make the synchronization
of distributed SGD more flexible and robust to stragglers. To be more specific, we consider
combining federated optimization with asynchronous training. Most contents of this chapter
are published in the paper [37]. The main contributions of this chapter are listed as follows:
• We propose an asynchronous federated optimization algorithm, and a prototype system
design.
• We prove the convergence of the proposed approach for a restricted family of non-convex
problems, under non-IID settings
• We propose strategies for controlling the error caused by asynchrony. To this end, we
introduce a mixing hyperparameter which adaptively controls the trade-off between the
convergence rate and variance reduction according to the staleness.
• We show empirically that the proposed algorithm converges quickly and often outperforms
synchronous federated optimization in practical settings.
• This chapter establishes the foundation of the asynchronous mode of the proposed dis-
tributed learning system that integrates both communication efficiency and security, which
is presented in Chapter 7.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Federated learning [34, 115, 116] enables training a global model on datasets partitioned
across a massive number of edge devices with relatively insufficient resources such as mem-
ory and computation power. On one hand, the federated approaches are motivated by
the modern phenomenon of distributed (often personal) data collected by edge devices at
scale, from the weak devices such as smartphones, wearable devices, sensors, and smart
homes/buildings. Ideally, the large amounts of training data from diverse users result in
improved representation and generalization of machine-learning models. On the other hand,
federated learning is also motivated by the desire for privacy preservation [35, 75]. In some
scenarios, there are regulations such as US HIPAA laws [117], US FERPA laws [118], and by
some interpretations of Europe’s GDPR law [119], which legally require on-device training
without depositing data in the cloud. Furthermore, there are scenarios where we want to
71
train a global model on the data from multiple organizations, whose internal data can not
be revealed or transferred out of the local datacenters due to the privacy or confidentiality
regulations.
As a result, in federated learning, the models are trained locally on the devices where
the data are stored. Then, the locally trained models or accumulated updates are revealed
and aggregated on a central server to produce the global model. Such a procedure prevents
revealing the local training data, but suffers from the slow communication and networking
due to the geographical distances between the training devices and the central servers.
A federated learning system is often composed of servers and workers, with an architecture
that is similar to parameter servers [17, 18, 19]. The workers train the models locally on
the private data. The servers aggregate the learned models from the workers and produce
a global model on the cloud/datacenter. To help protect user privacy, the workers do not
expose the training data to the servers, and instead, only expose the trained models or the
locally accumulated updates. Thus, the communication between the servers and the workers
is one of the most important components in a federated learning system, since it is the only
way for the servers to obtain the information to update the global models.
5.2 PRELIMINARIES
In the federated learning scenarios, the workers are geographically distant to the central
server, which makes the communication very slow. To reduce the communication overhead,
the typical federated optimization methods train deep neural networks with infrequent syn-
chronization. We first introduce the baseline synchronous federated optimization algorithm:
FedAvg [34]. The details of FedAvg are presented in Algorithm 5.1.
In general, FedAvg is similar to local SGD, but with two main differences:
• In each epoch, the active workers that participate the training is randomly subsampled
from all the workers.
• The number of local iterations between every two synchronization rounds varies among
different workers.
Furthermore, we make the following assumption for the number of local updates.
Assumption 5.1. (Bounded local iterations) On any worker, the number of local updates
is lower bounded by Hmin, and upper bounded by Hmax.
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Algorithm 5.1: Federated Averaging (FedAvg) [34]
Input: k ∈ [n]
Initialize x0 ∈ Rd
for all server step t ∈ [T ] do
Randomly select a group of workers St ⊆ [n], |St| = k
for all i ∈ St in parallel do
Receive the latest global model xt−1 from the server
xi,t,0 ← xt−1
for all local iteration h ∈ [Hi,t] do
Randomly sample zi,t,h
xi,t,h ← xi,t,h−1 − η∇f(xi,t,h−1; zi,t,h)
end for
Push xt,Hi,t to the server
end for







Our work is motivated by the following key properties of federated learning, which are
also highlighted in some of the previous works [34, 116]:
• Infrequent task activation. Firstly, edge devices typically have weak computational
capacity and limited battery power. Thus, unlike traditional distributed machine learning,
on-device federated learning tasks are executed only when the device can participate, e.g.,
when idle, charging, and connected to unmetered networks (i.e., WiFi) [35]. Edge devices
ping the servers when they are ready to execute training tasks. The servers then schedule
training tasks on available edge devices. Secondly, to avoid congesting the network, the
server selects a subset of available devices to activate training tasks. For these reasons,
the training task may be activated infrequently on each edge device.
• Infrequent communication. The connection between edge devices and the remote
servers may frequently be unavailable, slow, or expensive (in terms of communication
costs or battery power usage). Thus, compared to typical distributed optimization, the
frequency of communication in federated learning needs to be reduced.
• Various timing of check-in. Due to the infrequent task activation and communica-
tion, as well as the heterogeneity in the users’ behaviors and training environments on
the remote devices, the timing of the occasional communication with the servers vary
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from worker to worker, which makes it very difficult to reach synchronization or conduct
synchronous training even for a subset of workers.
• Large numbers of workers. For federated learning on the edge devices, the overall
number of workers can be extremely large, compared to the traditional distributed training
in datacenters.
In the previous works, federated learning is usually implemented by using the synchronous
approach, i.e., the server waits for all the active workers that have been chosen to participate
in a round to respond before executing the subsequent steps. However, one potential issue in
this synchronous approach is its susceptibility to congestion and delays caused by stragglers,
which is caused by the characteristics of federated learning mentioned above. As a result, the
previous works such as FedAvg have to limit the number of active workers k to avoid network
congestion or the variety in the check-in time of the different workers. In particular, the
standard synchronous training algorithms for federated averaging [34, 35] use a synchronous
approach for practical deployments and are designed to handle hundreds of devices in parallel,
much fewer than the nearly 4 billion mobile phones which are potentially available [120].
Consider the potential issues with the standard synchronous architecture. As availability
and completion time vary from device to device, e.g., due to limited computational capacity
and battery time, it is difficult to synchronize the selected devices at the end of each epoch.
Often, some devices will no longer be available before synchronization. As a remedy, the
server has to determine a timeout threshold to drop the stragglers. If the number of survived
devices is too small, the server may have to drop the entire epoch including all the received
updates. Furthermore, once synchronized, congestion issues can also occur at small scales,
e.g., with thousands of devices in a stadium during a game, too many devices checking in (i.e.,
declaring availability to participate in a computation round) at the same time can congest
the network on the server-side. When this occurs, the server is limited to selecting only from
the subset of available devices to trigger the training tasks. As a result, for synchronous
federated learning, the central scheduler has very limited choices: the number of activated
devices can not be too large so that it will not congest the server; and it can not be too
small so that there will be sufficient responses, which makes the scheduler less flexible.
We propose a novel asynchronous approach and algorithm for federated optimization. The
key ideas are 1) to solve regularized local problems to improve the convergence, and 2) then
use a weighted average to update the global model, where the mixing weight is set adaptively
as a function of the staleness. The combination of these techniques results in an effective
asynchronous federated optimization procedure. Furthermore, we propose the design of a
federated learning system with flexible and adaptive synchronization.
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5.4 METHODOLOGY
Now we formally introduce the asynchronous federated optimization algorithm. A single
execution of federated optimization has T server steps. In the tth server step, the server
receives a locally trained model xnew from an arbitrary worker, and updates the global model
by a weighted average:
xt = (1− α)xt−1 + αxnew, (5.1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the mixing hyperparameter.
On an arbitrary worker i, after receiving a global model xt′ (potentially stale) from the
server, we locally solve the following regularized optimization problem using SGD for arbi-







The server and workers conduct updates asynchronously. The server immediately updates
the global model whenever it receives a local model. The communication between the server
and workers is non-blocking.
The detailed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 5.2. We name this algorithm as FedAsync.
The model parameter xi,t′,h is updated in hth local iteration after receiving xt′ , on the ith
device. zi,t′,h is the data randomly drawn in hth local iteration after receiving xt′ , on the ith
device. Hi,t′ is the number of local iterations after receiving xt′ , on the ith device. η is the
learning rate and T is the total number of server steps.
Remark 5.1. On the server side, there are two threads running asynchronously in parallel:
the scheduler and the updater. The scheduler periodically triggers the training tasks on some
workers. The updater receives the locally trained models from the workers, and updates the
global model. There could be multiple updater threads with read-write lock on the global
model, which improves the throughput. The scheduler randomizes the timing of training
tasks to avoid overloading the updater thread, and controls the staleness (t − 1 − t′ in the
updater thread). We illustrate the overview of the system in Figure 5.1.
Intuitively, larger staleness results in greater error when updating the global model. For
the local models with large staleness τ = t−1−t′, we decrease α to mitigate the error caused
by staleness. As shown in Algorithm 5.2, optionally, we use a function s(τ) to decide the
value of α. There are infinite options of s(τ). We list some choices for s(τ), parameterized
by a > 0, b ≥ 0:
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Algorithm 5.2: Asynchronous Federated Optimization (FedAsync)
Server Process
Input: α ∈ (0, 1)
Initialize x0 ∈ Rd, αt ← α, ∀t ∈ [T ]
Scheduler Thread
Scheduler periodically triggers some training tasks on some workers, and sends them
the latest global model with time stamp
Updater Thread
for all server step t ∈ [T ] do
Receive the pair (xnew, t
′) from any worker
Optional: αt ← α× s(t− 1− t′), s(·) is a function of the staleness
xt = (1− αt)xt−1 + αtxnew
end for
Worker Processes
for all i ∈ [n] in parallel do
If triggered by the scheduler:
Receive the pair of the global model and its time stamp (xt′ , t
′) from the server
xi,t′,0 ← xt′




for all local iteration h ∈ [Hi,t′ ] do
Randomly sample zi,t′,h ∼ Di
xi,t′,h ← xi,t′,h−1 − η∇gxt(xi,t′,h−1; zi,t′,h)
end for
Push (xi,t′,Hi,t′ , t
′) to the server
end for
• Linear: sa(τ) = 1a(τ)+1 .
• Polynomial: sa(τ) = (τ + 1)−a.
• Exponential: sa(τ) = exp (−aτ).
• Hinge: sa,b(τ) =
1 if τ ≤ b1
a(τ−b)+1 otherwise
.
We compare the performance of different choices of s(τ) in the experiments.
5.5 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we establish the convergence guarantees of FedAsync. For simplicity, we




















Figure 5.1: System overview. 0○: scheduler triggers training tasks through the coordinator.
1○, 2○: worker receives a delayed global model xt′ from server. 3○: worker does local
update as described in Algorithm 5.2. The worker process can switch between the two
states: working and idle, according to the devices’ availability. 4○, 5○, 6○: worker pushes
the locally updated model to server via coordinator. The scheduler queues the models
received in 5○, and feed them to the updater sequentially in 6○. 7○, 8○: server updates
the global model and make it ready to be read in the coordinator. In our system, 1○ and 5○
operates asynchronously in parallel, so that the server can trigger training tasks on devices
at any time, and the devices can push the locally updated models to the server at any time.
Theorem 5.1. (Error bound of FedAsync) We take Assumption 2.1 (smoothness), 2.2 (bounded
variance), 2.3 (bounded heterogeneity between the workers), 2.4 (bounded gradients), 2.5 (global
minimum), and 5.1 (bounded number of local iterations). Fruthremore, we assume bounded
delay t − 1 − t′ ≤ τ , and bounded domain ‖x − y‖2 ≤ V4, where x, y ∈ Rd are arbitrary
model parameters. Taking α ≤ 1
LHmax
, after T server steps, Algorithm 5.2 (asynchronous
federated optimization) has the following error bound:∑
t∈[T ] Ht‖∇F (xt−1)‖2∑
t∈[T ] Ht
















where Ht is the number local updates in the new model received by the server in the t
th






, and the local mini-batch size
√
THmin, we have∑
























Proof. Using smoothness and α ≤ 1
HmaxL
, we have
F (xt)− F (xt−1)










































































































Note that xi,t′,h−1 is the local model on the ith device, which is locally updated for h− 1
steps, based on the global model xt′ , where t
′ ≤ t− 1.
To finish the error bound, we need to establish the upper bounds of 1○ and 2○ first.
Note that we assume the bounded delay (t− 1)− t′ ≤ τ . Thus, we have
1○
= ‖xt−1 − xt′‖2




































≤ 2α2τ 2V4 + 2η2α2τ 2H2maxV3.
Furthermore, conditional on all the historical model parameters previous to xt, we have
E[ 2○]
= E‖∇F (xt−1)−∇f(xi,t′,h−1; zi,t′,h)‖2
≤ 3‖∇F (xt−1)−∇F (xi,t′,h−1)‖2 + 3V2 + 3V1
≤ 3L2‖xt−1 − xi,t′,h−1‖2 + 3V2 + 3V1 . smoothness
= 3L2‖xt−1 − xt′ + η
∑
h1∈[h−1]
∇f(xi,t′,h11; zi,t′,h1)‖2 + 3V2 + 3V1
≤ 3L2‖xt−1 − xt′‖+ 3L2η2‖
∑
h1∈[h−1]
∇f(xi,t′,h11; zi,t′,h1)‖2 + 3V2 + 3V1
≤ 6L2α2τ 2V4 + 6L2η2α2τ 2H2maxV3 + 3L2η2H2maxV3 + 3V2 + 3V1
≤ 6L2α2τ 2V4 + 9L2η2τ 2H2maxV3 + 3V2 + 3V1.
Combining all the ingredients above and taking the expectation conditional on all the
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previous model parameters, we have








[2α2τ 2V4 + 2η
2α2τ 2H2maxV3] + ηαHi,t′ [6L
2α2τ 2V4 + 9L
2η2τ 2H2maxV3 + 3V2 + 3V1].
By re-arranging the terms, we have
Hi,t′‖∇F (xt−1)‖2 ≤





[2α2τ 2V4 + 2η
2α2τ 2H2maxV3]
+12L2Hi,t′α
2τ 2V4 + 18L
2η2τ 2H2maxHi,t′V3 + 6Hi,t′V2 + 6Hi,t′V1.
By telescoping and taking total expectation, we have∑
t∈[T ] Ht‖∇F (xt−1)‖2∑
t∈[T ] Ht











+12L2α2τ 2V4 + 18L
2η2τ 2H2maxV3 + 6(V1 + V2).
Taking α ≤ 1
T 3/8
, η ≤ 1
T 1/8
, and the local minibatch size
√
THmin, we have∑
























Compare the error bound of asynchronous federated optimization to the one of vanilla
asynchronous SGD (Algorithm 2.3), we find that FedAsync requires larger mini-batch sizes
for convergence, and has larger noises caused by heterogeneity, due to the infrequent syn-
chronization. Furthermore, larger α leads to faster escape from the initial value, but also
results in larger error caused by staleness and asynchrony. Thus, we could also use larger α
at the beginning, and decrease the value at the end of training.
5.6 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we empirically evaluate the proposed FedAsync algorithm.
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5.6.1 Datasets
We conduct the experiments on two benchmark datasets: CIFAR-10 [111], and WikiText-
2 [121]. In both experiments, the training dataset is partitioned onto n = 100 devices. We
use mini-batch size 50 for CIFAR-10, and 20 for WikiText-2. Note that our experiments in
this chapter are all based on simulation, since we do not have enough computation resources
to launch 100 workers simultaneously.
5.6.2 Evaluation setup
The baseline algorithm is FedAvg (Algorithm 5.1) introduced by [34], which implements
synchronous federated optimization. For FedAvg, in each serve step, k = 10 devices are ran-
domly selected to launch local updates. We also consider single-thread SGD (Algorithm 2.1)
as a baseline. For FedAsync, we simulate the asynchrony by randomly sampling the staleness
τ from a uniform distribution.
We repeat each experiment 10 times and take the average. For CIFAR-10, we use the top-
1 accuracy on the testing set as the evaluation metric. To compare asynchronous training
and synchronous training, we consider “metrics vs. number of gradients”. The “number of
gradients” is the number of gradients applied to the global model. For WikiText-2, we use
the perplexity (i.e., exp(loss)) on the testing set as the evaluation metric.
We also test the performance of FedAsync with adaptive mixing hyperparameters αt =
α × s(τ). We employ the following three strategies, including constant αt = α, polynomial
functions, and hinge functions parameterized by a, b > 0, as the weighting function s(τ).
For convenience, we refer to FedAsync with constant α as FedAsync+Const, FedAsync
with polynomial adaptive α as FedAsync+Poly, and FedAsync with hinge adaptive α as
FedAsync+Hinge.
5.6.3 Empirical results
We test FedAsync (asynchronous federated optimization in Algorithm 5.2) with different
learning rates η, regularization weights ρ, mixing hyperparameter α, and staleness τ .
In Figure 5.2 and 5.3, we show how FedAsync converges when the number of gradients
grows. We can see that when the overall staleness is small, FedAsync converges as fast as
SGD, and faster than FedAvg. When the staleness is larger, FedAsync converges slower.
In the worst case, FedAsync has similar convergence rate as FedAvg. When α is too large,
the convergence can be unstable, especially for FedAsync+Const. The convergence is more
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(a) Top-1 accuracy on testing set, τ ≤ 4


























(b) Top-1 accuracy on testing set, τ ≤ 16
Figure 5.2: Top-1 accuracy (the higher the better) vs. # of gradients on CNN and CIFAR-10
dataset. The maximum staleness is 4 or 16. η = 0.1, ρ = 0.005. For FedAsync+Poly, we
take a = 0.5. For FedAsync+Hinge, we take a = 10, b = 4. Note that when the maximum
staleness is 4, FedAsync+Const and FedAsync+Hinge with b = 4 are the same.
robust when adaptive α is used.


























(a) Perplexity on testing set, τ ≤ 4


























(b) Perplexity on testing set, τ ≤ 16
Figure 5.3: Perplexity (the lower the better) vs. # of gradients on LSTM-based language
model and WikiText-2 dataset. The maximum staleness is 4 or 16. η = 20, ρ = 0.0001. For
FedAsync+Poly, we take a = 0.5. For FedAsync+Hinge, we take a = 10, b = 2.
In Figure 5.4, we show how staleness affects the convergence of FedAsync, evaluated on
CNN and CIFAR-10 dataset. Overall, larger staleness makes the convergence slower, but
the influence is not catastrophic. Furthermore, the instability caused by large staleness
can be mitigated by using adaptive α. Using adaptive α always improves the performance,
compared to using constant α.
82





















Figure 5.4: Top-1 accuracy on CNN and CIFAR-10 dataset at the end of training, with
different staleness. η = 0.1, ρ = 0.01. α has initial value 0.9.
5.6.4 Discussion
In general, the convergence of FedAsync is between single-thread SGD and FedAvg. Larger
α and smaller staleness make FedAsync closer to single-thread SGD. Smaller α and larger
staleness makes FedAsync closer to FedAvg.
Empirically, we observe that FedAsync is generally insensitive to hyperparameters. When
the staleness is large, we can tune α to improve the convergence. Without adaptive α,
smaller α is better for larger staleness. For adaptive α, our best choice empirically was
FedAsync+Hinge. FedAsync+Poly and FedAsync+Hinge have similar performance.
In summary, compared to FedAvg, FedAsync performs as good, and in most cases better.
When the staleness is small, FedAsync converges much faster than FedAvg. When the
staleness is large, FedAsync still achieves similar performance as FedAvg.
5.7 CONCLUSION
We proposed the federated optimization algorithm with asynchronous update. Both the-
oretical and empirical analysis are provided. Although we only show simulated experiments
in this chapter, later we will show that the asynchronous federated optimization can be
combined with message compression in a real distributed learning system with empirical
evaluations.
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CHAPTER 6: BYZANTINE-TOLERANT DISTRIBUTED SGD
In this chapter, we study the Byzantine tolerance in distributed SGD algorithms. We
discuss the definition of Byzantine failures in distributed SGD, and various approaches to
protect distributed learning systems from malicious attacks. Most contents of this chapter
are published in the papers [38, 39, 122, 123, 124]. The contributions of this chapter are
summarized as follows:
• We present the definition of the Byzantine attacks and the Byzantine tolerance in the
scenario of distributed SGD.
• We study the previous works based on robust statistics, and their potential vulnerability
to the Byzantine attacks.
• We present a score-based approach to Byzantine tolerance in distributed SGD, that works
with an arbitrarily large number of faulty nodes, for both synchronous and asynchronous
training.
• We provide both theoretical and empirical analysis for the proposed approaches.
• This chapter establishes an important foundation of our proposed distributed learning sys-
tem that integrates both communication efficiency and security presented in Chapter 7.
In the integrated learning system, we will adapt the score-based approach presented in
this chapter to both synchronous training and asynchronous training with reduced com-
munication.
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In distributed machine learning, one of the most important and difficult problems today
is security, which has drawn increasing attention in recent years. In our research, we study
the Byzantine failures [26], which are perhaps the most well-studied threat model in the
traditional distributed systems. In the Byzantine threat model, the workers can behave
arbitrarily malicious. In addition, Byzantine workers are supposed to be omniscient and can
conspire. In the machine-learning scenario, Byzantine failures may be caused by poisoned
data, and hardware or software failures, such as bit-flipping in the memory or communication
media.
In this chapter, we study the Byzantine failures and Byzantine-tolerant SGD in the param-
eter server architecture, as introduced in Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2. The system is composed of
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the server nodes and the worker nodes. In each iteration, the honest workers pull the latest
model from the servers, compute the updates using the locally sampled training data, and
then push the updates to the servers. However, the Byzantine workers can send arbitrary
values to the servers. The servers use the received messages to update the global models.
In the remaining of this chapter, we first discuss the previous approaches based on robust
statistics, especially their potential weakness. To overcome such potential weakness, we
propose a new definition of Byzantine tolerance, which is particularly designed for distributed
SGD. Based on the new definition, we propose a new framework of Byzantine-tolerant SGD
algorithms. Different from the previous works, the new framework uses validation data to
verify the received updates, which tolerates an arbitrary number of Byzantine workers, and
works for both synchronous and asynchronous training.
6.2 PRELIMINARIES
First, we formally define the Byzantine failures in distributed SGD, for both synchronous
and asynchronous training. Then, we briefly introduce several previous work which tolerate
Byzantine workers using robust statistics on the server.
6.2.1 Byzantine Failures in Distributed SGD
We define the threat model: Byzantine failures in distributed SGD, for both IID and
non-IID settings (depending on whether Di = Dj,∀i, j ∈ [n]), and both synchronous and
asynchronous training. In this chapter, we only consider a single gradient estimator as
each update. Later in Chapter 7, we will extend the definition to SGD with infrequent
synchronization, where each update is composed of a sequence of gradient descent steps.
Definition 6.1. (Threat model for synchronous SGD). We assume that there are n honest
workers and q Byzantine workers. When the server receives a gradient estimator g̃i,t from
the ith worker in the t th iteration, it is either correct or Byzantine. If sent by a Byzantine
worker, g̃i,t is assigned arbitrary values. If sent by an honest worker, the correct gradient is
∇f(xt−1; zi,t), ∀i ∈ [n], t ∈ [T ]. Thus, we have
g̃i,t =
arbitrary value, if worker i is Byzantine, i.e. i ∈ [n+ 1, n+ q],gi,t = ∇f(xt−1; zi,t ∼ Di), otherwise, i.e. i ∈ [n].
Definition 6.2. (Threat model for asynchronous SGD). We assume that there are n honest
workers and q Byzantine workers. When the server receives a gradient estimator g̃t from
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the ith worker in the t th iteration, it is either correct or Byzantine. If sent by a Byzantine
worker, g̃t is assigned arbitrary values. If sent by an honest worker, the correct gradient is
∇f(xt′ ; zi,t′), ∀i ∈ [n], t′ ≤ t− 1. Thus, we have
g̃t =
arbitrary value, if worker i is Byzantine, i.e. i ∈ [n+ 1, n+ q],gt = ∇f(xt′ ; zi,t′ ∼ Di, t′ ≤ t− 1), otherwise, i.e. i ∈ [n].
The threat models above only make assumptions for the workers. For the servers, we make
the following assumption.
Assumption 6.1. (Honest server and anonymous worker) We assume that the servers are
always honest. However, whenever the servers receive a message, they do not know from
which worker the message is sent, i.e., the workers are anonymous to the servers.
6.2.2 Approaches Based on Robust Statistics
Most of the previous work are based on robust statistics. They share the following char-
acteristics:
• The algorithm is based on aggregation, where the servers collect multiple updates, and
take the average of the selected ones to update the global model parameters.
• The algorithm select a cluster of updates from the set of collected updates. The updates
distant to the selected cluster are filtered out.
For synchronous training, we use the general framework presented in Algorithm 6.1. The
servers collect and aggregate the gradients sent by the workers, and update the model as
follows:
xt = xt−1 − ηAggr({g̃i,t : i ∈ [n+ q]}), (6.1)
where Aggr(·) is an aggregation rule, which varies in different algorithms. If we use the
simple averaging as the aggregation rule: Aggr({g̃i,t : i ∈ [n + q]}) = 1n+q
∑
i∈[n+q g̃i,t,
then Algorithm 6.1 is equivalent to the vanilla distributed synchronous SGD presented in
Algorithm 2.2.
In the following definitions, we introduce several previous works that provide robust op-
tions of the aggregation rule Aggr(·): trimmed mean [30], Phocas [122], and Krum.
To define trimmed mean and Phocas, first we define ordered statistics.
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Algorithm 6.1: Distributed Synchronous SGD with Robust Aggregation
1: Server
2: x0 ∈ Rd
3: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
4: Broadcast xt−1 to all the workers
5: Wait until all the gradients {g̃i,t : i ∈ [n+ q]} arrive
6: Compute ¯̃gt = Aggr({g̃i,t : i ∈ [n+ q]})
7: Update the parameter xt ← xt−1 − η¯̃gt
8: end for
1: Worker (honest) i = 1, . . . , n
2: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
3: Receive xt−1 from the server
4: gi,t ← ∇f(xt−1; zi,t)
5: Send gi,t to the server
6: end for
Definition 6.3. (Order Statistics) By sorting the scalar sequence {ui : i ∈ [m]}, we get
u1:m ≤ u2:m ≤ . . . ≤ um:m, where uk:m is the kth smallest element in {ui : i ∈ [m]}.
Based on the ordered statistics, we define the trimmed mean for a sequence of scalars.
Definition 6.4. (1-dimensional trimmed mean) For 2b < m, the b-trimmed mean of the
sequence of scalars {ui : i ∈ [m]} is defined as follows:






where uk:m is the kth smallest element in {ui : i ∈ [m]} defined in Definition 6.3.
The high-dimensional version, Trmeanb({g̃i,t : i ∈ [m]}), simply applies Trmeanb(·) in the
coordinate-wise manner.
Definition 6.5. (Trimmed mean [30]) Parameterized by b, given m = n+q candidate gradi-
ents, we define the trimmed mean aggregation rule Trmean(·) as ¯̃gt = Trmean({g̃i,t : i ∈ [n+
q]}), where for any j ∈ [d], the jth dimension of ¯̃gt is (¯̃gt)j = Trmeanb ({(g̃i,t)j, . . . , (g̃n+q,t)j}),
(g̃i,t)j is the jth dimension of the vector g̃i,t.
Note that median is a special case of trimmed mean, where m− 2b ∈ {1, 2}.
Using coordinate-wise trimmed mean, we can aggregate not only the stochastic gradients
as in [30], but also the local accumulations of stochastic gradients resulted from infrequent
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synchronization. In [124], we combine the coordinate-wise trimmed mean with local SGD,
to achieve both communication efficiency and Byzantine tolerance.
Using the trimmed mean, we have to drop 2b elements for each coordinate. Based on
the trimmed mean, we propose an algorithm called Phocas [122], which takes the average
of the m− b values nearest to the trimmed mean in each coordinate. We call the resulting
aggregation rule Phocas 1, which is defined as follows.
Definition 6.6. (Phocas [122]) We sort the scalar sequence {ui : i ∈ [m]} by using the
distance to a certain value y: |u1/y− y| ≤ |u2/y− y| ≤ . . . ≤ |um/y− y|, where uk/y is the kth
nearest element to y in {ui : i ∈ [m]}. Phocas is the average over the first (m − b) nearest
elements to the b-trimmed mean y = Trmeanb({ui : i ∈ [m]}):





Parameterized by b, given m = n + q candidate gradients, the high-dimensional version,
¯̃gt = Phocasb({g̃i,t : i ∈ [m]}), simply applies Phocasb(·) in the coordinate-wise manner:
(¯̃gt)j = Phocasb ({(g̃i,t)j, . . . , (g̃n+q,t)j}), where (g̃i,t)j is the jth dimension of the vector g̃i,t,
j ∈ [d].
The last Byzantine-tolerant robust aggregation method, Krum [29], is not exactly based
on robust statistics, but still uses a clustering-like procedure.
Definition 6.7. (Krum [29]) Parameterized by b, given m = n+ q candidate gradients, the
Krum aggregation rule is defined as follows:






where i→ j is the indices of the m− b− 2 nearest neighbours of g̃i,t in {g̃j,t : j ∈ [m], i 6= j}
as measured by squared Euclidean distance.
6.3 RELATED WORK
Most of the existing Byzantine-tolerant SGD algorithms focus on synchronous training.
[30, 125, 126, 127] use robust statistics [128] including the geometric median, coordinate-wise
median, and trimmed mean as Byzantine-tolerant aggregation rules. [29, 129] propose Krum
and its variants, which select the candidates with minimal local sum of Euclidean distances.
1The name of a Byzantine emperor.
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[130] utilizes historical information to identify harmful gradients. [131] uses coding theory
and majority voting to recover correct gradients. Most of these synchronous algorithms
assume that there are less Byzantine workers than the honest workers. However, in practice,
there are no guarantees that the number of Byzantine workers can be controlled.
[132] proposes Kardam, which to our knowledge is the only prior work to address Byzantine-
tolerant asynchronous training. Kardam utilizes the Lipschitzness of the gradients to filter
out outliers. However, Kardam assumes a threat model much weaker than ours, where the
workers are not anonymous to the servers (i.e., violates Assumption 6.1). Furthermore,
similar to the previous synchronous approaches, Kardam also requires a majority of honest
workers.
6.4 MOTIVATIONS
In this section, we discuss the potential weakness of the previous work based on robust
statistics or similar ideas, which motivates a new definition of Byzantine tolerance specially
designed for distributed SGD, as well as a new framework of Byzantine-tolerant SGD algo-
rithms.
The previous work typically have the following potential weakness:
• Most of the previous approaches are based on majority voting, which assumes that the
honest workers dominate the entire set of workers. Thus, such algorithms can trim the
outliers from the candidates. However, in real-world failures or attacks, there are no
guarantees that the number of Byzantine workers can be bounded from above.
• Most of the previous approaches rely on comparing the candidate updates with each other,
which is unfeasible in asynchronous training, where the server receives a single update each
time and updates the global model immediately.
• In the previous work on Byzantine-tolerant SGD algorithms, most of the robust aggrega-
tion rules only guarantee that the robust estimator is not arbitrarily far away from the
mean of the correct gradients. In other words, the distance between the robust estima-
tor and the correct mean is upper-bounded. However, for gradient descent algorithms,
to guarantee the decrease of the loss, the inner product between the true gradient and
the robust estimator must be non-negative, so that at least the loss will not increase in
expectation. In particular, bounded distance is not enough to guarantee robustness, if the
attackers manipulate the Byzantine gradients and make the inner products negative.
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In a nutshell, the previous approaches are not specially designed for gradient descent
algorithms, especially asynchronous SGD. A deeper introspection reveals, however, that
what really matters for gradient descent algorithms is the direction of the descent. As
shown in Figure 6.1, to ensure the gradient descent algorithm makes progress, we need to
guarantee that the direction of the aggregated vector agrees with the true gradient, i.e., the
inner product between the aggregated vector and the true gradient must be non-negative.
This can be violated by an attack that makes the inner product negative, which indicates
an effective attack technique.
Figure 6.1: Descent Direction. The blue arrows are the directions which agree with the
steepest descent direction (negative gradient). The red arrows are the directions which
agree with the steepest ascent direction (gradient).
In our experiments, we find that creating gradients in the opposite direction with large
magnitude crashes coordinate-wise median, while creating gradients in the opposite direction
with small magnitude crashes Krum. We provide theoretical analysis as well as empirical
results to validate these findings.
The intuition is that, when gradient descent algorithm converges, the gradient ∇F (xt)
approaches 0. Thus, even if the distance between the robust estimator and the correct mean
is bounded, it is still possible to manipulate their inner product to be negative, especially
when the upper bound of such distance is large. Furthermore, the negative inner product
between the gradient estimator and the correct gradient implies the increasing loss values.
Thus, after accumulating such kind of updates for several iterations, the loss values will be
very bad.
In the following analysis, we provide a new definition of Byzantine tolerance for distributed
synchronous SGD, and theoretically show the vulnerability of some representative algorithms
in the previous work of Byzantine-tolerant SGD. Such analysis then motivates the new
approaches we present in this chapter.
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6.4.1 Byzantine tolerance in gradient descent: a revised definition
Based on the intuition mentioned above, we formally define a revised version of Byzantine
tolerance for distributed synchronous SGD (DS-SGD-Byzantine tolerance). Note that we
use the IID settings for simplicity.
Definition 6.8. (DS-SGD-Byzantine Tolerance) Without loss of generality, suppose that in
a specific iteration, the server receives n correct gradients V = {v1, . . . , vn} and q Byzantine
gradients U = {u1, . . . , uq}. We assume that the correct gradients have the same expectation
E[vi] = g,∀i ∈ [n]. An aggregation rule Aggr(·) is said to be DS-SGD-Byzantine-tolerant if
〈g, E [Aggr(V ∪ U)]〉 ≥ 0.
With the revised definition, now we theoretically analyze the DS-SGD-Byzantine tolerance
of coordinate-wise median and Krum.
Remark 6.1. Note that we do not argue that the theoretical guarantees in the previous work
are wrong. Instead, our claim is that the theoretical guarantees on the bounded distances
are not enough to secure distributed synchronous SGD. In particular, DS-SGD-Byzantine
tolerance is different from the Byzantine tolerance proposed in previous work.
Based on the new definition of Byzantine tolerance in distributed synchronous SGD, we
study the theoretical guarantees of the two representative approaches in the previous work:
median and Krum.
DS-SGD-Byzantine Vulnerability of Coordinate-wise Median
The following theorem shows that under certain conditions, Median is not DS-SGD-
Byzantine-tolerant.
Theorem 6.1. (Vulnerability of median) We consider the worst case where n− q = 1, and
median is a special case of trimmed mean with b = q. The server receives totally m = n+ q
gradients, which are composed of n correct gradients V = {v1, . . . , vn} and q Byzantine
gradients U = {u1, . . . , uq}. We assume that the stochastic gradients have identical expecta-
tion E[vi] = g,∀i ∈ [n], and non-zero coordinate-wise variance E[((vi)j − (g)j)2] ≥ σ2−,∀i ∈
[n], j ∈ [d], where (vi)j is the jth coordinate of vi, and (g)j is the jth coordinate of g. When
maxj∈[d] |gj| < σ√q , there exist Byzantine gradients U = {u1, . . . , uq} such that
〈g, E [Median(V ∪ U)]〉 < 0.
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Proof. (sketch) Since median is independently taken in each coordinate, it is sufficient to
prove Byzantine vulnerability for one coordinate or scalars. Thus, for convenience, with
a little bit abuse of notation, we suppose that the correct gradients V = {v1, . . . , vn} and
q Byzantine gradients U = {u1, . . . , uq} are all scalars. We only need to show that under
certain attacks, the aggregated value Median(V ∪ U) has a different sign than g.
Without loss of generality, we assume that g = 1
n
∑
i∈[n] E[vi] > 0 (the mirror case can be
easily proved with a similar procedure). The Byzantine gradients are all assigned negative
value: ui < 0,∀i ∈ [q]. Furthermore, we make the Byzantine gradients small enough such
that ui < min(V), ∀i ∈ [q].
By sorting the correct gradients, we can define the sequence {v1:n, . . . , vn:n}, where vi:n is
the ith smallest element in {v1, . . . , vn}:
v1:n ≤ v2:j ≤ · · · ≤ vn:n.
We also define the expectation of the ith smallest element: µi:n = E[vi:n].
Then, it is easy to check that Median(V ∪ U) = v1:n, and E [Median(V ∪ U)] = µ1:n.
Using Theorem 1(b) from [133] (equiv. 9(a) from [134]), we have
µ1:m−q ≤ g −
σ√
n− 1
= g − σ√
q
.
Thus, when g < σ√
q
, E [Median(V ∪ U)] is negative.
QED.
Remark 6.2. When gradient descent converges, the expectation of the gradient g ap-
proaches 0. Furthermore, since the gradient produced by the correct workers are stochastic,
the variance is non-zero. Thus, eventually, the condition maxj∈[d] |gj| < σ√m−q−1 will be sat-
isfied. To make things worse, the closer SGD approaches a critical point, the less likely the
coordinate-wise median is DS-SGD-Byzantine-tolerant.
Remark 6.3. The proof of Theorem 6.1 provides the intuition for constructing adversarial
gradients for the attackers. In practice, in each coordinate, the attackers only need to
guarantee that all the Byzantine values are much smaller than the smallest correct value
if the correct expectation is positive, or much larger than the largest correct value if the
correct expectation is negative. Then, hopefully (for the attackers), if the variance is large
enough, the smallest/largest value has the opposite sign to the correct expectation. Hence,
the attackers can successfully manipulate the aggregated value into the opposite direction
to the correct expectation.
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We provide an 1-dimensional toy example to illustrate how easily Median can fail. Suppose
that there are 3 correct gradients V = {−0.1, 0.1, 0.3} with the mean 0.1, and 2 Byzantine
gradient U = {−4,−2} with the negative mean −3. It is easy to check that Median(U∩V) =
−0.1, which means that Median produces a value with the opposite sign of the mean of the
correct gradients.
DS-SGD-Byzantine Vulnerability of Krum
The following theorem proves that Krum is not DS-SGD-Byzantine-tolerant, under certain
conditions. Note that Krum requires that m− 2q = n+ q − 2q = n− q > 2.
Theorem 6.2. (Vulnerability of Krum) We consider the worst case where n − q = 3.
The server receives totally m = n + q gradients, which are composed of n correct gradients
V = {v1, . . . , vn} and q Byzantine gradients U = {u1, . . . , uq}. We assume that the stochastic
gradients have identical expectation E[vi] = g,∀i ∈ [n]. We define the mean of the correct
gradients v̄ = 1
n
∑
i∈[n] vi. We assume that the correct gradients are bounded by ‖vi− v̄‖2 ≤
‖v̄‖2,∀i ∈ [n]. Furthermore, we assume that vi 6= vj,∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ [n], and ∃β such that
‖vi − vj‖2 ≥ β2, ∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ [n]. We take u1 = u2 = · · · = uq = −εv̄, where ε is a small





〈g, E [Krum(V ∪ U)]〉 < 0.




Since any u ∈ U is identical, the nearest (m − q − 4) neighbours of u must belong to U .
The remaining (m− q − 2)− (m− q − 4) = 2 nearest neighbours must belong to the set of
correct gradients V . Thus, we have
KR(u) ≤ 2‖v̄ + v̄ + εv̄‖2 = 2(ε+ 2)2‖v̄‖2.
For the correct gradients ∀v ∈ V , there are two cases:
• Case 1: There are some u ∈ U which belong to the (m− q − 2) nearest neighbours of v.
Suppose there are a1 nearest neighbours in V and a2 nearest neighbours in U , where
a1+a2 = m−q−2. Since the correct gradients are bounded by ‖vi−v̄‖2 ≤ ‖v̄‖2,∀i ∈ [m−q],
it is easy to check that ‖v − u‖2 ≥ ε2‖v̄‖2. Thus, we have
KR(v) ≥ a1β2 + a2‖v − u‖2 ≥ (m− q − 2)ε2‖v̄‖2.
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• Case 2: There are no u ∈ U which belong to the (m − q − 2) nearest neighbours of v.
Thus, we have
KR(v) ≥ (m− q − 2)β2 ≥ (m− q − 2)ε2‖v̄‖2.
In both cases, we have KR(v) ≥ (m − q − 2)ε2‖v̄‖2. Thus, when (m − q) is large enough:
m− q > 2(ε+2)
2
ε2
+ 2, we have
KR(u) ≤ 2(ε+ 2)2‖v̄‖2 < (m− q − 2)ε2‖v̄‖2
≤ KR(v).
As a result, Krum(V ∪ U) = u = −εv̄. Thus, E [Krum(V ∪ U)] = −εg.
QED.
Remark 6.4. In the theorem above, we assume that all the correct gradients are inside a
Euclidean ball centered at their mean: ‖vi− v̄‖2 ≤ ‖v̄‖2,∀i ∈ [m− q]. Such assumption can
not always be satisfied, but it is reasonable that the random samples are sometimes inside
such a Euclidean ball, if the variance is not too large. On the other hand, we assume that
the pair-wise distances between the correct gradients are lower-bounded by β > 0. Almost
surely, such β exists, no matter how small it is. Note that the Byzantine attackers are
supposed to be omniscient. Thus, the attackers can spy on the honest workers, and obtain
V and β. Then, the attackers can choose an ε such that ε2‖v̄‖2 ≤ β2. Finally, we only need




Remark 6.5. The proof of Theorem 6.2 provides the intuition of constructing adversarial
gradients for the attackers. In practice, the attackers only need to assign ε
n
∑
i∈[n] vi to all
the Byzantine gradients, with an ε > 0 small enough.
Remark 6.6. Krum [29] requires the assumption that cσ < ‖g‖ for convergence, where c
is a general constant, σ2 is the maximal variance of the gradients, and g is the gradient in
expectation. Note that ‖g‖ → 0 when SGD converges to a critical point. Thus, such an
assumption is never guaranteed to be satisfied if the variance is non-zero. Furthermore, the
better SGD converges, the less likely such an assumption can be satisfied.
Note that the assumptions made in Theorem 6.2 are sufficient but not necessary conditions
for the DS-SGD-Byzantine vulnerability of Krum. In practice, it can be easier to find an ε
that crashes Krum, especially for 1-dimensional cases.
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We provide an 1-dimensional toy example to show how easily Krum can fail. Suppose there
are 6 correct gradients V = {0, 0.02, 0.14, 0.26, 0.38, 0.5} with the mean 0.2167, and 3 Byzan-
tine gradient U = {−0.1,−0.1,−0.1} with the negative mean −0.1. According to Defini-
tion 6.7, the corresponding function values KR(·) of U ∪V = {−0.1,−0.1,−0.1, 0, 0.02, 0.14,
0.26, 0.38, 0.5} are {0.0244, 0.0244, 0.0244, 0.0304, 0.0436, 0.1060, 0.1440, 0.2160, 0.4320}. As
a result, we have Krum(U ∪ V) = −0.1, which means that Krum chooses the Byzantine
gradient with the opposite sign of the mean of the correct gradients.
6.5 PROBLEM SETUP
In the previous section, we discuss the potential weakness of the previous work, which
motivates new techniques to solve the emerging security issues. To design better Byzantine-
tolerant SGD algorithms, we revise the definition of Byzantine tolerance. Definition 6.8 only
defines the Byzantine tolerance in distributed synchronous SGD with inner products. Here,
we formally define the general Byzantine tolerance for both synchronous and asynchronous
SGD in the IID settings and smooth problems.
Definition 6.9. (SGD Byzantine Tolerance) Without loss of generality, suppose that in any
iteration t on the server, the global model parameters are updated by xt = xt−1−ηut, where
ut is the update vector (gradient estimator) produced by different approaches. An algorithm
is said to be SGD-Byzantine-tolerant if both of the following two conditions are satisfied
where there are Byzantine workers in the IID settings:
• ∃t′ ∈ T , s.t. 〈∇F (xt′), E [ut]〉 ≥ 0, where T = {t − 1} for synchronous training, and
T = {t′ : t′ ≤ t− 1} for asynchronous training.
• The algorithm has the following convergence rate
∑














. A relaxed definition allows some additional error terms in the
convergence.
6.6 METHODOLOGY
To overcome the potential weakness of the approaches mentioned in the previous sections,
we present a new framework of Byzantine-tolerant SGD algorithms that satisfies the condi-
tions in Definition 6.9, for both synchronous and asynchronous training respectively in the
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following sections. To distinguish the algorithms in the new framework from the previous
work, we call them “score-based approaches”. And we use “Zeno” 2 as the alias of the new
framework of Byzantine tolerance.
In contrast to the existing majority-based methods, we compute a score for each candidate
gradient estimator by estimating the decrease of the loss value. The score roughly indicates
how trustworthy each candidate is. For the synchronous training, we rank each candidate
gradient estimator based on the estimated decrease of the loss value, and the magnitudes,
and then aggregate the candidates with the highest scores. For the asynchronous training,
we use the first-order Taylor’s approximation to estimate the decrease of the loss value, and
use a hard threshold to filter out the potentially malicious values.
6.6.1 Synchronous Training
In this section, we introduce the idea of using a validation dataset on the server to verify the
gradient estimators sent from the workers. Based on such a validation procedure, we present
a new distributed synchronous algorithm. The main content of this section is presented in
[38].
We first introduce the idea of the score-based approaches in the synchronous settings. For
each candidate gradient estimator, we compute a score by using the stochastic zero-order
oracle. We rank each candidate gradient estimator based on the estimated decrease of the
loss function, and the magnitudes. Then, the algorithm aggregates the candidates with the
highest scores. The score roughly indicates how trustworthy each candidate is.
Definition 6.10. (Zeroth-order Zeno Score) Denote fr(x) = f(x; z ∼ Dr), where z is a
mini-batch of IID random samples drawn from the validation dataset Dr, with the mini-
batch size sr. For any update (gradient estimator) u, based on the current parameter x,
learning rate η, and a constant weight ρ > 0, we define its zero-order Zeno score as follows:
Scoreη,ρ(u, x) = fr(x)− fr(x− ηu)− ρ‖u‖2,
where fr(x) and fr(x− ηu) use the same random mini-batch of validation data.
The score defined in Definition 6.10 is composed of two parts: the estimated decrease of
the loss value, and the magnitude of the update. The score increases when the estimated
decrease of the loss function, fr(x)− fr(x− ηu), gets larger. The score decreases when the
magnitude of the update, ‖u‖2, gets larger. Intuitively, the larger decrease of loss suggests
2The name of another Byzantine emperor.
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faster progress in optimization, and the smaller magnitude suggests a smaller change. Even
if a gradient is faulty, a smaller change makes it less harmful and easier to be cancelled by
the correct gradients.
Using the score defined above, we establish the following score-based aggregation rule. We
ignore the index of iterations, t, for convenience.
Definition 6.11. (Score-based Aggregation, or Zeno Aggregation) Assume that among the
m = n + q gradient estimators {g̃i : i ∈ [m]}, q elements are faulty, and x is the current
value of the parameters. We sort the sequence by the zero-order Zeno score defined in
Definition 6.10, which results in {g̃(i) : i ∈ [m]}, where
Scoreη,ρ(g̃(1), x) ≥ . . . ≥ Scoreη,ρ(g̃(m), x).
In other words, g̃(i) is the vector with the ith highest score in {g̃i : i ∈ [m]}. The proposed
aggregation rule, Zeno, aggregates the gradient estimators by taking the average of the first
m− b elements in {g̃(i) : i ∈ [m]} (the gradient estimators with the (m− b) highest scores),
where m > b ≥ q:






Note that z’s (in Definition 6.10) are independently sampled in different iterations. Fur-
thermore, in each iteration, z’s are sampled after the arrival of the candidate gradient esti-
mators g̃i,t on the server. Since the Byzantine workers are not predictive, they cannot obtain
the exact information of fr(·), which means that the Byzantine gradients are independent
of fr(·), though the Byzantine workers can know E[fr(·)].
Using Zeno as the aggregation rule, we can directly substitute Aggr(·) by Zeno in Algo-
rithm 6.1. For clarification, we present the details in Algorithm 6.2.
In Figure 6.2, we visualize the intuition underlying Zeno. It is illustrated that all the
selected candidates (arrows pointing inside the black dashed circle) are bounded by at least
one honest candidate. In other words, Zeno uses at least one honest candidate to establish
a boundary (the black dashed circle), which filter out the potentially harmful candidates.
The candidates inside the boundary are harmless, no matter they are actually faulty or not.
The main advantage of Zeno over the previous approaches is that, Zeno only requires
q < n+q instead of q < n, which means that Zeno works as long as there is at least 1 honest
worker in all the m = n+ q workers, and no longer requires the majority of honest workers.
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Algorithm 6.2: Zeno (in Synchronous SGD)
1: Server
2: Input: ρ (defined in Definition 6.10), b (defined in Definition 6.11)
3: Initialize x0 ∈ Rd
4: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
5: Broadcast xt−1 to all the workers
6: Wait until all the gradients {g̃i,t : i ∈ [n+ q]} arrive
7: Draw the samples z ∼ Dr for evaluating fr(·) in Definition 6.10
8: Compute ¯̃gt = Zenob({g̃i,t : i ∈ [n+ q]}) defined in Definition 6.11
9: Update the parameter xt ← xt−1 − η¯̃gt
10: end for
1: Worker (honest) i = 1, . . . , n
2: for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
3: Receive xt−1 from the server
4: gi,t ← ∇f(xt−1; zi,t)
5: Send gi,t to the server
6: end for
Figure 6.2: Zeno on loss surface contours. We use the notations in Definition 6.10 and
6.11. The black dot is the current parameter x. The arrows are the candidate updates
{ṽi : i ∈ [m]}. Red arrows are the incorrect updates. Green arrows are the correct updates.
Taking b = 3, Zeno filters out the 3 arrows pointing outside the black dashed circle. These
3 updates have the least descendant of the loss function, among all the updates. There are
some incorrect updates (the red arrow) remaining inside the boundary. However, since they
are bounded by the correct updates, the remaining incorrect updates are harmless.
6.6.2 Asynchronous Training
The Zeno aggregation defined in Definition 6.11 solves the potential issues of the previous
majority-based approaches. However, Zeno aggregation still requires the servers to collect
multiple gradient estimators and compare them with each other. Such a procedure is un-
feasible for asynchronous training. On the other hand, Zeno requires evaluating the loss
values on the random mini-batch of validation data on every received candidate gradient,
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which is potentially expensive in computation. To reduce the computation overhead, we
approximate the score by its first-order Taylor’s expansion with stale validation gradients.
Furthermore, we use a hard threshold to filter out the candidate gradients with relatively





for all iteration t ∈ [T ] do
repeat
Receive g̃ from an arbitrary worker
Read v with lock (v may be from an old version of x: v = ∇fr(xt′), t′ ≤ t− 1)
Normalize g = cg̃ such that ‖g‖2 = ‖v‖2
until η 〈v, g〉 − ρ‖g‖2 ≥ ηε
gt ← g
xt ← xt−1 − ηgt




Randomly sample z ∼ Dr
Write with lock: v ← ∇fr(x; z)
Worker (honest) i = 1, . . . , n
repeat
Pull xt′ from the server
Draw random samples zi ∼ Di
Compute g̃ ← ∇f(xt′ ; zi)
Push g̃ to the server
until Convergence
Definition 6.12. (First-order Zeno Score) Denote fr(x) = f(x; z ∼ Dr), where z is a mini-
batch of IID random samples drawn from the validation dataset Dr, with the mini-batch
size sr. For any update (gradient estimator) u, the model parameter x, learning rate η, and
a constant weight ρ > 0, we approximate its zero-order Zeno score as follows:
Scoreη,ρ(u, x) ≈ Score′η,ρ(u, x) = η 〈∇fr(x), u〉 − ρ‖u‖2,
where x is a stale version of model on the server.
In brief, Zeno++ is a computation-efficient version of Zeno which reduces the computation
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overhead via two techniques: first-order Zeno score, and lazy updates of the validation gra-
dient v. The detailed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 6.3. Compared to Zeno, we highlight
several new techniques, specially designed for asynchronous training: 1) re-scaling the can-
didate gradient; 2) first-order Taylor’s expansion; 3) hard threshold instead of comparison
with the others; 4) lazy update for reducing the computation overhead.
Before moving forward, we wish to highlight several practical remarks for Zeno++:
• Preparing the validation dataset for Zeno++: The dataset Dr used for calculating
v (the validation gradient of Zeno++) can be collected in many ways. As a machine-
learning routine, it is common to separate the entire dataset into 3 parts: training data,
validation data, and testing data. Such partition naturally provides the validation dataset
for Zeno++. It can also be a separate validation dataset provided by a trusted third
party. Another reasonable choice is that, a group of trusted workers can upload local
data perturbed by additional noise (to help protect the users’ privacy). Typically, the
validation dataset is small and different from the training dataset, thus can only be used
to validate the gradients, and cannot be directly used for training.
• Scheduling ZenoUpdater(x): ZenoUpdater(x) updates v in the background. It will
only be triggered when the global model xt is updated and the server is idle. Another
scheduling strategy is to trigger ZenoUpdater(x) after every k iterations. Thus, k is the
upper bound of the delay of v. A reasonable choice is k = m, so that ideally v is updated
after all the m workers respond.
• Computational efficiency: We can reduce the computation overhead of the Zeno++
server by decreasing the mini-batch size sr, or the frequency of activating ZenoUpdater(x).
However, doing so will potentially incur larger noise for v, which makes a trade-off.
6.7 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we show the theoretical analysis of Zeno and Zeno++. For both algorithms,
we prove that under certain conditions, the two conditions of SGD Byzantine tolerance
defined in Definition 6.9 are satisfied.
6.7.1 Zeno
We start with the theoretical guarantees for Zeno in synchronous SGD. The following
lemma shows that the gradient estimators selected by Zeno always has a score no worse
than a correct gradient. Note that we ignore the iteration index, t, for convenience.
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Lemma 6.1. (Bounded score) Without loss of generality, we denote the m − q correct
elements in {g̃i : i ∈ [m]} as {gi : i ∈ [m− q]}. Sorting the correct vectors by the stochastic
descendant score, we obtain {g(i) : i ∈ [m− q]}. Then, we have the following inequality:
Scoreη,ρ(g̃(i), x) ≥ Scoreη,ρ(g(i), x),∀i ∈ [m− q],
or, by flipping the signs on both sides, it is equivalent to
fr(x− ηg̃(i))− fr(x) + ρ‖g̃(i)‖2 ≤ fr(x− ηg(i))− fr(x) + ρ‖g(i)‖2, ∀i ∈ [m− q],
Proof. We prove the lemma by contradiction.
Assume that Scoreη,ρ(g̃(i), x) < Scoreη,ρ(g(i), x). Thus, there are i correct vectors having
greater scores than g̃(i). However, because g̃(i) is the ith element in {g̃(i) : i ∈ [m]}, there
should be at most i− 1 vectors having greater scores than it, which yields a contradiction.
QED.
Now, we show that Zeno is SGD-Byzantine tolerant defined in Definition 6.9.
First, the following theorem shows that using Zeno, the condition of positive inner-product
is satisfied.
Theorem 6.3. (SGD-Byzantine tolerance of Zeno) We take Assumption 2.1 (smoothness),
and 2.2 (bounded variance). Additionally, we assume that the validation data is the same
as the training data Dr = D, and the weak convexity with L− ≤ 0: 〈∇f(x; z), y − x〉 +
L−
2
‖y − x‖2 ≤ f(y; z) − f(x; z), ∀x, y ∈ Rd, z ∈ D. We take ρ = µη2
2
, where µ ≥ 0 is
large enough such that µ + L− ≥ 0. Then, taking small enough learning rate η such that







) , we have the positive inner-product:
〈∇F (xt′), E [¯̃gt]〉 ≥ 0,
where ¯̃gt = Zenob({g̃i,t : i ∈ [n+ q]}).
Proof. According to Lemma 6.1 above, we have
fr(x− ηg̃(i))− fr(x) + ρ‖g̃(i)‖2 ≤ fr(x− ηg(i))− fr(x) + ρ‖g(i)‖2,∀i ∈ [m− q],
Since Dr = D, we have E[fr(x)] = F (x). Thus, taking expectation w.r.t. the random
samples on both sides, conditional on x, we have
E[F (x− ηg̃(i))]− F (x) + ρE‖g̃(i)‖2 ≤ E[F (x− ηg(i))]− F (x) + ρE‖g(i)‖2.
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Using weak convexity, we have


















On the other hand, using smoothness, we have


















E‖g(i) −∇F (x) +∇F (x)‖2






E[‖g(i) −∇F (x)‖2 + ‖∇F (x)‖2]
≤ −
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Now, we prove the convergence of Zeno. For simplicity, we take b = q in the following
theoretical analysis.
Theorem 6.4. (Error bound of Zeno) We take Assumption 2.1 (smoothness), 2.2 (bounded
variance), 2.4 (bounded gradients), and 2.5 (global minimum). Additionally, we assume that
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the validation data is the same as the training data Dr = D, and the weak convexity with
L− ≤ 0: 〈∇f(x; z), y − x〉 + L−2 ‖y − x‖










t∈[T ] E‖∇F (xt−1)‖2
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Proof. Without loss of generality, we denote the n = m− q correct elements in {g̃i : i ∈ [m]}
as {gi : i ∈ [n]}, where E[gi] = ∇F (x). Sorting the correct vectors by the online descendant
score, we obtain {g(i) : i ∈ [n]}. We also sort g̃i by the online descendant score and obtain
{g̃(i) : i ∈ [m]}.
According to the definition, ¯̃g = Zenob({g̃i : i ∈ [m]}) = 1m−b
∑m−b
i=1 g̃(i). Furthermore, we








Using weak convexity, we have
fr(x− ηg̃(i)) ≥ fr(x− η¯̃g) +
〈







for ∀i ∈ [m− b].












Using Lemma 6.1, we have
fr(x− ηg̃(i)) + ρ‖g̃(i)‖2 ≤ fr(x− ηg(i)) + ρ‖g(i)‖2,
for ∀i ∈ [m− b].
































We take ρ = µη
2
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Using the L-smoothness, we have
fr(x− ηg(i)) ≤ fr(x− ηḡ) +
〈








































































Conditional on g̃(i)’s, taking expectation w.r.t. fr on both sides, we have
F (x− η¯̃g)− F (x)
≤ 〈∇F (x),−ηḡ〉+ η
2








‖∇F (x)‖2 + η
2






Now, taking the expectation w.r.t. g̃(i)’s on both sides and using ‖g(i)‖2 ≤ V3, we have
E [F (x− η¯̃g)]− F (x)
≤ −η
2
‖∇F (x)‖2 + η
2








‖∇F (x)‖2 + η
2





Finally, we have E‖∇F (x)− ḡ‖2 ≤ σ2
ns
.
Putting all the ingredients together, we obtain the desired result
E [F (x− η¯̃g)]− F (x) ≤ −η
2







Using xt = xt−1 − η¯̃gt, we have










Re-arranging the terms, telescoping and taking total expectation, we have∑
t∈[T ] E‖∇F (xt−1)‖2
T













Thus, we prove that if the validation dataset is the same as the training dataset, then
Zeno is SGD-Byzantine-tolerant.
6.7.2 Zeno++
Now, we establish the theoretical guarantees for Zeno++ in asynchronous SGD, by show-
ing that Zeno++ is SGD-Byzantine tolerant defined in Definition 6.9.
First, the following theorem shows that using Zeno++, the condition of positive inner-
product is satisfied.
Theorem 6.5. (SGD-Byzantine tolerance of Zeno++ with unbiased validation data) As-
sume that the validation data is the same as the training data Dr = D, and ε is large enough.
Then, under Assumption 2.2, 2.4 (bounded gradients and variance, which are also applied to
the validation gradients), there exists t′ ≤ t−1 such that we have the positive inner-product:
〈∇F (xt′),E[gt]〉 ≥ 0.
Proof. Zeno++ algorithm guarantees that there exists t′ ≤ t− 1 such that η 〈∇fr(xt′), gt〉 ≥
ρ‖gt‖2 + ηε. Taking expectation on both sides w.r.t. the random data samples and re-
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arranging the terms, we have
E 〈∇fr(xt′), gt〉 ≥
ρ
η




On the other hand, we have
E 〈∇fr(xt′), gt〉
= E 〈∇fr(xt′)−∇Fr(xt′) +∇Fr(xt′), gt〉


























Now, we prove the convergence of Zeno++.
Theorem 6.6. (Error bound of Zeno++ with unbiased validation data) We take Assump-
tion 2.1 (smoothness), 2.2 (bounded variance), 2.4 (bounded gradients), and 2.5 (global
minimum). Additionally, we assume that the validation data is the same as the training
data Dr = D, and we take ρ = cη, where c > 0. Using η = 1L√T , and sr ∝ T , we have∑
t∈[T ] E[∇F (xt−1)]
T
≤ E[F (x0)− F (x∗)]
cηT
+

















Proof. Using smoothness, we have
F (xt)− F (xt−1)



















where ∇fr(xt′) is the validation gradient used in the tth iteration.
Taking the expectation on both sides, we have
E[F (xt)− F (xt−1)]


































































































By re-arranging the terms, telescoping, taking total expectation, we have∑
t∈[T ] E[∇F (xt−1)]
T
≤ E[F (x0)− F (xT )]
cηT
+













The theoretical analysis above only consider the cases where the validation data is the
same as the training data. However, in practice, the validation data is typically biased, i.e.
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Dr 6= D. In the following theorems, we establish the theoretical guarantees for the cases of
biased validation data.
Theorem 6.7. (SGD-Byzantine tolerance of Zeno++ with biased validation data) Assume
that the validation data is close to the training data ‖∇Fr(x)−∇F (x)‖ ≤ r,∀x ∈ Rd where
r ≥ 0 and Fr(x) = E[fr(x; z ∼ Dr)] (the expectation is taken w.r.t. z), and ε is large enough.
Then, under Assumption 2.2, 2.4 (bounded gradients and variance, which are also applied to
the validation gradients), there exists t′ ≤ t−1 such that we have the positive inner-product:
〈∇F (xt′),E[gt]〉 ≥ 0.







The Zeno++ algorithm guarantees that there exists t′ ≤ t − 1 such that η 〈∇fr(xt′), gt〉 ≥
ρ‖gt‖2 + ηε. Taking expectation on both sides w.r.t. the random data samples and re-































On the other hand, we have
E 〈∇fr(xt′), gt〉
= E 〈∇fr(xt′)−∇Fr(xt′) +∇Fr(xt′), gt〉








































































≤ 〈∇F (xt′),E[gt]〉+ 〈∇Fr(xt′),∇F (xt′)〉




















































Theorem 6.8. (Error bound of Zeno++ with biased validation data) We take Assump-
tion 2.1 (smoothness), 2.2 (bounded variance), 2.4 (bounded gradients, which is also applied
to the validation gradients), and 2.5 (global minimum). Additionally, we assume that the
validation data is close to the training data ‖∇Fr(x) − ∇F (x)‖ ≤ r,∀x ∈ Rd where r ≥ 0
and Fr(x) = E[fr(x; z ∼ Dr)] (the expectation is taken w.r.t. z). Taking ρ = cη, we have
the following error bound:∑
t∈[T ] E[∇F (xt−1)]
T
≤ E[F (x0)− F (x∗)]
cηT
+





































Proof. Using smoothness, we have
F (xt)− F (xt−1)


















where ∇fr(xt′) is the validation gradient used in the tth iteration.
Taking the expectation on both sides, we have
E[F (xt)− F (xt−1)]










































≤ −ρ‖∇F (xt−1)‖2 + 2ρ
√












































By re-arranging the terms, telescoping, taking total expectation, we have∑
t∈[T ] E[∇F (xt−1)]
T
≤ E[F (x0)− F (xT )]
cηT
+



















The theorems above shows that a larger ε guarantees that the global model parameters
converges on the training data and mitigate the influence of the difference between the
training data and the validation data. However, a larger ε also decreases the rate that
candidate gradients pass the validation procedure, and slow down the global optimization
progress. In practice, we need to tune ε to achieve a good trade-off between the convergence
error and the acceptance rate.
The last remaining question is that, given the desired threshold ε, how many data samples
we need to collect to establish the validation dataset, so that we can achieve the desired error
bound. Furthermore, since ε only depends on r (taking c as a constant), we simply show
the relationship between r and the size of the validation dataset in the following theoretical
analysis.
Theorem 6.9. (Size of the validation dataset) We assume that the training data and
validation data are two sets of independent samples drawn from the same distribution. On
any model parameter x, for the full gradients on the training data and validation data, we
assume
∇F (x) = ∇F̄ (x) + ξ1,
∇Fr(x) = ∇F̄ (x) + ξ2,
where ξ1 and ξ2 are random noises caused by the randomly sampled training and validation
datasets, and ∇F̄ (x) is the full gradient on the source distribution in expectation. For any
stochastic gradient drawn from the source distribution, we assume that it has sub-Gaussian
noise ξ ∼ SubG(σ2). Thus, we have ξ1 ∼ SubG(σ2/N) and ξ2 ∼ SubG(σ2/Nr), where N
and Nr are the sizes of training and validation datasets, with 2 ≤ Nr ≤ N . Then, given
the similarity constant r, ‖∇F (x)−∇Fr(x)‖ ≤ r,∀x ∈ Rd is guaranteed with probability at
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least 1− δ for δ ∈ (0, 1), if we have at least
Nr ≥


















Proof. We establish the concentration bound for ‖ξ‖2, where ξ ∼ SubG(σ2).










































































The integral is finite when t < 1/σ2.


























Now, using Chernoff bound, we have



















(1− tσ2)d/2 exp ta
2
.
Then, we have ∀t < Nr
σ2
:
Pr(‖ξ1‖2 + ‖ξ2‖2 ≥ a)
≤ Pr(‖ξ1‖2 ≥ a/2) + Pr(‖ξ2‖2 ≥ a/2)
≤ 1




(1− tσ2/Nr)d/2 exp ta4
.
Taking t = (1− 1/N)Nr/σ2, we have
























= δ. . Nr ≤ N
Thus, a =





Thus, with probability at least 1− δ for δ ∈ (0, 1), we have
‖∇F (x)−∇Fr(x)‖2
= ‖ξ1 − ξ2‖2
≤ 2 ‖ξ1‖2 + 2 ‖ξ2‖2
≤










Theorem 6.9 shows that the lower bound of the ratio Nr
N
increases when r, N , and δ
decrease, and when d increases. To help understand how such lower bound changes with
the size of training data N , and the bounded distance r, w.r.t. Theorem 6.9, we illustrate
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the trend of Nr
N
in Figure 6.3. In general, with a large enough training dataset (larger than
50k), it is safe to use a relatively small validation dataset (less than 15% of the size of the
training dataset) for a small r.
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Figure 6.3: The ratio of Nr
N
, with various N and r, and fixed d = 270k and δ = 0.001 (i.e.,
with high probability 0.999). As a standard configuration, ResNet-20 has the number of
parameters d ≈ 270k, and CIFAR-10 has N = 50000 samples. To simplify the illustration,
we take r2 = κdσ2 to eliminate the impact of σ.
6.8 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we first show that we can break the defense of the previous work Median
and Krum. Then, we empirically evaluate both Zeno and Zeno++ algorithms.
6.8.1 Vulnerability of the Previous Approaches
We conduct experiments on the benchmark CIFAR-10 image classification dataset [111].
We use a convolutional neural network (CNN) with 4 convolutional layers followed by 1 fully
connected layer. For any worker, the mini-batch size for SGD is 50.
In each experiment, we launch 25 worker processes. We repeat each experiment 10 times
and take the average. We use top-1 accuracy on the testing set and the cross-entropy loss
function on the training set as the evaluation metrics.
We use the averaging, Median, and Krum without attacks as the gold standards, which are
referred to as Mean without attack, Median without attack, and Krum without attack.
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We start the attack at different epochs, so that SGD can warm up and make some progress
first.
MEDIAN
In each iteration, the server receives m = 25 gradients. A randomly selected subset
of q = 12 correct gradients are replaced by Byzantine gradients. We define the set of
Byzantine gradients as U = {u1, . . . , u12}, and the set of the remaining correct gradients as
V = {v1, . . . , v13}. Our attack strategy is as follows:






According to our theoretical analysis, Median is vulnerable to positive ζ with large magnitude
|ζ|.
We test the above attack strategy with different ζ. The results are shown in Figure 6.4.
Median fails when ζ > 0. When ζ = 0, Median gets stuck and stops making progress. When
ζ < 0, Median successfully defends against the attack.
KRUM
In each iteration, the server receives m = 25 gradients. A randomly selected subset
of q = 11 correct gradients are replaced by Byzantine gradients. We define the set of
Byzantine gradients as U = {u1, . . . , u11}, and the set of the remaining correct gradients as
V = {v1, . . . , v14}. Our attack strategy is as follows:






According to our theoretical analysis, Krum is vulnerable to positive ζ with relatively small
magnitude |ζ|.
We test the above attack strategy with different ζ. The results are shown in Figure 6.5.
Krum fails when ζ > 0 is small. When ζ is large enough, Krum successfully defends against
the attack.
Both Median and Krum are actually more vulnerable than we expected. Note that our
theorems only analyze the worst cases. There are other cases where Median and Krum can
fail.
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Median, attack starts at 10th epoch
Median, attack starts at 50th epoch
Median, attack starts at 100th epoch
Median, attack starts at 150th epoch
(a) Top-1 Accuracy on Testing Set, ζ = 10












Median, attack starts at 10th epoch
Median, attack starts at 50th epoch
Median, attack starts at 100th epoch
Median, attack starts at 150th epoch
(b) Cross Entropy on Training Set, ζ = 10

















Median, attack starts at 10th epoch
Median, attack starts at 50th epoch
Median, attack starts at 100th epoch
Median, attack starts at 150th epoch
(c) Top-1 Accuracy on Testing Set, ζ = 0.1












Median, attack starts at 10th epoch
Median, attack starts at 50th epoch
Median, attack starts at 100th epoch
Median, attack starts at 150th epoch
(d) Cross Entropy on Training Set, ζ = 0.1

















Median, attack starts at 10th epoch
Median, attack starts at 50th epoch
Median, attack starts at 100th epoch
Median, attack starts at 150th epoch
(e) Top-1 Accuracy on Testing Set, ζ = 0












Median, attack starts at 10th epoch
Median, attack starts at 50th epoch
Median, attack starts at 100th epoch
Median, attack starts at 150th epoch
(f) Cross Entropy on Training Set, ζ = 0

















Median, attack starts at 10th epoch
Median, attack starts at 50th epoch
Median, attack starts at 100th epoch
Median, attack starts at 150th epoch
(g) Top-1 Accuracy on Testing Set, ζ = −10












Median, attack starts at 10th epoch
Median, attack starts at 50th epoch
Median, attack starts at 100th epoch
Median, attack starts at 150th epoch
(h) Cross Entropy on Training Set, ζ = −10
Figure 6.4: Convergence on training set, using Median as aggregation rule. ζ ∈
{10, 0.1, 0,−10}.
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Krum, attack starts at 10th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 50th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 100th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 150th epoch
(a) Top-1 Accuracy on Testing Set, ζ = 0.1












Krum, attack starts at 10th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 50th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 100th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 150th epoch
(b) Cross Entropy on Training Set, ζ = 0.1

















Krum, attack starts at 10th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 50th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 100th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 150th epoch
(c) Top-1 Accuracy on Testing Set, ζ = 0.5












Krum, attack starts at 10th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 50th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 100th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 150th epoch
(d) Cross Entropy on Training Set, ζ = 0.5

















Krum, attack starts at 10th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 50th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 100th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 150th epoch
(e) Top-1 Accuracy on Testing Set, ζ = 1












Krum, attack starts at 10th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 50th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 100th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 150th epoch
(f) Cross Entropy on Training Set, ζ = 1

















Krum, attack starts at 10th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 50th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 100th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 150th epoch
(g) Top-1 Accuracy on Testing Set, ζ = 10












Krum, attack starts at 10th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 50th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 100th epoch
Krum, attack starts at 150th epoch
(h) Cross Entropy on Training Set, ζ = 10
Figure 6.5: Convergence on training set, using Krum as aggregation rule. ζ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1, 10}.
For Median, even if we take ζ = 0, SGD still performs badly. Theoretically, even if we do
not use positive ζ, small ζ can still enlarge the variance of SGD, which can be potentially
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harmful to the convergence. We can see that with large negative ζ, the defense of Median
is successful. Our experiments reveal certain new vulnerabilities of Median in distributed
synchronous SGD. The experiments conducted by [30] do not fail because the attacker only
changes the labels of the poisoned training data by flipping a label ∈ {0, . . . , 9} to 9− label.
It is very likely that such an attack produces Byzantine gradients surrounding the correct
gradients coordinate-wisely on both sides. However, according to our theoretical analysis, an
effective attack should place the Byzantine gradient on only one side of the correct gradients,
which is the side opposite to the mean of the correct gradients, coordinate-wisely.
For Krum, small positive ζ makes the training vulnerable. Furthermore, even if we take
ζ = 1, Krum still fails. Our experiments reveal certain new vulnerabilities of Krum in
distributed synchronous SGD. The experiments conducted by [29] do not fail even though a
similar attack strategy called “omniscient” is conducted. The reason is that, in the paper of
[29], the attacker “proposes the opposite vector, scaled to a large length”, which is similar
to our attack strategy but with a large positive ζ, while we find that small positive ζ crashes
Krum.
Guided by our theoretical analysis, we designed efficient attack strategies for both Median
and Krum. Our results show that the definition of Byzantine tolerance for distributed
synchronous SGD should be revised. Using our definition of DS-SGD-Byzantine tolerance,
research can be conducted to design better defense techniques.
6.8.2 Zeno in Synchronous Training
Now, we evaluate the Byzantine tolerance of Zeno in synchronous training. We summarize
our results here:
• Compared to the baselines, Zeno shows better convergence with more Byzantine workers
than honest ones.
• Zeno is robust to the choices of the hyperparameters, including the Zeno batch size sr,
the weight ρ, and the number of trimmed elements b.
• Zeno also works in the non-IID settings.
We conduct experiments on benchmark CIFAR-10 image classification dataset [111]. We
use convolutional neural network (CNN) with 4 convolutional layers followed by 1 fully
connected layer. In each experiment, we launch 20 worker processes. We repeat each ex-
periment 10 times and take the average. We use top-1 accuracy on the testing set and the
cross-entropy loss function on the training set as the evaluation metrics.
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We use the averaging without failures/attacks as the gold standard, which is referred to
as Mean without failures. Note that this method is not affected by b or q. The baseline
aggregation rules are Mean, Median, and Krum.
No Attack
We first test the convergence when there are no attacks. In all the experiments, we take
the learning rate η = 0.1, validation batch size 100, Zeno batch size sr = 4, and ρ = 0.0005.
Each worker computes the gradients on IID samples. For both Krum and Zeno, we take
b = 4. The result is shown in Figure 6.6. We can see that Zeno converges as fast as Mean.
Krum converges slightly slower, but the convergence rate is acceptable.
Label-flipping Attack
In this section, we test the Byzantine tolerance to label-flipping attacks. When such
attacks happen, the workers compute the gradients based on the training data with “flipped”
labels, i.e., any label ∈ {0, . . . , 9}, is replaced by 9 − label. Such attacks can be caused by
data poisoning or software failures.
In all the experiments, we take the learning rate η = 0.1, worker batch size 100, validation
batch size sr = 4, and ρ = 0.0005. Each honest worker computes the gradients on IID
samples.
The result is shown in Figure 6.7. As expected, Zeno can tolerate more than half Byzantine
gradients. When q = 8, Zeno preforms similar to Krum. When q = 12, Zeno preforms much
better than the baselines. When there are Byzantine gradients, Zeno converges slower, but
still has better convergence rates than the baselines.
Sign-flipping Attack
In this section, we test the Byzantine tolerance to a type attacks similar to the ones used
in Section 6.8.1. To be more specific, a Byzantine worker multiplies the gradients by −1
without rescaling. Such attacks or failures can be caused by some hardware failures, where
the bits that control the sign of the floating numbers are flipped. To make the failure even
worse, one of the Byzantine gradients is copied to and overwrites the other faulty gradients,
which means that all the Byzantine gradients have the same value.
In all the experiments, we take the learning rate η = 0.1, worker batch size 100, validation
batch size sr = 4, and ρ = 0.0005. Each honest worker computes the gradients on IID
120


















(a) Top-1 accuracy on testing set, without attack













(b) Cross entropy on training set, without attack
Figure 6.6: Convergence on IID workers, without attacks. Batch size on the workers is 100.
Batch size of Zeno is sr = 4. ρ = 0.0005. η = 0.1. We take b = 4 for both Krum and Zeno.
Each epoch has 25 iterations.



















(a) Top-1 accuracy on testing set, with q = 8














(b) Cross entropy on training set, with q = 8



















(c) Top-1 accuracy on testing set, with q = 12














(d) Cross entropy on training set, with q = 12
Figure 6.7: Convergence on IID workers, with label-flipping failures. Batch size on the
workers is 100. Batch size of Zeno is sr = 4. ρ = 0.0005. η = 0.1. Each epoch has 25
iterations. When q = 8, we take b = 8 for Krum, and b = 9 for Zeno. When q = 12, we take
b = 8 for Krum, and b = 16 for Zeno.
samples.
The result is shown in Figure 6.8. As expected, Zeno can tolerate more than half Byzantine
gradients. Furthermore, Zeno outperforms all the baselines. When q = 12, Zeno is the only
strategy which avoids catastrophic divergence. Zeno converges slower compared to the cases
with no attacks, but still has better convergence than the baselines.
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(a) Top-1 accuracy on testing set, with q = 8













(b) Cross entropy on training set, with q = 8



















(c) Top-1 accuracy on testing set, with q = 12













(d) Cross entropy on training set, with q = 12
Figure 6.8: Convergence on IID workers, with sign-flipping failures. Batch size on the workers
is 100. Batch size of Zeno is sr = 4. ρ = 0.0005. η = 0.1. Each epoch has 25 iterations.
When q = 8, we take b = 8 for Krum, and b = 9 for Zeno. When q = 12, we take b = 8 for
Krum, and b = 16 for Zeno.
Discussion
An interesting observation is that, when q = 8, Mean seems to have good performance,
while it is not supposed to be Byzantine-tolerant. The reason is that both label-flipping
and sign-flipping failures do not change the magnitude of the gradients. When the number
of Byzantine gradients q is less than half, it is possible that the Byzantine gradients are
cancelled out by the non-faulty ones. However, when the magnitude is enlarged, Mean will
fail, as pointed out in [122].
In general, we find that Zeno is more robust than the previous works. When the Byzantine
workers dominate, Zeno is the only aggregation method that converges in all experiments.
When the honest workers dominate, Median can be an alternative with cheap computation.
The computational complexity of Zeno depends on the complexity of inference and the val-
idation batch size sr. These additional hyperparameters make direct comparison to standard
methods more challenging. If we take the approximation that the computational complexity
of inference is linear to the number of parameters, then we can roughly compare the time
complexity to the baselines. Compared to Median, Zeno is computationally more expensive
122
by the factor of sr = 4. However, compared to Krum, which requires 20× 19/2 = 190 times
of O(d) operators, Zeno only needs 21× 4 = 84 times of O(d) operators. Furthermore, since
the mini-batch size on the workers is 100, the computation required on the server is less
than that of one worker, which does not cancel out the computational improvements due
to data parallelism. The additional computation is the cost that we have to pay for better
Byzantine tolerance.
6.8.3 Zeno++ in Asynchronous Training
Finally, we conduct the experiments of asynchronous training on two benchmarks: CIFAR-
10 image classification dataset [111], and WikiText-2 language modeling dataset [121].
6.8.4 Baselines
We use the asynchronous SGD without attacks as the gold standard, referred to as
AsyncSGD without attack. Since Kardam is the only previous work on Byzantine-tolerant
asynchronous SGD, we use it as the baseline.
One may conjecture that Zeno++ is analogous to training on the validation data. To
explore this, we consider training only on Dr – assumed to be clean data on the server, i.e.,
update the model only using v = ∇fr(x) on the server, without using any workers. We call
this baseline Server-only.
CIFAR-10
We train a convolutional neural network (CNN) with 4 convolutional layers followed by
2 dense layers on CIFAR-10 dataset. From the training set, we randomly extracted 2.5k of
them as the validation set for Zeno++, the remaining are randomly partitioned onto all the
workers. In each experiment, we launch 10 worker processes. We repeat each experiment
10 times and take the average. Each experiment is composed of 200 epochs, where each
epoch is a full pass of the training dataset. We simulate asynchrony by drawing random
delay from a uniform distribution in the range of [0, τw], where τw is the maximum worker
delay (different from the maximum server delay τ of Zeno++). In all the experiments, we
take the learning rate η = 0.1, mini-batch size s = sr = 128, ρ = 0.002, ε = −0.1, τ = 10.
We use the top-1 accuracy on the testing set and the cross-entropy loss function on the
training set as the evaluation metrics. We also report the false positive rate (FP), which is
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the ratio of correct gradients that are recognized as Byzantine and filtered out by Zeno++
or the Kardam baseline.
We first test the convergence when there are no attacks. For Kardam, we take q = 2 (i.e.
here Kardam assumes that there are 2 Byzantine workers). The result is shown in Figure 6.9.
Zeno++ converges a little bit slower than AsyncSGD, but faster than Kardam, especially
when the worker delay is large. When τw = 10, Zeno++ converges much faster than Kardam.
Server-only performs badly on both training and testing data.


















(a) Top-1 accuracy on testing set, kw = 5.












(b) Cross entropy on training set, kw = 5.


















(c) Top-1 accuracy on testing set, kw = 10.












(d) Cross entropy on training set, kw = 10.
Figure 6.9: Results on CNN and CIFAR-10, without attacks, with different maximum worker
delays kw. ρ = 0.002, ε = −0.1, k = 10 for Zeno++.
We test the Byzantine-tolerance to the “sign-flipping” attack, which is also used in the
previous experiments for synchronous training. Additional to flipping the signs, the Byzan-
tine workers also rescale the gradients to make the In such attacks, the Byzantine workers
send −10∇f(x) instead of the correct gradient ∇f(x) to the server. The result is shown in
Figure 6.10, with different number of Byzantine workers q. It is shown that when q = 4,
Zeno++ converges slightly slower than AsyncSGD without attacks, and much faster than
Kardam. Actually, we observe that Kardam fails to make progress when the worker delay
is large. When the number of Byzantine workers gets larger (q = 8), the convergence of
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Zeno++ gets slower, but it still makes reasonable progress, while AsyncSGD and Kardam
fail. Note that Kardam performs even worse than Server-only, which means that Kardam
is not even as good as training on a single honest worker. Thus, when there are Byzantine
workers, distributed training with Kardam is meaningless.
Kardam performs surprisingly badly in our experiments. The experiments in [132] focus
on dampening staleness when there are no Byzantine failures. For Byzantine tolerance, [132]
only reports that Kardam filters out 100% of the Byzantine gradients, which matches the
results in our experiments. However, we observe that in addition to filtering out 100% of the
Byzantine gradients, Kardam also filters nearly 100% of the correct gradients. We find that
the false positive rate of Kardam is nearly 99%, which makes the convergence extremely slow.
To make things worse, Kardam does not even perform as good as Server-only. For these
reasons, we discourage the use of Kardam for distributed training. One reason why Kardam
performs badly is that we use a more general threat model, which does not guarantee an
important assumption of Kardam, namely “any sequence of successively received gradients
of length 2q + 1 must contain at least q + 1 gradients from honest workers”. It is clear that
this assumption is quite strong, as in an asynchronous setting, Byzantine workers can easily
send long sequences of erroneous responses. Our approach does not depend on such a strong
assumption.
In all the experiments, Zeno++ converges faster than the baselines when there are Byzan-
tine failures. Although the convergence of Zeno++ is slower than AsyncSGD when there are
no attacks, we find that it provides a reasonable trade-off between security and convergence
speed. In general, larger worker delay τw and more Byzantine workers q add more error
and noise to the gradients, which slows down the convergence, because there are fewer valid
gradients for the server to use. Zeno++ can filter out most of the harmful gradients at the
cost of FP ≈ 50%.
Note that Server-only is an extreme case that only uses the server and the validation
dataset to train the model in a non-distributed manner, which will not be affected by Byzan-
tine workers. However, only using the validation data is not enough for training, as shown
in Figure 6.9. Similarly in practice, we can use a small dataset separated from the training
data for cross-validation, but will never directly train the model only on such validation
dataset. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 6.10, Zeno++ performs much better than Server-
only. Thus, we can draw the conclusion that Zeno++ is efficiently training the model on the
honest workers in a distributed manner, which is not equivalent to training on the validation
dataset only.
On average, the server computes sr
τ
= 12.8 gradients in each iteration, since the validation
gradient v of Zeno++ is updated after every τ = 10 iterations. Thus, the workload on the
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(a) Top-1 accuracy on testing set, τw = 5, q = 4.












(b) Cross entropy on training set, τw = 5, q = 4.



















(c) Top-1 accuracy on testing set, τw = 15, q = 4.












(d) Cross entropy on training set, τw = 15, q = 4.



















(e) Top-1 accuracy on testing set, τw = 5, q = 8.












(f) Cross entropy on training set, τw = 5, q = 8.



















(g) Top-1 accuracy on testing set, τw = 15, q = 8.














(h) Cross entropy on training set, τw = 15, q = 8.
Figure 6.10: Results on CNN and CIFAR-10, with sign-flipping attacks, and different maxi-
mum worker delays τw. For any correct gradient g, if selected to be Byzantine, g will be re-
placed by −10g. q ∈ {4, 8} out of the 10 workers are Byzantine. ρ = 0.002, ε = −0.1, τ = 10
for Zeno++.
server is much smaller than a worker. Furthermore, since we can parallelize the workload on
the server and the workers, the computation overhead of v can be hidden, so that Zeno++
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(a) Perplexity on testing set, q = 0.



















(b) Perplexity on testing set, q = 4.



















(c) Perplexity on testing set, q = 6.
Figure 6.11: Perplexity (the lower the better) on LSTM-based language model and WikiText-
2 dataset. We show the convergence under sign-flipping attacks with maximum worker
delays τw = 10. For any correct gradient g, if selected to be Byzantine, g will be replaced
by −10g. q ∈ {0, 4, 6} out of the 10 workers are Byzantine. η = 20 for all the algorithms.
ρ = 10, ε = −2.0, τ = 10 for Zeno++. FP refers to the fraction of false positive detect ions
i.e. incorrect prediction that a message is Byzantine. Note that when q = 4 or 6, the results
of Kardam are off the charts.
can benefit from distributed training.
WikiText-2
The WikiText-2 dataset contains over 2 million tokens from Wikipedia articles, and anno-
tations from Wikidata. We train a LSTM-based language model with one LSTM layer, and
one dense layer. The dimension of the hidden state is 200. The back propagation through
time (BPTT) is 35. In all the experiments, we take the learning rate η = 20, mini-batch
size s = sr = 20, τ = τw = 10, ρ = 10, ε = −2. Each experiment runs 40 epochs, where
each epoch is a full pass of the training data. The other basic settings are the same as the
experiments on CIFAR-10.
We use the perplexity (the exponential of the loss value) on the testing set as the evaluation
metric. We also report the false positive rate (FP), which is the ratio of correct gradients
that are recognized as Byzantine and filtered out by Zeno++ or the Kardam baseline.
In Figure 6.11, we test the Byzantine-tolerance to the “sign-flipping” attack, on LSTM-
based language models and WikiText-2 dataset. It is shown that when there are no Byzantine
workers, Zeno++ converges as fast as vanilla asynchronous SGD. When there are Byzantine
workers, Zeno++ converges slightly slower than AsyncSGD without attacks, and much faster
than Kardam. When the number of Byzantine workers gets larger, the convergence of
Zeno++ gets slower. In overall, on the language models, Zeno++ achieves performance
similar to what we observe for CNN. It is shown that Zeno++ can protect asynchronous SGD




We proposed a new framework for Byzantine-tolerant SGD in both synchronous and asyn-
chronous settings. The idea is to use validation datasets on the server to verify the updates
sent from the workers. For future work, we plan to test and refine the proposed algorithms
in the scenarios where the workers are highly heterogeneous.
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CHAPTER 7: ZENOPS: A DISTRIBUTED LEARNING SYSTEM
INTEGRATING COMMUNICATION EFFICIENCY AND SECURITY
In this chapter, we propose a prototype of distributed learning system: ZenoPS, that
integrates both communication efficiency and security. To be more specific, this system
combines all the new techniques presented in the previous chapters, including the following
three main components: 1) communication reduction with message compression, infrequent
synchronization, and error reset; 2) asynchronous training; 3) score-based approaches for
Byzantine tolerance. In the remaining of this chapter, we will present the overall design of
this distributed learning system, establish the theoretical guarantees, and show the results
of the empirical evaluation. The contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• We present a distributed learning system, ZenoPS, that integrates all the new techniques
presented in [36, 37, 38, 39, 122, 123, 124].
• We present the system design and implementation details of ZenoPS.
• We show that the integrated system can achieve both communication efficiency and secu-
rity.
• We show the theoretical guarantees for the convergence, and Byzantine tolerance of the
proposed system.
7.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapters, we have studied different aspects of distributed SGD, and focus
on a single topic in each chapter. Now, we want to integrate all our previous research into
a single system. The goal of the proposed distributed learning system is to provide the fol-
lowing features: reduced communication overhead, flexible synchronization, and Byzantine
tolerance for distributed SGD in various scenarios.
In practice, there exist different scenarios for distributed model training, which require
different solutions. For example, when conducting training tasks in a traditional datacenter,
we do not require too much reduction of the communication overhead, or too much asyn-
chrony, since the communication is relatively fast. In such a scenario, the requirement of
Byzantine tolerance is also lower. However, when there are remote devices which are geo-
graphically far away from each other, the system should still work well with small amount
of communication. Additionally, the system should also support an asynchronous mode, in
case that there are stragglers. Furthermore, for the edge devices, the system has to prepare
129
for unreliable or malicious entities. In summary, the system should be flexible enough in
order to fulfill the requirements of different scenarios.
Besides the system-level concerns, a machine-learning system also needs to theoretically
guarantee the performance of model training. In general, there is no free lunch. Reducing
the communication overhead usually causes performance regression due to the inaccuracy in
training. Robustness or fault tolerance also causes additional noise in training. It is essential
to develop algorithms that satisfy the system requirements, and meanwhile guarantee the
training performance by providing the theoretical analysis to show the trade-offs.
7.2 PROBLEM SETUP
Same as the other chapters throughout the entire thesis research, we consider the following











i∈[n] Ezi∼Dif(x; zi), ∀i ∈ [n], x ∈ Rd is the model param-
eters, and zi is a mini-batch of data sampled from the local data Di on the ith device. Each
device can be a GPU, a machine with multiple GPUs, or an edge device such as a smart
phone, depending on the scenario and application.
Additionally, we solve this distributed optimization problem based on a server-worker
architecture with the following features:
• Communication reduction: Optionally, the workers can reduce the communication
overhead via both infrequent synchronization and message compression. To be more
specific, every worker sends updates to the central server after every H local iterations, and
compress the update with error reset introduced in Chapter 4 and an arbitrary compressor
C that satisfies δ-approximation: ‖C(v)−v‖2 ≤ (1−δ)‖v‖2,∀v ∈ Rd, where v is the message
vector sent to the server.
• Synchronization mode: The system supports both synchronous and asynchronous
training.
• Byzantine tolerance: The system supports Byzantine tolerance on the server side, with
multiple choices of defense methods, including coordinate-wise trimmed mean and score-
based validation approaches.
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7.3 SYSTEM DESIGN AND ALGORITHMS
In this section, we present ZenoPS, which is a distributed learning system based on the
PS architecture. Our implementation is based on the cutting-edge PS implementation called
BytePS [20, 21]. In the ZenoPS architecture, the processes are categorized into three roles:
servers, workers, and validators. Note that compared to the original PS architecture, ZenoPS
has an additional role of nodes: validators, which reads the update cached on the servers, and
filter out the potentially malicious ones. The responsibilities of the three roles are described
as follows:
• Server: The server nodes maintain the global model parameters. ZenoPS also supports
multiple server nodes, where the model parameters are partitioned into several blocks
and uniquely assigned to different server nodes via some hash functions. The servers
communicate to both the workers and the validators. On one hand, the servers send the
latest model parameters to the workers on request, and cache the updates sent from the
workers. On the other hand, the servers send the cached updates to the validators, and
collect the verified updates from the validators. Once verified, the updates are supposed
to be benign and safe for the servers to update the global model parameters. In the
synchronous mode, the servers will wait until all the validators to respond, take the average
of the verified updates from all the validators, and then apply the averaged updates to the
global model parameters. In the asynchronous mode, the servers update the global model
parameters whenever a verified update arrives.
• Worker: The worker nodes takes the main workload of training and computation in
the ZenoPS system. Periodically, the workers pull the latest model parameters from
the servers, run SGD locally for H steps to update the local models, and then send the
accumulated updates to the server. Optionally, the workers can compress the updates sent
to the servers, and use error reset for biased compressors. Also optionally, the workers
can randomly replace the updates sent to the servers with arbitrary noises, which provide
privacy preservation for individual updates, assuming curious servers.
• Validator: The validators are used for filtering out the potentially malicious updates.
Any update sent from the workers will be cached and relayed to a validator. The users
of ZenoPS can choose various algorithms for validation. In the synchronous mode, the
validators can use coordinate-wise trimmed mean, Phocas, or score-based approaches,
or simply take the average. In the asynchronous mode, the validators only have two
options: score-based approaches or no validation at all (approving any received updates).
Typically, we assume fast communication between the servers and validators. A reasonable
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configuration is to co-locate the servers and the validators. For example, when using the
score-based approaches, a validator node should have the computation power similar to
a worker node. In that case, we could put the server node and the validator node in the
same machine, where the server is assigned to the CPU, and the validator is assigned to
the GPU.
The detailed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 7.1, where we only use the score-based
validation approach defined in Definition 7.1 for Byzantine tolerance. In the algorithm, we
assume that there are n honest workers, q Byzantine workers, and nv validators.
The workers pull the model parameters from the servers, and add the local residual errors
to the pulled model. After H steps of local updates, the workers obtain the accumulated
local update, which is the difference between the current version of local models and the
previously pulled models. The workers will then compress the local updates, update the
local residual errors, and send the compressed updates to the servers. To protect the privacy
of the individual updates, the workers can randomly replace the messages with arbitrary
values, which inserts some noise in the released updates, in order to protect themselves from
curious servers.
The servers simply relay all the updates sent from the workers to the validators, and
respond to any pulling request from the workers and the validators. In the synchronous
mode, the servers will wait until the approved updates are received from all the validators.
In the asynchronous mode, the servers will update the global model parameters whenever an
approved update is received from any validator. Note that the validators can send vectors
of all 0’s to the server, as a notification that an update failed the validation. The servers
will not move on to the next iteration until a non-zero approved update is received.
The validator uses the criterion defined in Definition 7.1 to validate the candidate updates
sent from the servers. If a candidate update passes the validation procedure, it will be sent
to the servers, otherwise the validator will send a vector of all 0’s to the server. Periodically,
the validators will pull the model parameters from the servers, and update the validator
vector. Note that in the synchronous mode, the validators always pull the latest version of
the global model, while in the asynchronous mode, the pulled model can have some delay.
To make the system design and the relationship between the three groups of nodes clearer,
we illustrate the ZenoPS architecture in Figure 7.1.
In the remaining of this section, we present more details of the optional features provided
by ZenoPS.
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Algorithm 7.1: ZenoPS with score-based validation
1: Server
2: Initialize x0 ∈ Rd
3: for all server step t ∈ [T ] do
4: ut ← 0
5: while ut = 0 do
6: Send xt−1 to workers on request
7: Receive updates {ũi : i ∈ [n+ q]} from workers, and relay to validators
8: if Synchronous then
9: ut ← 1nv
∑
i∈[nv ] ui, after all the validators respond
10: else
11: ut ← ui, after receiving ui : i ∈ [nv] from a validator
12: end if
13: Update the parameters xt ← xt−1 + αut
14: end while
15: end for
1: Worker (honest) i = 1, . . . , n
2: Initialize ei ← 0
3: while until terminated do
4: Receive xt′ from the server, and initialize xi,t′,0 ← xt′ + ei
5: for all local iteration h ∈ [H] do
6: xi,t′,h ← xi,t′,h−1 − η∇f(xi,t′,h−1; zi ∼ Di)
7: end for
8: Compute the accumulated update ui ← xi,t′,H − xt′
9: Compress u′i ← C(ui), and update the local residual error ei ← ui − u′i
10: Replace u′i by arbitrary value with probability pbyz (optional)
11: Send u′i to the server
12: end while
1: Validator j = 1, . . . , nv
2: Initialize counter = 1
3: while until terminated do
4: if mod (counter, n/nv) = 1 then
5: Pull xt′ from server, update for H SGD steps and get xt′,H
6: Update the validation vector vt = xt′,H − xt′
7: end if
8: counter ← counter + 1
9: Wait until any update ũ arrives
10: u← ũ if pass the validation defined in Definition 7.1, else u← 0






Pull model from server Push update to server
1. Pull model  from server
2. Add local residual error 
3. Locally iterate and get 
4. Get update 
5. Compress: 
6. Update the residual error 
7. Randomly replace  with some noise
8. Send update  to the server
1. Receive update from a worker
2. Hash and send the update to a validator
3.1. If synchronous: average the updates from
all the validators, and update the global model
3.2. If asynchronous: update the global model
whenever receive an update from any validator
1. Collect one or several updates 
2. Process with trimmed mean, Phocas (only for synchronous mode), 
    or score-based approaches
3. Send approved update to the server
Push approved update 
to server
Pull update from server
Figure 7.1: ZenoPS architecture
7.3.1 Communication Reduction
When sending updates to the servers, the workers can choose to compress the message
by an arbitrary compressor C, and use the technique of error reset introduced in Chapter 4
to handle the residual error of the compression. In the algorithm, we compress the locally
accumulated update ui and maintain the local residual error ei of worker i, in Line 6 in
Algorithm 7.1 (in the worker process). The local residual error will then be applied to the
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model parameters pulled from the servers in the next time. Similar to CSER in Chapter 4,
we assume δ-approximate compressors: ‖C(v)− v‖2 ≤ (1− δ)‖v‖2,∀v ∈ Rd, where δ ∈ (0, 1].
7.3.2 Synchronization Modes
Besides the synchronous mode, ZenoPS also provides the asynchronous mode, where the
workers and validators can check in and send updates to the server at any time, as we intro-
duced in Chapter 5. The servers launch multiple threads to handle the pushing and pulling
request sent by the workers and validators. In the synchronous mode, any pulling request
from the workers or the validators will be blocked until the global model parameters are up-
dated. In the asynchronous mode, the servers respond to the pulling requests immediately
without any barrier.
7.3.3 Byzantine Tolerance
In ZenoPS, we use the following score-based approach for Byzantine tolerance, which is
similar to Zeno++.
Definition 7.1. (ZenoPS validation) Assume that in the tth iteration, based on the model
parameters xt′ (with latency) on the server where t
′ ≤ t − 1 (t′ = t − 1 in the synchronous
mode), the validator locally update the model parameters for H steps using the validation
data and obtain the accumulated update for validation: v = −η
∑
h∈H ∇f(xt′,h−1; zt′,h ∼ Dr),
where xt′,h = xt′,h−1 − η∇f(xt′,h−1; zt′,h ∼ Dr), and xt′,0 = xt′ . Then, an update u from any
worker will be approved and sent back to the server for updating the global model parameters,
if the following condition is satisfied:
〈u, v〉 ≥ ρ‖v‖2 + ε,
‖u‖2 ≤ (1 + γ)‖v‖2 alternative: clip u to the maximum norm (1 + γ)‖v‖2 ,
where ρ, γ > 0 are some hyperparameters for the thresholds.
The above validation mechanism is an extension of Zeno++, which allows both the can-
didate update and the validation vector to be the accumulation of multiple steps of SGD
updates. Thus, such a validation mechanism can be used for distributed SGD with infre-
quent synchronization, such as federated optimization or local SGD. Despite the extension
to the accumulated updates, the general idea of ZenoPS validation is the same as Zeno++,
where we ensure the positive inner product, and the upper bounded `2 norm.
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In our implementation, we add a simulator on the worker side to simulate Byzantine
failures and send malicious values to the servers.
7.4 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we show the theoretical guarantees of ZenoPS using score-based approach
in the validators. We theoretically analyze the Byzantine tolerance, the convergence, and
the differential privacy of the proposed system.
7.4.1 Byzantine Tolerance
In the following theorem, we show the Byzantine tolerance of score-based validation ap-
proach defined in Definition 7.1.
Theorem 7.1. (SGD-Byzantine tolerance of ZenoPS) Assume that the validation data is
close to the training data ‖∇Fr(x) − ∇F (x)‖ ≤ r,∀x ∈ Rd where r ≥ 0 and Fr(x) =
E[fr(x; z ∼ Dr)] (the expectation is taken w.r.t. z), and ε is large enough. Then, under
Assumption 2.2, 2.4 (bounded gradients and variance, which is also applied to the validation
gradients), for a verified update u sent from the validators, there exists t′ ≤ t− 1 such that







where xt′,h = xt′,h−1 − η∇f(xt′,h−1; zt′,h ∼ Dr), and xt′,0 = xt′ .
















h∈H ∇fr(xt′,h−1)‖2 + ε. Taking expectation on both sides w.r.t. the random data










































∇F (xt′,h−1)‖2 − 2ρη2H2r
√
V3 + ε.













































































































































































































Now we prove the convergence of the proposed algorithm in the synchronous mode. For
simplicity, we take α = 1 in the synchronous mode.
Theorem 7.2. (Error bound of ZenoPS in synchronous mode without compression) We
take Assumption 2.1 (smoothness), 2.2 (bounded variance), 2.4 (bounded gradients), and
2.5 (global minimum). Additionally, we assume that the compressors are disabled and the
validation data is close to the training data ‖∇Fr(x) − ∇F (x)‖ ≤ r,∀x ∈ Rd where r ≥ 0
and Fr(x) = E[fr(x; z ∼ Dr)] (the expectation is taken w.r.t. z). Taking ε = cH2η2, we
have the following error bound for ZenoPS in the synchronous mode:∑
t∈[T ] E‖∇F (xt−1)‖2
T
≤ F (x0)− F (x∗)
THηρ
+
3 + 3γ + 4ρ
2ρ
LHηV3 +













Taking η = 1√
TH
, sr ∝ TH, we have∑

























Proof. Using smoothness, we have
F (xt)− F (xt−1)












where xt = xt−1 + ut, vt is the validation vector. Taking the expectation on both sides, we
have


























Using the results in the proof of Byzantine tolerance, we have















































































































































































where t′ = t− 1.
















E[F (xt)− F (xt−1)]

























































≤ −Hηρ‖∇F (xt−1)‖2 +
1
Hη
























To finish the upper bound, we have


























On the other hand, we have
‖E[ut]‖
≤ E‖ut‖
≤ (1 + γ)E‖vt‖




E[F (xt)− F (xt−1)]
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≤ −Hηρ‖∇F (xt−1)‖2 +
1
Hη

















































By re-arranging the terms, telescoping and taking total expectation, we have∑
t∈[T ] E‖∇F (xt−1)‖2
T
≤ E[F (x0)− F (xT )]
THηρ
+
3 + 3γ + 4ρ
2ρ
LHηV3 +


















The error bound of ZenoPS is composed of four parts: the escape from the initial value
[F (x0) − F (x∗)], the error caused and infrequent synchronization which is proportional to





. A better validation dataset that is closer to the training dataset with
smaller r decreases the validation error. Increasing c and ρ, or decreasing γ decreases the
validation error, but also potentially decreases the chances of the benign updates to pass
the validation procedure, which can slow down the optimization progress. In short, stronger
security guarantees smaller validation error, but also slower convergence.
When the compressors are enabled, there is an additional error term with the approxima-
tion factor δ.
Theorem 7.3. (Error bound of ZenoPS in synchronous mode with compression) We take
Assumption 2.1 (smoothness), 2.4 (bounded gradients), and 2.5 (global minimum). Addi-
tionally, we assume that the compressors are disabled and the validation data is close to the
training data ‖∇Fr(x) − ∇F (x)‖ ≤ r,∀x ∈ Rd where r ≥ 0 and Fr(x) = E[fr(x; z ∼ Dr)]
(the expectation is taken w.r.t. z). Taking ε = cH2η2 and η = 1√
TH
, we have the following
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error bound for ZenoPS in the synchronous mode:∑



































Proof. We only need to add the additional error caused by ei,t to the previous error bound.























≤ (1− δ)(1 + a)E ‖ei,t−1‖2 + (1− δ)H2η2(1 + 1/a)V3
≤ (1 + 1/a)(1− δ)H2η2V3
+∞∑
t′=0
[(1 + a)(1− δ)]t
′
≤ 1 + 1/a
1− (1 + a)(1− δ)
(1− δ)H2η2V3,
for any a > 0, such that (1 + a)(1 − δ1) ∈ (0, 1). The bound above is minimized when we
take a = 1√








Finally, we prove the convergence of the proposed algorithm in the asynchronous mode.
Theorem 7.4. (Error bound of ZenoPS in asynchronous model with compression) We
take Assumption 2.1 (smoothness), 2.2 (bounded variance), 2.4 (bounded gradients), and
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2.5 (global minimum). Additionally, we assume that the validation data is close to the train-
ing data ‖∇Fr(x) − ∇F (x)‖ ≤ r,∀x ∈ Rd where r ≥ 0 and Fr(x) = E[fr(x; z ∼ Dr)] (the
expectation is taken w.r.t. z). Furthermore, we assume that in any server step t, the ap-
proved update is based on the global model parameters in the server step t′, where t′ ≤ t−1
has bounded delay t− 1− t′ ≤ τ . Taking ε = cH2η2, we have the following error bound for
ZenoPS in the asynchronous mode:∑
t∈[T ] E‖∇F (xt−1)‖2
T
≤ F (x0)− F (x∗)
THαηρ
+




























Taking η = 1√
TH
, sr ∝ TH, we have∑
t∈[T ] E‖∇F (xt−1)‖2
T


































Proof. Using smoothness, we have
F (xt)− F (xt−1)












where xt = xt−1 + ut, vt is the validation vector. Taking the expectation on both sides, we
have
E[F (xt)− F (xt−1)]


























Using the results in the proof of Byzantine tolerance, we have



























































































































































































where t′ ≤ t− 1.















L[‖xt′,h−1 − xt′‖+ ‖xt′ − xt−1‖]




E[F (xt)− F (xt−1)]






























































≤ −Hαηρ‖∇F (xt−1)‖2 +
α
Hη



























To finish the upper bound, we have























≤ ηH[2(τ + 1)LHη
√
V3 + r].
On the other hand, we have
‖E[ut]‖
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E[F (xt)− F (xt−1)]
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By re-arranging the terms, telescoping and taking total expectation, we have∑
t∈[T ] E‖∇F (xt−1)‖2
T
≤ E[F (x0)− F (xT )]
THαηρ
+



















Then, similar to the synchronous mode, we add the additional compression error to get
the final result.
QED.
7.4.3 Local Differential Privacy
As an interesting observation, we consider the possibility of using the Byzantine approach
to enable a similar protocol as differential privacy. While there are many different kinds of
differential privacy (DP) [135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146], this
thesis uses the following limited definition for local differential privacy (LDP) when releasing
the individual updates from the workers to the servers:
Definition 7.2. (ξ-LDP [147]) Given the domain D of the datasets and a query function
query : D → Rd, a mechanism M with domain Rd is ξ-LDP if for any S ⊆ Range(M) and
two arbitrary datasets D1, D2 ∈ D,
Pr [M (query(D1)) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ξ) Pr [M (query(D2)) ∈ S] .
In the case of distributed SGD, the queries are the gradients or updates released by the
workers. Specifically, note here that the result does not refer to differential privacy of the full
training pipeline, but only to differential privacy of a single step with the following threat
model: we assume that the attackers are the curious servers, from which we want to protect
the workers and avoid the servers recovering the private updates from individual workers.
There are various mechanisms or protocols that achieves LDP [148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153,
154, 155]. Furthermore, some LDP mechanisms can also provide ξ-DP guarantees [147, 156]
for the full training process, at the expense of increased ξ for LDP.
Formally, we introduce the Byzantine mechanism as follows.




vi with probability 1− pbyz;noise ∼ Dnoise otherwise,
where vi is the correct vector. In other words, with probability pbyz, the worker sends the
value noise, which is randomly drawn from the distribution Dnoise instead of the correct
value vi, to the server.
Based on the definitions above, we present the theoretical guarantee of LDP for the Byzan-
tine mechanism. Denote pnoise(·) as the probability density function of the random variable
noise ∼ Dnoise. We show that the Byzantine mechanism is LDP in the following theorem.
Theorem 7.5. (LDP of Byzantine mechanism) Assume that the noise distribution Dnoise
has the support [a, b], and there exists p− = minz∈[a,b] pnoise(z) > 0, where pnoise(·) is the
PDF of the noise distribution Dnoise (e.g., uniform distribution with support [a, b]). Then,





Proof. Denote qv(z) as the probability density function of the output of the Byzantine mech-
anism, given the input v. For arbitrary output z ∈ Range(Mbyz), we have
qv(z) = 1{Mbyz(v) = z}[(1− pbyz)1{v = z}+ pbyzpnoise(z)] + 1{Mbyz(v) 6= z}pnoise(z).
Using 0 ≤ 1{v = z} ≤ 1, we have
qv(z)
≤ 1{Mbyz(v) = z}[(1− pbyz)(1− pnoise(z))] + pnoise(z)
≤ (1− pbyz)(1− pnoise(z)) + pnoise(z),
and
qv(z)
≥ 1{Mbyz(v) = z}pbyzpnoise(z) + 1{Mbyz(v) 6= z}pnoise(z)
≥ 1{Mbyz(v) = z}pbyzpnoise(z) + 1{Mbyz(v) 6= z}pbyzpnoise(z)
≥ pbyzpnoise(z).
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Thus, for any pair of inputs v, v′, we have
qv(z)
qv′(z)
≤ (1− pbyz)(1− pnoise(z)) + pnoise(z)
pbyzpnoise(z)
=















Thus, the larger pbyz makes the mechanism more differentially private, at the cost of
replacing more correct values with the random noise, and slow down the overall optimization
progress on the servers.
Note that such mechanism is different from the previous works that add small random
noises to the updates [157], or use multi-party computation (MPC) to aggregate the up-
dates [75, 158]
7.5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we empirically evaluate the proposed ZenoPS system.
7.5.1 Evaluation setup
We train ResNet-20 on CIFAR-10 [111] dataset. The mini-batch size is 32. In this chapter,
our experiments are conducted in real distributed environments with CPU workers. We use
η = 0.2 in the synchronous mode, and η = 0.1 in the asynchronous mode. In the epochs 100
and 150, the learning rate decays by 0.1 in the synchronous mode and 0.2 in the asynchronous
mode. We take constant α = 1 in the synchronous mode. In the asynchronous mode, we
take the initial value α = 0.4, which decays by 0.5 in the epochs 100 and 150.
The communication overhead is reduced by both message compression and infrequent
synchronization. We use random block-wise sparsification to compress the communication.
Whenever a worker sends an update of a block of parameters to the server, with the proba-
bility of 0.2, it ignores the communication and put the update into the local residual error.
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Furthermore, the number of local steps H is 8.
For the validators, we take b = 3 for both trimmed mean and Phocas, and γ = 0.6,
ρ = −0.001, ε = 0 for Zeno validation in the synchronous mode. In the asynchronous mode,
we take γ = 0 (with clipping), ρ = −0.02, ε = 0 for Zeno validation.
We randomly and evenly partition the training data into the number of workers plus one
parts, and assign the additional part the every validator.
We evaluate ZenoPS in both the synchronous mode and the asynchronous mode. In the
synchronous mode, we use Mean, Trimmed mean, Phocas [122], and Zeno (the score-based
validation defined in Definition 7.1) as the validators. In the asynchronous mode, we use
FedAsync (no validation), and Zeno as the validators.














































(b) Sign-flipping attack rescaled by 6























(c) Random attack rescaled to 1























(d) Random attack rescaled by 8
Figure 7.2: ZenoPS in synchronous mode with various attacks and validators. In each
experiment, we launch 1 server, 1 validator, and 16 workers. In each iteration, each worker
has the probability of 50% to be active.
In the experiments, we use the following two types of attacks:
• Sign-flipping attack: The worker multiplies the original updates by −ζ, i.e., flips the
sign and rescale the updates by ζ. We call this type of attacks as “Sign-flipping attack
rescaled by ζ”
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(b) Random attack rescaled to 1
Figure 7.3: ZenoPS in synchronous mode with multiple validators. In each experiment, we
launch 2 servers, 2 validators, and 16 workers. In each iteration, all the workers are active.










































(b) Sign-flipping attack rescaled by 2





















(c) Random attack rescaled to 1





















(d) Random attack rescaled by 8
Figure 7.4: ZenoPS in asynchronous mode with various attacks and validators. In each
experiment, we launch 1 server, 1 validator, and 8 workers. In each communication round,
each worker has the probability of 50% to drop the entire communication.
• Random attack: The worker use Gaussian random values with 0 mean to replace the
original values. If we use Gaussian random values with variance ζ, then we call this type of
attacks as “Random attack rescaled to ζ”. On the other hand, if we use Gaussian random
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(b) Random attack rescaled by 8
Figure 7.5: ZenoPS in asynchronous mode with multiple validators. In each experiment, we
launch 2 servers, 2 validators, and 8 workers.


















ρ =-0.100, approval rate: 0.684
ρ =-0.010, approval rate: 0.553
ρ =-0.001, approval rate: 0.528
ρ =0.000, approval rate: 0.344
ρ =0.001, approval rate: 0.341
ρ =0.010, approval rate: 0.318
ρ =0.100, approval rate: 0.164
validation only
Figure 7.6: Sensitivity to ρ. ρ varies, with fixed ε = 0, γ = 0.6. ZenoPS in synchronous
mode with multiple validators. In each experiment, we launch 2 servers, 2 validators, and
16 workers. Random attack rescaled to 1.
values, and rescale the Byzantine vector, so that the `2 norm of the Byzantine vector is ζ
times of the original one, this type of attack is called “Random attack rescaled by ζ”.
We simulate the Byzantine attacks by randomly replace the vectors sent from the workers
to the servers with probability 0.2.
7.5.2 Empirical results
The result of ZenoPS in the synchronous mode is shown in Figure 7.2. We can see that
when there are no Byzantine attacks, all the algorithms have similar performance. When
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there are Byzantine attacks, using Zeno validator, ZenoPS converges almost as well as using
averaging without any attack. However, trimmed mean has relatively bad results under
sign-flipping attacks, and both trimmed mean and Phocas fail under the random attacks
rescaled to 1. In some cases where the attacks are relatively weak, such as sign-flipping
attacks rescaled by 6 and random attacks rescaled by 8, Phocas also has good convergence,
which is an option cheaper than Zeno. However, in general, using Zeno as the validator
provides the best performance under all kinds of attacks.
Furthermore, we show that ZenoPS is capable of using multiple servers and validators.
Different servers are responsible for different blocks of the model parameters. The updates
sent to the servers will be evenly hashed to the validators, so that different validators are
assigned similar workload. Figure 7.3 shows that using multiple validators, ZenoPS has
similar performance compared to the case of using a single validator. The Zeno validator
has larger noise in the early stages, but converges well at the end.
The result of ZenoPS in the asynchronous mode is shown in Figure 7.4. When there
are no Byzantine attacks, using Zeno as the validator provides good convergence similar to
FedAsync. Adding Byzantine attacks makes FedAsync performs much worse. Using Zeno as
the validator, ZenoPS has the convergence as good as the cases where there are no attacks.
We also show the results where 2 servers and 2 validators are used in Figure 7.5.
In Figure 7.6, we test the sensitivity to the hyperparameter ρ, with fixed ε = 0. We vary ρ
in {−0.1,−0.01,−0.001, 0, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1}. In most cases, the Zeno validator is insensitive
to ρ and converges to the same value. The only exception is the case of ρ = 0.1, where the
threshold is too large and makes the convergence extremely slow. Although the convergence
analysis shows that larger ρ gives smaller error bounds, it will also decrease the number of
the approved updates. As shown in Figure 7.6, when ρ = 0.1, only 16% of the updates pass
the validation. By decreasing the threshold, the approval rate gets closer to the ideal value
80% (20% of the updates are Byzantine). We also show the result of training the model only
using the validation data, which is referred to as “validation only”. Note that in this case,
the training is not affected by the attacks. It is shown that if we only use the validation
data, the testing accuracy will be very bad. Thus, we draw to the conclusion that using Zeno
as the validator, the models are learning from the training data. However, if the threshold
ρ is too large, the approved updates will be extremely biased to the validation data, which
result in the performance close to the case of “validation only”.
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7.6 CONCLUSION
We proposed a prototype of distributed learning system that integrates all the new tech-
niques presented in the previous chapters. The proposed system provides communication
reduction, asynchronous training, and Byzantine tolerance. For future work, we plan to test
the system on more applications and datasets.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
There is an increasing interest in distributed machine learning also raises many new chal-
lenges, including accelerating the distributed training, and protecting the learning systems
from malicious attacks. In this dissertation, we have studied the communication reduction,
asynchronous federated optimization, Byzantine tolerance, and their combination.
For communication reduction, we have studied the previous works including message com-
pression with error feedback, and infrequent synchronization with local SGD. We have dis-
cussed the potential weakness of the previous works, and presented a technique called “error
reset”, which has shown promising empirical results along with provable convergence.
For asynchronous federated optimization, we have discussed the necessity of introducing a
more flexible synchronization mechanism into the federated learning scenario, and presented
an algorithm that enables asynchronous training to federated optimization with reduced
communication. We have shown the theoretical guarantees of convergence, and simulation
results for the asynchronous federated optimization algorithm.
For Byzantine tolerance, we have empirically and theoretically studied the potential weak-
ness and vulnerability of the previous approaches based on robust statistics, and presented a
framework of score-based approaches. The score-based framework uses a validation dataset
to verify the candidate updates sent from the workers. We have provided both theoretical
and empirical results, for the Byzantine tolerance in both synchronous and asynchronous
training.
Finally, we have proposed and implemented a distributed learning system, which provides
distributed SGD with communication reduction, asynchronous training mode, Byzantine
tolerance, and privacy preservation, by combining all the presented techniques mentioned
above. We have shown theoretical guarantees for the convergence, Byzantine tolerance, and
differential privacy of the proposed system. We have also evaluated the proposed system
empirically.
However, there are still a great number of challenges and yet-to-be-solved problems in
distributed machine learning. In the future work, we plan to study the following problems.
• Combining communication reduction and adaptive learning rates: As mentioned
in Chapter 3, some popular machine-learning applications typically use SGD variants with
adaptive learning rates to train the models, such as Adam and AdaGrad. However, it is
non-trivial to apply arbitrary compressors with error feedback or error reset to adaptive
learning rates. The main issue is the changing adaptive learning rates, which incurs incon-
sistent denominators for the residual errors of the compression. As a result, the theoretical
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analysis usually requires large batch sizes for convergence, and show no gain in adding
more nodes. There are some early exploration in combining infrequent synchronization
and adaptive learning rates, such as local AdaAlter [64], and FedAdam [65]. The former
lazily updates the adaptive variables, in order to keep the denominators consistent across
the workers. The later uses lookahead SGD [159] with Adam as the optimizer in the server
loops. However, compared to SGD with momentum, there are very few works on the SGD
with adaptive learning rates.
• Applications including but not limited to computer vision: Recently, there is
an increasing interest in the large-scale machine-learning applications in natural language
processing and recommendation systems. In these fields, the cutting-edge models usually
have large numbers of parameters, thus require large datasets and distributed training.
For example, BERT [160], a large bidirectional self-attention model involving 0.5B pa-
rameters, is trained on large Wikipedia corpus, and has reached state-of-the-art in many
benchmarks. GPT-3 [72] uses 175B parameters to achieve amazing results in natural lan-
guage generation. The deep learning recommendation model [161] has 540M parameters.
The language models and recommendation models are usually trained by SGD with adap-
tive learning rates such as Adam and AdaGrad, which raises new challenges in distributed
training as we mentioned above. Furthermore, both the language models and the rec-
ommendation models typically have embedding layers to encode the inputs, which result
in sparse updates as the gradients. Such sparsity also introduces new problems in both
memory consumption and communication overhead.
• Decentralized training: As mentioned in Chapter 3, decentralized optimization algo-
rithms have different characteristics compared to the centralized algorithms using param-
eter servers or AllReduce. Furthermore, decentralized approaches have the advantages
in fault tolerance and privacy preservation. However, the decentralized optimization al-
gorithms also requires more complicated system design and implementation, as well as
additional concerns in communication and theoretical guarantees of convergence. It will
be very interesting to extend the techniques introduced in this dissertation, including
communication reduction and Byzantine tolerance, to the decentralized learning systems.
• Model parallelism: Recently, the increasing sizes of machine-learning models makes
it more and more difficult to fit the model training in a single GPU device. To train
large models, we can partition the model onto multiple devices to reduce the memory
consumption on each device, which is an approach to distributed machine learning different
from data parallelism. For example, GPT-3 [72] typically uses model parallelism for
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training. The model partitioning involves both assigning each operator (layer), and slicing
each layer (weight tensor) itself. The time cost by training is highly influenced by the
partitioning strategies. It is also an interesting problem to combine model parallelism and
data parallelism.
• Distributed training with serverless computing: Serverless computing (e.g. AWS
Lambda, Google Cloud Functions, Azure Functions) is a programming model that attracts
increasingly attention recently. The unique characteristics of serverless computing, such
as statelessness, and the function-as-a-service APIs, raise some new problems and chal-
lenges in distributed systems. Serverless computing frameworks provide an economical
way to execute massive parallel tasks, but also suffer from certain systematic constraints.
Recently, [162] proposes the implementation of some popular linear algebra algorithms
with serverless computing. Implementing machine-learning algorithms on serverless com-
puting platforms is another yet-to-be-explored problem, which raises new challenges in
distributed machine learning. One of the requirements of the core system design is the
decentralized task execution and scheduling without a central scheduler. Potentially, we
can borrow some idea from the deep learning frameworks which use message passing be-
tween the actors for decentralized task execution, such as deep graph library [163] and
OneFlow [164].
• Byzantine tolerance via self defense on the workers: So far, in most of the previous
works as well as in this dissertation, we only discuss Byzantine tolerant mechanisms on
the central servers. However, the worker can also protect themselves via score-based
approaches, by naturally using the local training data as the validation datasets. We call
this idea as “self defense” on the workers. Along with the validation on the servers, self
defense can provide additional protection against the malicious attacks.
• Handling heterogeneity in federated optimization: In federated learning, one of the
most important problems yet-to-be-solved is the heterogeneity of the local training data.
Recently, there is some research using variance reduction to mitigate the convergence prob-
lems caused by heterogeneity [165]. Furthermore, some recent research [166, 167] provides
theoretical analysis which indicates bad performance of SGD with infrequent synchroniza-
tion when the local training data are highly heterogeneous. Thus, more research and new
algorithms are required in this field.
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